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Abstract 
  
In recent years there has been a renewal of interest in subsidising agricultural inputs and 
public health products to achieve various social, economic and public health objectives. 
Despite numerous justifications, implementers face a range of practical challenges that 
can significantly undermine the achievement of policy or programme goals. At the centre 
of these challenges lie the issues of targeting and how to maximise incremental increases 
in ownership and use of the products being subsidised, over the short and longer-term. 
This thesis adopts a cross-sector approach to the identification of its research questions 
and methodological approaches, drawing on both the agricultural and health literatures, 
exploring the potential for cross-sector learning. The empirical research is based around 
Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) and the Tanzania National Voucher 
Scheme (TNVS) for mosquito nets. Concentration curves and concentration indices, as 
used in the health literature, are adapted to estimate the socioeconomic-related inequality 
at key stages in the transmission of fertiliser subsidies to farmers in the FISP, 
complemented by a qualitative investigation of the key determinants of outcomes at these 
stages using semi-structured interviews. The impact of the TNVS on demand for 
unsubsidised mosquito net purchases is then explored using non-linear multivariate 
regression to estimate a household demand model, as applied in the agricultural input 
subsidy literature. 
Overall, the results highlight the numerous challenges associated with targeting 
agricultural and health subsidy programmes and subsequent implications. In particular, 
the analysis on the FISP urges caution in the use of community-based targeting in certain 
contexts, while that on the TNVS encourages greater investigation of what more can be 
done to ensure that subsidies lead to higher incremental increases in ownership and use 
of the products being subsidised. As a whole, the thesis demonstrates the utility of a cross-
sector approach to research. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Since the turn of the millennium there has been a substantial growth in the number of 
programmes and policies in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), which aim to 
reduce the price paid for specific commodities deemed important for agricultural 
production or public health. A key driver behind this trend has been the desire of 
governments and, particularly in the case of health, the international community, to 
substantially increase the level of use of such products in order to meet a wide range of 
policy objectives. In agriculture these include increasing national and household food 
production, improving household income and strengthening input supply markets. In 
health they include a range of public health objectives such as reducing malaria-related 
deaths, transmission of sexually transmitted infections and malnutrition as well as 
strengthening private sector supply of affordable health products. While the programmes 
and policies differ in various ways within and across the sectors, some have come to 
occupy a central position in the attempts by governments to tackle socioeconomic and 
health challenges, despite requiring significant financial, administrative and institutional 
resources. It is partly for these reasons, as well as the existence of a number of 
considerable challenges in achieving their full potential impacts, that these initiatives 
have stirred a number of burgeoning debates and criticisms. 
To date, research into these programmes and policies has taken a single sector focus, 
looking at particular issues either from an agricultural or health perspective. This reflects 
the general tendency within academia and beyond to compartmentalise our knowledge 
and understanding into sectoral ‘silos’ (Waage et al., 2010). While there is obviously a 
need to develop specialised knowledge within sectors, given that the subsidy initiatives 
mentioned above share a number of common features in their design, broad conceptual 
justification, and challenges in their implementation, there may be important lessons and 
insights to be learnt by looking at both literatures and particular issues together. This may 
be broadly defined as taking a cross-sector research approach. Some potential benefits of 
this approach are considered in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Benefits of a cross-sector approach to research 
 
Benefit Explanation 
Development of new 
research questions 
Entrenched research traditions, ideologies or policy priorities may prevent 
certain research questions from being considered or from being given the 
attention they deserve. Exposure to thinking in another sector may help to 
stimulate new ideas for future research. For example, where policy priorities 
for particular outcomes mean that certain issues are overlooked but may 
actually be critical to the effective functioning of the policy in question. 
Strengthening 
analysis or providing 
new policy insights 
through cross-
fertilisation of 
methods 
The way in which impacts and outcomes are studied and measured may differ 
across sectors, even within the same broad discipline. This may arise because 
of tendencies or norms among researchers in a given sector, meaning that 
useful methods go unused or underutilised. In this case, the adaptation and 
application of methods used in another sector to answer similar questions may 
help extend and deepen existing empirical analysis. 
Encouraging the 
questioning and 
development of 
theory 
Analysing how particular policies are thought about and conceptualised in 
another sector may help to promote a critical re-thinking of dominant 
paradigms or existing conceptual frameworks. Drawing on the evidence and 
experience from more than one sector may help provide the basis for a 
stronger theoretical framework with which to understand and research 
particular policies or approaches. 
Practical operational 
lessons to overcome 
challenges or 
improve cost-
effectiveness 
 
Where sufficient similarities exist between policies in two or more sectors, 
research around specific programmatic or policy approaches used in one 
sector could be considered for application in the other. These approaches may 
include the use of certain programme design features, technologies, or 
approaches to implementation. 
Source: Author. 
 
This thesis seeks to investigate what insights can be gained by comparing and contrasting 
the experiences of subsidy policies and programmes in agriculture and health and 
empirically investigating two issues of crucial importance within both sectors.  The first 
issue concerns targeting outcomes and the determinants of those outcomes. Who ends up 
receiving subsidies and how much is received can fundamentally determine the success 
of a subsidy initiative in terms of how far it raises incremental coverage or use of the 
product being subsidised. This in turn has implications for its impacts, including on final 
outcomes such as health or food security and the socioeconomic distribution of increases 
in household income, as well as for cost-effectiveness. The second issue is the extent to 
which subsidies on particular products crowd-in or crowd-out purchases of equivalent 
unsubsidised products. That is, how far they lead to further future unsubsidised purchases 
or displace unsubsidised purchases respectively. The level of crowding-out in turn 
determines the impact a subsidy initiative has on raising incremental coverage of the 
particular product being subsidised and therefore its cost-effectiveness. The issues of 
targeting and crowding-in /-out are inter-linked in that the level of crowding-out will 
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crucially depend on who receives the subsidy. For example, if the recipient were someone 
who would have purchased the product at full price anyway the subsidy leads them to 
forego that purchase, this would be a case of crowding-out. By contrast, if the recipient 
would not have purchased the product but in receiving a subsidised version is encouraged 
or becomes able to purchase future unsubsidised equivalent products, this represents a 
case of crowding-in. 
Both issues are discussed in more detail in the following chapter, where it is shown how 
both topics demonstrate particular scope for cross-sector learning. In the case of targeting, 
a review of the literature reveals how methods used in the health sector to investigate the 
socioeconomic-related inequality in targeting outcomes could be usefully applied to 
measuring targeting outcomes of agricultural subsidies. Regarding crowding-in and 
crowding-out, the particular concern shown for these issues in the agricultural sector 
inspires a closer look in the case of a health subsidy policy where there has so far been 
more limited empirical research. 
In summary, the overall research aim of the thesis is: 
To investigate the theoretical, methodological, empirical and policy insights that 
can be gained in relation to voucher subsidies in agriculture and health through 
drawing on the literature and experience of both sectors, specifically relating to 
the issues of socioeconomic inequality in targeting and the challenge of crowding-
out. 
The specific research objectives that guide the empirical research are presented following 
the literature review, at the end of chapter 3. 
 
1.2 Definitions 
Before giving an overview of the broad methodology adopted in this paper, it is important 
to define more specifically the two types of subsidy being investigated. Both share the 
basic feature of reducing the private cost of specific products, used either in agricultural 
production or to improve public health outcomes. The emphasis in this thesis is on these 
subsidies within a LMIC context. 
Typical definitions of the term ‘subsidy’ are often problematic. Many tend to focus on 
the subsidy being funded by a particular entity (usually a government) and often to the 
benefit of a particular beneficiary (usually an enterprise or industry) and for specific 
purposes. For example, one standard dictionary definition refers to a subsidy as ‘A sum 
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of money granted from public funds to help an industry or business keep the price of a 
commodity or service low’ (OUP, 2001). By contrast, other dictionary definitions can end 
up so broad as to lose the distinct meaning of a subsidy. For example, ‘A grant or 
contribution of money’ (OUP, 2001) could in theory include donations. Given these 
limitations, the term subsidy is defined here by the author as: 
a grant (or a loan if it is to be repaid at below the market price after interest) 
passed on to an individual, company, or organisation by any actor with the aim 
of reducing the private cost to the grantee for a good or service. 
In defining the specific types of subsidy being considered in this thesis, it is helpful to 
situate them within a broader range of subsidy policies. Table 2 presents a typology of 
explicit subsidies, which are those specifically aimed to reduce the price of a good or 
service. These stand in contrast to implicit subsidies, which reduce the cost of a good or 
service indirectly (e.g. through a favourable exchange rate) but where the subsidy may 
not necessarily be the primary or sole intention of the associated policy.1 In Table 2 the 
object of the subsidy is shown within each cell according to delivery mechanism 
(horizontal) and the broad category of subsidy (vertical). 
A few comments on Table 2 are helpful. Firstly, a distinction can be made between full 
and partial subsidies, with the former implying a 100% subsidy whereby the recipient is 
expected to pay nothing. A partial subsidy, by contrast, requires the beneficiary to pay 
some contribution towards the total price of the good or service being subsidised. 
Secondly, a distinction can be made relating to delivery mechanism between ‘indirect 
subsidies’ and ‘direct subsidies’. The former are those received in a form that is physically 
separate to the eventual goods or services being subsidised, generally through a voucher, 
while ‘direct subsidies’ are obtained by recipients directly at the point of sale. Where this 
is associated with the subsidy being available to all individuals or all within a particular 
subsector (e.g. smallholder farmers), the term universal subsidy may then be appropriate 
to describe it. It is also important to note that while Table 2 distinguishes between 
subsidies according to the delivery mechanism, it says nothing about who finances the 
subsidy, which may often be the government, though can also include a range of other 
actors. 
 
                                                 
1 This distinction is taken from (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1993). 
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Table 2: A typology of subsidy policies in agriculture and health 
 
Category of 
subsidy 
General 
infrastructure 
Specific 
infrastructure 
Knowledge 
services 
Public health 
products / 
agricultural inputs 
Other 
products 
Delivery 
mechanism 
     
Vouchers N/A N/A Sexual and 
reproductive 
healthcare, 
technical 
training 
Mosquito nets, 
fertiliser, seeds 
Food, fuel 
Social 
marketing 
N/A N/A Sexual and 
reproductive 
healthcare, 
handwashing 
Contraceptives, 
oral rehydration 
therapy, mosquito 
nets, malaria 
treatment, water 
purification 
Fortified 
food 
Direct partial 
price subsidy 
(government, 
NGO, private or 
mix) 
Water and 
sanitation 
Irrigation or 
energy 
User-fee 
based 
healthcare 
Malaria treatment, 
fertiliser, seeds, 
farming 
equipment 
Food, fuel 
Free distribution 
or investments 
(government, 
NGO or public-
private 
partnership) 
Investment in 
roads, energy 
Investment in 
irrigation or 
healthcare 
infrastructure 
Healthcare 
services, 
agricultural 
extension 
services 
Mosquito nets, 
seeds, farming 
tools, 
contraceptives 
Food 
Price controls N/A N/A N/A Government 
guaranteed price 
for staple crops, 
medicine 
Food, fuel 
Source: Author. N/A indicates that there are few examples of subsidies within the 
category by a particular delivery mechanism. 
 
From Table 2 it can be seen that subsidies on public health products and agricultural 
inputs are one category that concern the subsidisation of specific types of physical 
product. These products may however be quite different, for example, in their frequency 
of purchase, whether they are consumable or durable and in their value. This may have 
important implications for the design of a subsidy programme, the potential role of a 
subsidy in stimulating future purchases, the incentives for corruption and leakage and for 
how impacts are evaluated, among others. 
Turning now to the definitions of agricultural input subsidies (AISs) and public health 
product subsidies (PHPSs), in the literature AISs have been defined somewhat more 
broadly than in Table 2. For example, Tiba has suggested that input subsidies can be 
defined as ‘any kind of public investment which promotes input use…including provision 
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of agricultural research, extension services, irrigation pumps, etc.’ (Tiba, 2010: 1). Fan et 
al. (2007) consider input subsidies as covering direct support to input industries and 
across fertiliser, credit, irrigation and power. However, for the purpose of this thesis, a 
more narrow definition is used, defining AISs as: 
a grant (or loan, if repaid at below the market price after any interest) given to a 
farmer as a means of reducing the private cost of a specific input used in 
agricultural production. 
Inputs here refer to products used on the farm such as fertiliser, seeds, storage chemicals 
and durable goods such as farming tools and equipment. Unlike other definitions, the 
emphasis here is on goods and not services. The reason for this is to ensure the review 
and analysis remain focused, but also because goods and services are conceptually quite 
different, which can have implications for analysis and interpretation. 
Turning to the health sector, while there is a definition for public health products, there 
appear to be few attempts to define PHP subsidies. PHPs have been defined as 
‘commodities that are used for treatment of diseases of public health importance or for 
the promotion of health, which can be provided at the retail level without a “service” 
attached to them’ (Conteh and Hanson, 2003: 1148). Examples include condoms and 
insecticide-treated mosquito nets (ITNs). PHPSs are therefore defined here as: 
a grant (or loan, if repaid at below the market price after any interest) given to 
an individual as a means of reducing the private cost of a specific public health 
product. 
It should be noted that, in contrast to the existing definitions of general subsidies given 
above, neither definition for AISs or PHPSs are specific about who finances the subsidy, 
nor about the specific delivery mechanism. The reason for this is that, as will be seen in 
the subsequent section, in practice there have been a number of different combinations of 
programme design. As noted above, in both definitions the focus is on those goods that 
can in theory be sold without the need for a service to be attached, meaning that such 
goods may be sold through a variety of delivery mechanisms such as through public, 
private, or other non-governmental providers. However, while there may be no need for 
a service to be attached, unlike with certain products such as vaccinations, it will generally 
be to the benefit of subsidy programmes in both agriculture and health to provide 
guidance on the appropriate use of the products. This has implications for complementary 
policies, including support and regulation of the private sector if it is used to deliver 
subsidised goods. 
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1.3 Overview of methods and case selection 
In order to investigate targeting and crowding-out, two policy case studies were chosen, 
one in agriculture and one in health. Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) 
was selected for the former and the Tanzanian National Voucher Scheme (TNVS) for 
mosquito nets for the health example. Both cases were found to have specific gaps in their 
related empirical literature and also benefitted from the availability of sufficiently large 
datasets containing the required data in order to carry out the necessary analysis. 
Overall, the thesis adopts a mixed-methods approach. In the case of the FISP, 
concentration curves and concentration indices are estimated with repeated nationally 
representative household survey data to estimate the degree of socioeconomic-related 
inequality associated with a range of targeting outcomes over the lifetime of the 
programme. Fieldwork was then carried out in Malawi to collect semi-structured 
interviews from a range of stakeholders involved in the FISP in order to explain the 
findings from the quantitative analysis. 
The analysis on the TNVS is entirely quantitative, with the exception of two in-depth 
interviews carried out with key stakeholders involved at a high operational level in 
Tanzania to help inform the analysis. The quantitative analysis involved the econometric 
estimation of a household demand model for unsubsidised mosquito nets, using a range 
of non-linear multivariate regression techniques. The inclusion of subsidised net 
purchases as the key explanatory variable allows for estimates of the effect that past 
purchases of partially subsidised mosquito nets had on future unsubsidised net purchases. 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The next chapter reviews the changing theory, thinking and practice of AISs and PHPSs 
and synthesises some key similarities and differences between the sectors. Chapter 3 then 
reviews the specific literature on the issues of targeting and crowding-in and crowding-
out. Chapters 4 to 6 are three paper-style empirical chapters, which include their own 
literature review, methods and discussion. Chapter 7 draws together the findings from 
these three empirical chapters and reflects on the overall contribution of the thesis. 
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2 The shifting theory, thinking and practice of agricultural input 
subsidies and public health product subsidies 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins to bridge the gap between the literatures on AISs and PHPSs by 
reviewing the shifting theory, thinking and practice of both types of subsidy and 
synthesising key similarities and differences between the sectors. The review draws 
particularly on literature gathered through a systematic search of CAB Abstracts and 
Medline - two major academic databases of relevance to the agricultural and health 
literatures respectively. Search strings were carefully constructed and tested in order to 
cover the range of relevant literature.2 Articles then went through two stages of screening 
in order to identify studies that focused in particular on the impacts of AISs or PHPSs in 
LMICs. The search helped cover the wide breadth of historical literature that exists across 
both sectors, including the history of theory and practice, the various design and 
implementation issues, key debates, as well as the strength of evidence around various 
impacts, which ultimately assisted in the identification of the topics that form the basis of 
the empirical analysis in the thesis. Grey literature was also captured through additional 
online searches and recommendations from supervisors Professor Andrew Dorward and 
Dr Catherine Goodman. 
The first two sections of this chapter put AISs and PHPSs into their historical context, 
exploring trends in thinking and practice within each sector up to the present day. A 
number of the current debates, issues and questions from the field as a whole are 
reviewed. The third section then provides a brief synthesis of the two literatures by pulling 
out some of the key similarities and differences relating to impacts and challenges in 
particular. 
First of all, however, it is useful to highlight some key differences between the agriculture 
and health sectors in LMICs in order to provide a basis for understanding the differences 
between AISs and PHPSs. Table 3 focuses on three key issues, from which a number of 
important distinctions arise. First, while the health sector is concerned primarily with 
maintaining the health of a population, the agricultural sector both provides a source of 
income (at the household level and nationally) and also helps ensure that people have 
access to a sufficient and diverse diet (either through the market or own production), 
which in turn is central to leading a healthy life. Second, whereas in health there is a far 
                                                 
2 Search strings can be found in Appendix 1. 
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greater acceptance of the primary and extensive role played by the government (especially 
for protecting the poorest and most vulnerable), in agriculture the appropriate role of the 
state has for some time largely been seen as more circumscribed towards making certain 
basic investments and providing a more limited range of services. However, these views 
are changing slightly in both sectors. For example, in agriculture there has been a renewal 
in recent years of the idea that the government may have a temporary role to play in 
facilitating access to agricultural inputs where the market would otherwise under-provide 
them. In health, there is now a greater acceptance of the role the private sector can and 
should play in helping to increase access to and coverage of certain PHPs. These key 
differences are useful to bear in mind while considering the different experiences of AISs 
and PHPSs, not least in terms of the greater acceptance within the health sector of 
subsidising certain products. 
 
Table 3: Key differences between the agriculture and health sectors in LMICs 
 
 Agriculture Health 
Basic 
functions / 
objectives 
of the sector 
Source of income and livelihood for 
individuals, households and the wider 
economy. 
 
Source of food, nutrition, sustenance 
and therefore basic health of 
individuals and households. 
Source of services and products to 
meet the health needs of individuals 
and to maintain public health. 
Dominant 
view 
regarding 
appropriate 
role of 
government 
Government responsible for 
investments in basic infrastructure 
(public goods) that would likely be 
under-provided if left to the market (e.g. 
roads, research and extension 
services). 
 
More recently, some renewal of the 
idea that market failures may justify 
temporary subsidised government 
provision of specific inputs necessary 
for increasing agricultural production 
(e.g. fertiliser and improved seeds) if 
targeted to those who would not 
otherwise use such inputs. 
Government responsible for provision 
of all basic health services, 
particularly ensuring that the poorest 
and most remote are not left without 
access. 
 
Key justification for the special 
government role in access to services 
and goods is due to extensive market 
failures in health care provision. 
Dominant 
view 
regarding 
appropriate 
role of 
private 
sector 
Countries should be moving towards a 
situation where the private sector is 
responsible for providing access to 
inputs on a commercial basis. 
An appropriately regulated formal 
private sector can help support and 
complement the public sector in 
improving and maintaining public 
health, particularly through the sale of 
public health products. 
Sources: Agriculture: (Dorward et al., 2004, Morris et al., 2007, World Bank, 2007). 
Health: (Hanson, 2004, Hsiao and Heller, 2007, Mills et al., 2002, Patouillard et al., 2007, 
Söderlund et al., 2003). 
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2.2 Agricultural input subsidies: an historical overview 
2.2.1 Early input subsidies in theory and practice 
AISs were a prominent feature in the agricultural policy of many LMICs in the post-
independence period, which is somewhat unsurprising when one considers what 
Kherallah et al. (2002) refer to as the ‘ideological footprint’ left by departing colonial 
powers, who themselves often intervened fairly extensively within colonial economies. 
AISs generally took the form of large-scale, direct, universal subsidies available either to 
all farmers or those of a particular type, through government control over prices, often 
using public distribution channels (Islam, 1980, Niaz, 1984, Wallace, 1986). Loans were 
also often extended from international donors, such as the United States, World Bank and 
Asian Development Bank (Gaud, 1968, Wallace, 1986). While fertiliser was often the 
main focus, governments also subsidised other inputs, such as high-yielding seeds, 
pesticides and farm machinery (Asuming-Brempong, 1994, Repetto, 1985). Particularly 
in parts of Asia and Latin America, input subsidies were also often part of a wider package 
of governmental support, which included investment in rural infrastructure, irrigation, 
research and extension, credit and high-yielding seeds (Chaturvedi et al., 1982, Fan et al., 
2007, Gangadharan and Kumbhare, 1982, Johnson et al., 2003). It was this combination 
of policies that has been credited with underpinning the substantial improvements in 
yields and agricultural productivity from the late 1960s, particularly in Asia, referred to 
as the Green Revolution (Gaud, 1968). 
The general aims of subsidy programmes varied, though they were often linked to 
increasing self-sufficiency in staple crops through raising yields and, particularly in the 
case of many Asian economies, encouraging the production of new high-yielding 
varieties, which required fertiliser and irrigation (Barker and Hayami, 1976, Islam, 1980). 
Other policy aims included compensation of farmers due to loss of output and income 
due to export taxes and price controls (Quibria, 1987), and supporting rural incomes for 
reasons of equity and industrial policy (Committee on Controls and Subsidies, 1979). 
The level of subsidy provided to farmers varied quite widely, though according to the 
1986 World Development Report, fertiliser subsidies in the early 1980s were ‘rarely 
below 30 percent of delivered cost and were in some cases 80 to 90 percent (in Nigeria, 
for example). Rates of 50 to 70 percent [were] common’ (World Bank, 1986: 95). The 
volume of inputs permitted to be subsidised and the cost to government often ended up 
being substantial. Of seven Asian countries covered by a study in the late 1980s, the 
fertiliser subsidy as a percentage of current government expenditure ranged from 0.32 in 
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Afghanistan to 6.56 in Bangladesh in 1981/82, and from 2.51 in Bangladesh to 5.99 in 
Nepal in 1984/85 (Quibria, 1987). The importance attached to these subsidies by farmers 
generally led to considerable political pressure for subsidy rates to increase or at least for 
subsidies to not be removed in the face of increasing fertiliser prices, therefore 
representing a significant challenge for governments in avoiding growing inefficiencies 
(Gulati and Narayanan, 2003). 
Within the research and policy community, at least until the mid-1980s a number of 
researchers acknowledged that, under certain circumstances, AISs could be justified by 
bringing about a positive net benefit to social welfare (Ahmed, 1978, Barker and Hayami, 
1976, Timmer, 1985). The main theoretical justification arose from the recognition that, 
while subsidies may lead to welfare losses in economies that are in competitive 
equilibrium, agricultural economies were often not in equilibrium due to sub-optimal 
input use (Quibria, 1987, Timmer, 1985). At the time this was thought to arise because 
farmers were unclear about the optimal level of fertiliser use, lacked knowledge about the 
benefits of inputs, were risk averse and / or suffered from credit constraints (Barker and 
Hayami, 1976, Timmer, 1985, Tower and Christiansen, 1988). 
Theoretically, a subsidy on fertiliser was seen as justified providing there was a large gap 
between the actual and optimum levels of input use, where the optimal level is where the 
Marginal Value of Production (MVP) is equal to the Marginal Factor Cost (MFC) (Barker 
and Hayami, 1976).3 That is, where the marginal cost (MC) of applying an extra unit of 
input equals the marginal benefit gained from the resulting extra unit of output. For 
Timmer, a fertiliser subsidy was worth using if the Marginal Revenue (MR) from the 
change in fertiliser use induced by a subsidy was greater than its full MC, including social 
costs ‘plus the share of incremental output incurred as costs of harvesting, marketing and 
processing’ (Timmer, 1985: 58). 
It should be noted, however, that in spite of the generally supportive policy environment, 
from at least the late 1970s AISs were also considered by some economists as ‘second-
best’ options, with other investments such as improvements in physical and institutional 
infrastructure like irrigation, research extension systems, education or credit markets seen 
as often more effective at achieving self-sufficiency in the long-run, though less attractive 
for politicians and policy makers given large investments and long gestation periods 
(Barker and Hayami, 1976, Tower and Christiansen, 1988, World Bank, 1986). The idea 
                                                 
3 While the term Marginal Cost is used by Barker and Hayami, the term MFC, as used by Dorward, is 
considered a more appropriate definition in this context (Dorward, 2009). 
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of input subsidies representing a second best option has been referred to as the Barker-
Hayami thesis (Sambrani, 1982).4  
Looking in more detail at the theoretical operation of AISs, and continuing with the 
example of fertiliser subsidies, these were seen to work by a lower price of fertiliser 
lowering the MC curve facing farmers. Faced with lower MCs, standard neoclassical 
theory suggests this will shift the equilibrium point at which MC = MR and thereby 
encourage increased use of inputs, according to the price elasticity of demand for fertiliser 
held by farmers. Over time, the increased use of inputs should lead to a rightward shift in 
the supply curve of the crop to which the fertiliser is applied according to the production 
elasticity of fertiliser and specific agro-ecological conditions, in turn helping to raise net 
social welfare (Barker and Hayami, 1976, Tower and Christiansen, 1988). 
Drawing on Barker and Hayami (1976), these effects can be seen by looking first at the 
demand for fertiliser in the presence of a subsidy in Figure 1, where DD and SS are the 
domestic demand and supply curves for fertiliser respectively and Sw is the world supply, 
which is assumed perfectly elastic. X0 is the quantity demanded at the unsubsidised world 
price (Pfw), which shifts to Xs following the imposition of a fertiliser subsidy at price Pfs. 
The area ABPfsPfw then represents the core government cost of the fertiliser subsidy 
(excluding any administrative or other costs).  
To understand the theoretical benefits of such a subsidy, Figure 2 represents the domestic 
supply and demand of a particular staple crop in the presence of a fertiliser subsidy. Pe is 
the domestic equilibrium price of the crop prior to any subsidies or imports and Pd=Pw is 
the world price of the crop, which is assumed equal to a target price by the government 
in order to maintain consumption at the level Qc (Pw’ and Pw” simply represent 
fluctuations to a higher and lower world price respectively). DD represents the total 
demand for the crop. SS represents the initial domestic supply, which we assume is 
restricted due to sub-optimal use of fertiliser.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Tower and Christiaensen (1988) did note that AISs may be preferable if the resource costs of longer term 
investments exceed the inefficiencies associated with AISs. 
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Figure 1: Demand for fertiliser in the presence of a subsidy 
Source: Adapted from Barker and Hayami (1976) 
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Figure 2: Impacts of a fertiliser subsidy on staple crop production 
Source: Adapted from Barker and Hayami (1976) 
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If, as in Figure 2, the prevailing world price (Pw) is below the domestic equilibrium price 
(Pe) then the country may be expected to import the quantity AB in order to meet domestic 
food requirements / demand at this lower price. However, depending on the world price 
such a policy may be an expensive one for maintaining food security. One alternative to 
maintain consumption at Qc is to subsidise the price of fertiliser sufficiently to shift 
domestic production out to S’S’. The rightward shift in the supply of the staple crop was 
seen to depend crucially upon: the price elasticity of demand for the subsidised input; the 
MVP/MC ratio; and the yield response from increased use of the input (Barker and 
Hayami, 1976, Timmer, 1985). 
The following potential welfare impacts then arise. Firstly, depending on the relative cost 
of fertiliser compared to the imported staple crop, the government may benefit (lose) from 
an increase (decrease) in revenue arising from a reduction in staple imports. For example, 
if the world price of the crop was relatively high (Pw” in Figure 2) then, providing the 
cost of subsidising the amount of fertiliser required to meet self-sufficiency was 
sufficiently low, the government might increase its revenue by forgoing the cost of the 
expensive staple imports needed to meet domestic demand, represented by ABRT. 
Secondly, there may be net savings in foreign exchange arising from the net reduction in 
expenditure on the imported staple (ABQ0Qc in Figure 2) minus any increase in foreign 
exchange required for the additional fertiliser imports due to the subsidy (ACX0Xs in 
Figure 1). 
Thirdly, domestic producers of the staple crop were seen to gain from a fertiliser subsidy 
both through the lower cost of fertiliser (represented by ABPfsPfw in Figure 1) as well as 
the increased output value (ABQ0Qc from Figure 2) minus the cost of purchasing the 
additional fertiliser (BDX0Xs in Figure 1) and other incremental production costs.  
In this particular model, consumer welfare was not seen to change at all as the baseline 
scenario involved the same level of consumption at the same price, maintained by 
importing the amount AB (Figure 2). However, where some form of export controls are 
in place or high transport costs drive a wedge between import and export prices, a 
sufficient supply response to a fertiliser subsidy would likely lead to the consumer price 
of the staple crop decreasing, which could be a source of a variety of considerable indirect 
welfare effects, with an obvious initial cost to net producers (Dorward, 2009). 
In theory, AISs were generally seen to provide a positive economic surplus to producers 
at the expense of a net welfare loss to the government, with consumers assumed to 
experience a more negligible effect compared to producers. However, a number of other 
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possible wider impacts were also noted in the literature, particularly within partial and 
general equilibrium frameworks. These are drawn together in Figure 3. 
 
2.2.2 Changes in thinking and practice during structural adjustment 
Increasingly from the mid-1980s there was growing concern and criticism relating to the 
use of AISs, accompanied by a considerable scaling down in their use particularly in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), primarily through conditions attached to structural adjustment 
loans (SALs) that were extended to increasingly indebted countries.5 A number of reasons 
seem to explain this shift. Firstly, within the research and policy community there was 
growing criticism relating to the justifications for subsidies and the awareness that 
subsidies had often outlived their short-term role, becoming an inefficient drain on 
government resources, with negative impacts such as encouraging overuse of inputs and 
displacing government funds for necessary physical and institutional infrastructure that 
was seen to yield higher returns and an improved distribution of income (Gulati and 
Narayanan, 2003, Martinez, 1989, Quizon, 1985, World Bank, 1986). Some more 
supportive views did still exist, such as that by Quibria (1987) who recognised that 
‘…there is no unique answer regarding the desirability of subsidies for all countries at all 
stages of economic development’, though views such as these became increasingly 
marginalised. By 1990, the mainstream critique had become more hardline. In one 
particularly critical report by the World Bank, input subsidies were considered to be 
market distorting, inefficient, an increasing strain on government finances, and ultimately 
non-beneficial to the smallholder sector (Knudsen and Nash, 1990). A further argument 
put forward was that fertiliser subsidies did nothing to address the supply side constraints, 
which were increasingly seen to be the major problem holding back low fertiliser use 
(Donovan, 1996). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 In some cases the use of input subsidies did continue despite considerable external pressure (e.g. India, 
Indonesia and Nigeria). 
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Figure 3: Summary of the main impacts of fertiliser subsidies in the early literature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Author’s conception adapted from (Barker and Hayami, 1976, Quizon, 1985, 
Tower and Christiansen, 1988). 
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Secondly, specific criticism of AISs appears to have come at a time during which there 
was a fundamental shift within mainstream economics, away from the dominance of 
earlier Keynesian thinking towards a more free market approach based on microeconomic 
foundations. This was epitomised by the rise of rational expectations and new classical 
macroeconomics from the 1970s. These shifts represented a move towards emphasising 
the perfect operation of markets based on optimisation by rational agents and full market 
clearing (Snowdon and Vane, 1997). With this shift came growing scepticism about the 
role of government intervention within the economy. 
Thirdly, the mid-1980s also saw a major shift in policies among key international donors 
such as the World Bank, away from earlier support for government intervention towards 
‘pricist and state minimalist policies’ (Lipton, 1987), which taken together were 
subsequently coined the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1989). In this view, and 
mirroring the dominant economic thinking of the time, considerable emphasis was placed 
on addressing supply-side constraints, moving away from an earlier emphasis within 
economics on the importance of the demand-side (Keynes, 2007, Rosenstein-Rodan, 
1943). 
Finally, the continued economic fragility of many newly independent countries led to a 
growing indebtedness and dependence on international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank and IMF, which needed to contain their own fiscal outlays and attached a 
range of conditions to their SALs. The 1980s and 1990s therefore saw the scaling-down 
and wholesale removal of AISs in many LMICs as part of the conditions attached to SALs 
(Kherallah et al., 2002). One review in 1996 found that 16 out of 29 African countries 
had reduced or eliminated their fertiliser subsidy programmes (Donovan, 1996). 
 
2.2.3 Recent changes in thinking and practice 
By the late 1990s it had become increasingly apparent that the removal of input subsidies 
had not generally been replaced by flourishing private sector input industries selling 
affordable inputs, hence the tendency towards lower fertiliser use (Osorio et al., 2011, 
Quizon, 1985). One exception often referred to is Kenya, which has seen an increase in 
fertiliser use in recent decades, though it is recognised to contrast with the general 
experience within SSA and therefore of many LMICs (Ariga and Jayne, 2009). As SALs 
often involved removal of other policies that were also important for farmers in accessing 
inputs, such as credit schemes, it is unsurprising that the removal of input subsidies was 
associated with a significant decrease in the affordability of fertiliser or profitability of 
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staple production, leading to declining returns to farmers, shifting production patterns and 
various negative externalities (Asuming-Brempong, 1994, Harrigan, 2008, Holden, 
1996). While some are more sceptical about associating the reduction or removal of 
subsidies with changes in fertiliser use (Donovan, 1996), across many LMICs, 
particularly in SSA, countries were clearly suffering from agricultural decline and 
widespread food insecurity (Reardon et al., 1997, Yanggen et al., 1998).  In Africa, yields 
of maize – a key staple crop within the continent – have remained fairly stagnant in the 
past few decades in comparison with other regions containing LMICs (Figure 4). While 
there are various reasons for this poor performance, one of the key issues is the stagnation 
in levels of fertiliser use. Figure 5 demonstrates this, plotting the consumption of 
nitrogenous fertiliser in Africa against that in Latin America and southern Asia. 
 
Figure 4: Stagnating maize yields in Africa (1990 to 2013) 
 
 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
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Figure 5: Stagnating consumption of nitrogenous fertiliser in Africa (1990 to 2012) 
 
 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
 
Aside from the practical realities of persistently low fertiliser use and low staple 
production, there has also been a shift away from the dominance of the earlier economic 
thinking that underpinned the Washington Consensus policies, with a move towards an 
alternative position from the late 1990s described as the post Washington consensus. This 
new paradigm emphasised, among other things, the importance of state action to invest 
in human capital, with a greater focus on addressing poverty and on targeted social safety 
nets (Stiglitz, 1998). New Institutional Economics was also gaining traction, highlighting 
the crucial importance of the state and institutions in achieving capitalist development 
and the realities of widespread market failure and high transaction costs in LMICs 
(Dorward et al., 2004, Dorward et al., 1998, North, 1990). 
Within policy circles it was becoming apparent that while privatisation and liberalisation 
of fertiliser markets may have been important, it was far from sufficient for breaking the 
high-price-low-demand cycle, which would require a focus on the fundamental problems 
of high transaction costs, risks and widespread poverty (Yanggen et al., 1998). The 
solution, according to some, was to encourage a strong increase in demand for fertiliser 
at the same time as improving market efficiency (Yanggen et al., 1998).  
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Over recent years there has been a growing political consensus, again within SSA in 
particular, of the need to dramatically increase fertiliser use, including through the use of 
targeted subsidies as demonstrated in the Abuja Declaration (African Union, 2006). It 
was against this backdrop along with continued widespread poverty and looming food 
crises, and more recently the 2007/08 global spike in food prices, that a number of new 
government input subsidy initiatives have therefore emerged since the end of the 1990s, 
particularly in SSA. One of the early pioneers was Malawi with its Starter Pack 
programme in 1998, which aimed to distribute enough free fertiliser and seed for all 
smallholder farmers to be able to cultivate 0.1 hectares of staple crops (Levy, 2005). By 
2009, Dorward identified 10 AISPs in SSA alone, with many more reported there and in 
other regions by the International Fertiliser Development Center (Dorward, 2009).6 
Further programmes were reported a few years later (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013a, Jayne 
and Rashid, 2013). 
In contrast to earlier AISs, most of the new programmes now take somewhat different 
approaches. This includes experimenting with vouchers to better target and deliver 
subsidies and greater involvement of the private sector in the distribution and sale of 
subsidised inputs (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013a). There have also been some universal 
subsidy programmes, though there is somewhat tighter rationing of inputs compared to 
earlier AIS programmes (Jayne and Rashid, 2013). However, many of the programmes 
continue to represent sizeable proportions of the public agricultural budgets, which is one 
of the reasons why they have come under such considerable scrutiny (Jayne and Rashid, 
2013). For example, the cost of Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy Programme averaged just 
over 7% of the national budget between 2006/07 and 2011/12, excluding 2008/09 when 
a spike in the price of fertiliser led to it representing 16% (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013a). 
Programmes have varied quite widely in terms of their scale, with some more localised 
or pilot projects and others far bigger national programmes. Levels of subsidy per 
beneficiary also vary widely, with some offering a rationed package of inputs that are 
fully subsidised and others subsidising from 50% or more of the full cost of inputs 
(Chirwa and Dorward, 2013a, Dorward, 2009: 35). 
It was only really after a number of countries began to implement AISPs that there was a 
major mainstream re-think in the theory behind AISs with the emergence of the ‘market 
smart’ paradigm (Morris et al., 2007). While remaining sceptical of the use of subsidies 
on economic grounds, this perspective acknowledges that temporary targeted subsidies 
                                                 
6 Three of those in SSA were part of the evolving policy in Malawi beginning with the Starter Pack. 
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on fertiliser, when used as part of a broader package of policies, can be justified on a 
number of grounds. They may play a role in overcoming specific market failures such as 
absent financial or insurance markets (Donovan, 2004, IFDC, 2003), they could help to 
kick-start input supply industries through stimulating demand and helping to achieve 
economies of scale (Morris et al., 2007), or even correct negative environmental 
externalities associated with soil fertility depletion (Donovan, 2004, Gladwin et al., 
2002). Morris et al. (2007) therefore argue that fertiliser subsidies may support longer-
term agricultural productivity growth provided they adhere to a number of principles. 
These are set out in full in Appendix 2. According to the authors: 
‘Market-smart subsidies are temporary interventions that work singly or in 
combination to lower the price and/or improve the availability of fertilizer at the 
farm level in ways that encourage efficient use of fertilizer while at the same time 
promoting private investment in fertilizer markets. The main differences between 
traditional fertilizer subsidies and market-smart fertilizer subsidies are that 
market-smart fertilizer subsidies are temporary, they do not distort the relative 
price of fertilizer relative to other inputs so as to encourage excessive and 
economically inefficient use of fertilizer, and they are designed to shift incentives 
faced by buyers and sellers in ways that are consistent with the development of 
sustainable private markets for fertilizer.’ 
(Morris et al., 2007: 103) 
As can be seen from this quote, in contrast to fears within the earlier mainstream view of 
subsidies undermining input markets, a key argument behind the market smart paradigm 
is that AISs may actually be an important policy for helping to stimulate the very demand 
needed in order to establish private input supply markets. This represents a notable u-turn 
from the earlier emphasis within the mainstream critique on the importance of focusing 
on supply-side measures. 
A key part of the market smart approach is ensuring effective targeting of subsidies, with 
vouchers considered to be an important design tool in this regard. A number of theoretical 
benefits and disadvantages of vouchers have been put forward (Minot and Benson, 2009, 
Morris et al., 2007: 107-108). Potential benefits include:  
x Being able to build demand for inputs and accelerate input market development, 
providing those targeted do not already use the inputs;  
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x Facilitating graduation away from subsidies, such as by reducing the value of 
vouchers over time; and 
x Facilitating targeting of specific farmers. 
Potential weaknesses or disadvantages include:  
x High administrative costs in design and implementation, especially given the need 
for measures to control corruption and rent-seeking; 
x Danger of leakage and corruption if vouchers can be resold, which will likely 
undermine programme objectives; and 
x The need for recipients to have access to an input supplier. 
Although the mainstream position now acknowledges some role for fertiliser subsidies 
under specific conditions, it also puts forward a large number of arguments against using 
subsidies, with Morris et al. (2007), referring to no less than 10 (see Figure 6). However, 
closer inspection of these suggests that most arguments are not arguments against 
subsidies per se, but rather challenges which must be recognised and addressed through 
careful programme design and implementation. 
 
 
Figure 6: Arguments against AISs according to the market smart perspective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Morris et al., 2007). 
 
 
‘Arguments against fertiliser subsidies’ 
x High fiscal cost which makes them fiscally unsustainable 
x Crowding out of private sector 
x Rent seeking 
x Regressive distribution of benefits 
x High administrative costs 
x Late delivery 
x Inefficiency at the farm level 
x Leakages to neighbouring countries 
x Creation of vested political interests 
x Lack of complementary measures 
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A further perspective that considers AISs in a more positive light is the position of Jeffrey 
Sachs and some others, which, rather than emphasising the role of AISs in supporting the 
development of the private sector, focuses on how large-scale AISs can be a means of 
helping smallholder farmers overcome ‘poverty traps’ (Morris et al., 2007: 8). With the 
emphasis on poverty reduction, this perspective also has a somewhat different view on 
targeting, with it being suggested that AISs should be targeted at highly food insecure 
farmers (UN Millennium Project, 2005). However, as with the market smart approach, it 
is also aware of the utility of using some form of vouchers for targeting and of seeing 
subsidies as a relatively short-term or temporary policy. 
A further view, sharing some similarities with both the market smart perspective and the 
poverty trap perspective is that taken by Dorward (2009). While recognising the 
importance of a number of market smart principles, such as targeting those who would 
otherwise not have purchased inputs, Dorward puts forward alternative justifications for 
AISs; being able to address profitability and affordability / cash constraints. A further key 
difference in this view is the recognition of the much wider range of economic benefits 
that may arise from input subsidies, depending on how they are implemented, including: 
x A long term ‘thickening’ of supply chains and rural markets;   
x Lower staple food prices and higher wages;   
x Increased real incomes for poor non-recipients as a result of food price and wage 
changes; and 
x Longer term structural changes in livelihoods and the rural and national economy 
with expanded domestic demand for higher value livestock and horticultural 
products and for non-farm goods and services together with expanded supply 
capacity, due to release of land and labour as a result of increased staple crop 
productivity (Dorward, 2009). 
The conceptual framework in Figure 7 highlights these potential impacts along with a 
range of mediating contextual factors. 
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Figure 7: Conceptual framework of the impacts of AISs 
Source: (SOAS et al., 2008) 
 
Acknowledgement of potential wider benefits does not mean that Dorward believes these 
benefits are always obtained or that major problems do not exist. Rather, the view is 
simply less dismissive of the potential for AISs to work and to play a central part in the 
process of agricultural and economic transformation in certain LMICs, if implemented 
appropriately. 
In terms of the evidence regarding the impacts of recent AISs, there is a wide and growing 
literature covering a whole manner of effects, which cannot all be covered here. However, 
a summary of some of the key contemporary issues, debates and challenges along with 
relevant evidence is provided in Appendix 3. 
In brief, while the pendulum has somewhat swung back in favour of AISs being a 
legitimate policy tool, there remain considerable debates over when they might be 
justified, how they should be implemented and their actual impacts. This is confounded 
by a lack of data and monitoring and evaluation in many programmes (Dorward, 2009: 
32). 
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2.3 Public health product subsidies: an historical overview 
2.3.1 Early practice and thinking behind public health product subsidies 
As with AISs, the use of PHPSs is not a recent phenomenon. Among the earliest examples 
found in the literature search were those associated with social marketing programmes 
for contraceptives from the 1960s onwards (Black and Harvey, 1976, Boone et al., 1985: 
31, Chandy et al., 1965). The term social marketing is attributed to Kotler and Zaltman, 
who have described it as ‘the design, implementation, and control of programs calculated 
to influence the acceptability of social ideas and involving considerations of product 
planning, pricing, communication, distribution, and marketing research’ (Kotler and 
Zaltman, 1971: 5). In other words, it involves the use of marketing skills and subsidisation 
of PHPs in order to make them attractive for the purpose of achieving social change. The 
aims of early social marketing programmes were generally to popularise the use of 
modern PHPs deemed to be of importance to public health, and to provide a reliable 
source of affordable supply (Boone et al., 1985: 30). 
In the case of the early contraceptive social marketing programmes, PHPs were generally 
made available at prices that were ‘only a fraction of those charged for products of similar 
quality in the private commercial sector’ (Boone et al., 1985: 30-31). For example, the 
Nirodh Marketing Programme in India, which eventually operated at a national scale, 
involved the government being responsible for covering the costs of the marketing 
campaign and condoms, which were subsequently distributed through the private sector, 
allowing retailers to sell them at 80% below market value (Gupta, 1970). 
Given the emphasis on the use of commercial channels, many programmes involved the 
private sector and/or non-profit organisations - Population Services International - being 
a key example - though also with a role for public institutions such as ministries of health. 
As other PHPs were deemed important from a public health perspective they too were 
distributed using social marketing methods. For example, by the end of the 1970s Oral 
Rehydration Therapy (ORT) was being recommended as a key healthcare intervention, 
leading to a number of related subsidy initiatives (Fox, 1988, Kenya et al., 1990: 979).  
In general, many programmes appear to have been fairly large-scale, though accessibility 
would have depended crucially upon the distribution networks established. There also 
does not appear to have been much targeting or rationing, other than through the decisions 
on where products were made available. 
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While theoretical economic foundations of PHPSs appear to have been much less 
developed than for AISs, part of the underlying justification for using social marketing 
techniques was ‘the growing conviction that traditional public health measures were 
inadequate to achieve broad popularity and acceptance of modern social and health 
programs’ (Boone et al., 1985: 30). In other words, the public health care networks were 
recognised as being too limited to achieve the desired levels of uptake and coverage. 
With the accumulation of practical experience, in the 1980s a number of papers emerged 
involving some theoretical reflections upon the experiences of social marketing from 
higher income countries. For example, in the early 1980s Bloom and Novelli (1981) 
raised a number of challenges that social marketing programmes can face, covering topics 
such as marketing analysis, market segmentation, pricing, communications and 
evaluation. Later on in the decade, Lefebvre and Flora (1988) highlighted eight essential 
aspects to ensure cost-effective social marketing programmes based on experiences from 
the United States. This included: advice around use of a consumer orientation in the 
development and marketing of intervention techniques to develop and market 
intervention techniques (as opposed to a producer or sales orientation that is typical in 
business); the use of audience analysis and segmentation strategies for intervention 
design; and use of the marketing mix (product, price, place and promotion). 
 
2.3.2 Growing challenges and criticisms arising in the 1980s and 1990s 
As mentioned earlier, from the 1980s many LMICs were facing growing budget deficits 
and economic crises. With increasingly limited financial resources, there were growing 
criticisms relating to inefficient use of resources in the health sector (Mills, 1998). 
Following this, there were calls from the World Bank for countries to introduce user fees 
for health care as a way of meeting increasing demands (Akin et al., 1987). 
From the beginning of the 1990s, some concerns were also being raised regarding the 
impact that subsidised products may have had on commercial provision of the same 
products (Hanson et al., 2001). Some questioning of the market impacts of PHPSs was 
emerging out of a broader paradigmatic shift in healthcare across the globe, towards the 
principles of ‘New Public Management’, the general aim of which was to increase the 
efficiency of public services primarily through the use of market mechanisms (Mills, 
1998: 506). 
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While the changing economic environment and critical questioning of PHPSs does share 
some parallels with the rise of the mainstream critique in agriculture, it does not appear 
to have led to the same widespread backlash against and removal of PHPSs as occurred 
in the agricultural sector. There continued to be various examples of PHPS programmes 
taking place throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Fox, 1988, Janowitz et al., 1992, Kenya et 
al., 1990). These were generally social marketing programmes, often for contraceptives, 
and other previously subsidised commodities such as ORT. At least part of the reason for 
this is likely to be that subsidies for the PHPs in question would have not been anywhere 
near as costly as subsidies on fertiliser, which were reported earlier to have represented a 
considerable portion of government revenue in some countries. 
 
2.3.3 Recent changes in thinking and practice 
As the 1990s were drawing to a close, and particularly since the early 2000s, there has 
been a rapid growth in the number of PHPS programmes taking place in LMICs with a 
number of new arguments put forward in their favour. A review of rigorous PHPS impact 
studies by the author found, from 1996, six ITN programmes in Africa, a number of 
country programmes associated with the global Affordable Medicines Facility-malaria 
(AMF-m) programme for artemisinin-based combination therapies for malaria (ACTs), 
and examples of contraceptive social marketing programmes and subsidies on nutritional 
supplements and ORT. Key features of these programmes are summarised in Table 4. 
A number of reasons seem to explain these developments. Firstly, while there continue 
to be examples of subsidising conventional PHPs, there has been a notable growth in the 
subsidisation of other products following trials on their effectiveness. This is particularly 
true for ITNs, as well as ACTs (Schellenberg et al., 1999, Wang et al., 2011, Yeung et 
al., 2011).  
Secondly, there has been much international focus on the setting of ambitious targets for 
health as well as other social, economic, and political goals. This manifested itself in 2000 
with the Millennium Development Goals declaration and also in the 2000 Abuja 
Declaration, which committed LMICs and the global community to achieve a target of at 
least 60% coverage of those at risk and suffering from malaria through access to 
preventative measures such as ITNs and effective and timely treatment (UNGA, 2000, 
WHO, 2000).  
   40 
Thirdly, as part of this process there has been a notable growth in the size and influence 
of international civil society groups, including Population Services International, the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and 
Malaria. These groups have all been influential in financing and supporting various public 
health initiatives, including PHPSs. 
In terms of their design and implementation, there have been a number of innovations in 
recent PHPSs. Regarding targeting, while there are still examples of universal targeting 
(e.g. the AMF-m initiative, which provides a direct price subsidy at the point of sale) there 
has been some shift towards a greater focus on targeting subsidies in a way that will help 
to bring about the maximum public health benefit with the given resources (World Bank, 
2005). Another part of this is the strong emphasis in health of addressing inequalities in 
access as it can often be the poorest who tend to benefit least (Magadi et al., 2003, Worrall 
et al., 2005). 
In terms of targeting mechanisms, one of the major innovations concerns the increasing 
role played by the private sector in the delivery of subsidised PHPs and the associated 
growth of indirect subsidies through the use of vouchers, which can be used as part 
payment for PHPs at private or public outlets (World Bank, 2005). However, there 
continue to be a wide range of delivery mechanisms, including free public distribution 
(e.g. for ITNs, condoms, and ACTs). The increasing role of the private sector emerges 
from the recognition that it has become a key source of health care products and services 
in many LMICs (Patouillard et al., 2007). However, some authors are somewhat less 
supportive of the benefits of using the private sector as a means of distributing subsidised 
PHPs, highlighting a number of negative outcomes arising from it in the context of the 
AMF-m, such as diversion of subsidised products benefitting third parties, and poor 
targeting arising from incentives to made profits (Bate and Tren, 2011, Marriott, 2009). 
Marriott also argues that financial resources may be better spent investing in an improved 
public health care system. 
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The growing use of vouchers emerges in part out of the desire to target specific groups of 
individuals. It also emerges from a growing awareness of the need to address demand 
generation. The idea underpinning this is set out in the notion of demand side financing 
(Gupta et al., 2010). For example, there has been the suggestion that vouchers might help 
bring commercial supply out to remote rural areas (Roll Back Malaria, 2005). Other 
theoretical benefits of vouchers put forward include them interfering less with the supply-
side and allowing holders to have a choice over where they go, thereby encouraging 
competition and a greater sensitivity to the needs of patients (Mills et al., 2002). Further 
benefits mentioned include the avoidance of confusion regarding the perceived value of 
the commodity, giving choice to consumers and, when going through the private sector, 
saving costs compared with distributing and selling PHPs through the public sector 
(Kweku et al., 2007, Roll Back Malaria, 2005).  
Although focused on health services rather than PHPs, two systematic reviews by 
Bellows et al. (2011) and Brody et al. (2013) found strong evidence that voucher 
programmes for maternal health, family planning and sexual health have increased the 
utilisation of health services, but more limited evidence that they can improve the quality 
of service provision and target resources effectively to specific populations (Bellows et 
al., 2013). The same two reviews also highlight the need for stronger evidence on the 
cost-effectiveness of voucher-based programmes. It has also been noted in other studies 
that there are various obstacles that can prevent voucher redemption, particularly among 
the poorest, such as lack of stock in retail outlets, loss of vouchers, no perceived need for 
the product and not having knowledge of where to go to redeem the voucher (Bellows et 
al., 2013, Jones and Mponda, 2006, Kanya et al., 2014). 
As Table 4 shows, there has been a wide variety in terms of the scale of recent PHPS 
programmes, with some local and/or pilot projects and others operating on a national or 
even multi-national scale. Levels of subsidy involved in the new programmes also vary 
widely. There are various programmes and campaigns that involve the distribution of 
fully subsidised products, such as the many free ITN campaigns seen in recent years 
(Hightower et al., 2010, Macedo de Oliveira et al., 2010, Renggli et al., 2013) and free 
distribution of ACTs for children under five and pregnant women through health care 
facilities (Alba et al., 2010). Among the partial subsidy programmes reviewed by the 
author, there were subsidies of 80% of the market price and more for ACTs, and between 
25% to 91% for partial ITN subsidy programmes (Table 4). 
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As well as developments in practice, there have also been some advances in the 
justifications and theory behind PHPSs, although some of this has to be inferred from 
more general justifications around public intervention in health. Justifications for current 
PHPSs seem to be based upon a mixture of the presence of market failures and more 
ethical concerns with roots in the concept of extra-welfarism, where equity may trump 
efficiency concerns (Brouwer and Koopmanschap, 2000, MacLachlan and Maynard, 
1982, Mooney, 1992) and, more recently, health as a human right (Backman et al., 2008, 
Pillay, 2008, The Lancet, 2008). 
Regarding market failures, Hanson has argued that the failure of perfectly competitive 
markets in the case of malaria control justifies extensive public intervention (Hanson, 
2004). For Hanson, the presence of a range of market failures associated with monopoly, 
public goods and externalities and informational failure are pervasive. In addition, 
cultural barriers to acceptance of particular PHPs may also exist (Ensor and Cooper, 
2004). Dupas (2014) also alludes to failures in credit markets in LMICs as breaking down 
the logic of standard economic theory and providing a rationale for subsidisation. The 
main justification Dupas puts forward is that the majority of households cannot afford 
essential health products at their retail price due to credit constraints. As with Hanson, 
she also highlights the potentially large positive externalities arising from the use of such 
products in the form of public health benefits (especially when the PHPs tackle 
communicable diseases) and highlights that subsidies can help people to experiment and 
learn how valuable products are, including through social learning among non-
beneficiaries. A further economic justification for health interventions in general that has 
re-emerged is based on avoiding the associated costs of morbidity, such as work hours 
lost due to illness (Purdy et al., 2013).  
Hanson provides a list of principles to which public interventions should adhere in order 
to remain justifiable. These include: cost-effectiveness; equity of impact; affordability to 
government; crowding-in (‘pump-priming’) of the private sector and associated impacts 
on total use; and avoiding cross-border leakage (Hanson, 2004).  
While crowding-out typically comes with negative connotations, a recent key justification 
for subsidising improved anti-malarial medication in the AMF-m is that this may help to 
have positive crowding-out effects of inferior monotherapies (Arrow et al., 2004, Sabot 
et al., 2009). 
One of the major recent debates in the PHPS literature has been over the issue of ‘cost 
sharing’ or, more specifically, the appropriate level of pricing for subsidised PHPs. At the 
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core of the debate it has been recognised that, given the high price elasticity of demand 
of many health products in LMICs, if the level of subsidy is too low then there is a danger 
of over-exclusion (excluding those who need and would use the product) and if the 
subsidy is too high then there could be a danger of over-inclusion (subsidised products 
reaching those who do not need it or would not use it or use it inappropriately in a way 
that does not improve health), assuming the targeting design allows for this (Bates et al., 
2012, Dupas, 2014). What recent empirical studies have suggested is that the theoretical 
risk of over-inclusion may be much lower than previously thought. Typically, it has been 
argued that providing products for free may lead to individuals not using them 
appropriately and so it may be better to charge something for them (Easterly, 2006). 
However, more recently Dupas points to evidence from randomised trials which suggests 
that people are just as likely to use a product when it was highly subsidised or free than 
if they had to pay for it (Berry et al., 2012, Dupas, 2014). Dupas therefore argues that ‘for 
products with large social benefits, free distribution is the most cost-effective strategy for 
increasing coverage of essential health products and services’ (Dupas, 2014: 1280). The 
theoretical basis for this is that standard economic theory, which suggests it may be better 
to charge a non-trivial fee to target products to those who need them most, breaks down 
in the presence of credit constraints where people’s ability to pay is lower than their 
willingness to pay (WTP). 
One area where there is a danger relating to high subsidies concerns the subsidisation of 
medication, such as anti-malarials. The reason for this is that if simply left to individuals 
as to whether or not to purchase the subsidised medication, there is a danger of 
overtreatment due to informational asymmetries in healthcare and limited use of 
diagnostic tests in LMICs. This has been found in the case of the AMF-m (Briggs et al., 
2014, Cohen et al., 2014), meaning that at a minimum there is a problem of mistreatment 
and potentially diverting limited stocks of important medication, and at worst a danger of 
creating drug resistance. 
Related to the cost sharing debate, there has also been much discussion recently within 
the literature on ITNs on developing the right policy mix of full and partial subsidies to 
achieve a rapid and equitable catch-up and keep-up of ITN coverage (Grabowsky et al., 
2007, Lengeler et al., 2007, Roll Back Malaria, 2005, Sexton, 2011). That is, what the 
most appropriate, cost-effective and sustainable approach is to achieving rapid increases 
in coverage and maintaining them over the longer term. As part of this debate, there have 
been some studies more recently looking at the impact free nets have on demand for 
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partially subsidised nets (Eze et al., 2014, Gingrich et al., 2011b, Gingrich et al., 2014). 
However, although the main policy priority in this debate has been on how to maximise 
coverage of ITNs over the longer term, there has been surprisingly little empirical focus 
on the impact of subsidised products on demand for unsubsidised products. This is 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 
Acknowledging the potential wider market impacts of PHPSs, there have been calls in 
some quarters for a more comprehensive approach to implementing and evaluating PHPS 
programmes (Hanson et al., 2001). This idea appears to have taken root by 2003, with 
calls for a ‘Total Market Aproach’ to social marketing (Meadley et al., 2003). In general, 
this involves greater integration of social marketing programmes within the economy, 
focusing more on the demand side, and focusing on generic promotion rather than 
promotion of a single brand. One of the reasons behind this new approach is the desire 
to, over time, move away from the need for subsidies and to encourage sustainable 
commercial provision. Another factor behind the emergence of the Total Market 
Approach may be the recognition that high sales of subsidised products do not necessarily 
mean that there has been a significant increase in total coverage or total market size of 
the PHP being subsidised if subsidised products simply displace unsubsidised products.  
In brief, PHPSs have a long history of widespread practice and general support though 
they did come under increasing scrutiny from the early 1990s, with some questions 
beginning to emerge regarding their impact on commercial provision of PHPs. While 
there continues to be some criticism of specific programmes and approaches, in general 
there appears to be a widespread acceptance within the health literature of the need to 
subsidise certain PHPs. 
As in agriculture, in spite of a general increase in support for PHPSs, a number of 
questions, criticisms and debates continue, some of which have been briefly discussed. 
These include: challenges in targeting and reaching intended beneficiaries with subsidies 
and ensuring that the poorest are able to benefit; whether fully subsidised products will 
be used as effectively as partially subsidised products; impacts of subsidised products on 
the commercial sector; relative cost-effectiveness of different types of subsidy; and the 
appropriate role of the private sector. Further details of the main topics are provided in 
Appendix 4. 
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2.4 A brief cross-sector synthesis 
This section draws together a number of findings from the foregoing review. After giving 
a broad overview, the section focuses in particular on similarities and differences related 
to the impacts of, and challenges associated with, AISs and PHPSs. It is through the 
discussion of the challenges that the topics for empirical analysis are identified. 
Fundamentally, AISs and PHPSs both aim to overcome the same basic problem, which is 
that, left to the market, the use of agricultural inputs and PHPs in many LMICs will 
typically tend to be below that deemed socially or economically optimal or desirable. 
However, while sharing a common broad justification, there have been considerable 
differences in the general willingness to use them over time. In agriculture there has more 
often been a sense that justifications must be grounded firmly on an economic basis, 
perhaps partly due to inputs often being seen as private goods, while PHPs are often 
justified on public health grounds. In agriculture, there has also been a longstanding 
argument that other public investments may be more cost-effective in achieving the end 
goals (e.g. agricultural productivity or poverty reduction). However, more recently there 
has been a common resurgence in the use of subsidies in both sectors, including a move 
towards justifying subsidies as a means of helping to develop private sector markets. 
There has also recently been some tendency in both sectors to target more narrowly and 
to use vouchers, though free PHP campaigns remain common in health and the specific 
mechanisms used for identifying beneficiaries have differed, as discussed further in the 
following chapter. 
 
2.4.1 Impacts 
One factor that may partly underlie sectoral differences in the perceptions of AISs and 
PHPSs is that, in many respects, the implementation of PHPSs is somewhat less 
problematic than in AISs due to the shorter and simpler impact pathway required in order 
to achieve the end objectives of most programmes. Figure 8 and Figure 9 set out these 
potential pathways, drawing on the review of the theoretical and empirical literature. In 
health, beyond achieving the impacts of increased ownership and use of PHPs, subsidies 
on PHPs are generally aimed towards the outcome of improved health among 
beneficiaries and in some cases improvement in the health of the wider community. The 
main challenges therefore are focused particularly around ensuring appropriate targeting, 
timely delivery and effective use of the PHPs. By contrast, in agriculture, the challenges 
of reaching intended beneficiaries and ensuring appropriate use of inputs represents more 
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of a first stage of challenges in the impact pathway. The main benefits from subsidised 
inputs arise after some time delay following their use and are dependent upon a range of 
factors such as crop yields and total output (themselves dependent upon agro-ecological 
conditions, research and extension, farm management, the weather and complementary 
investments among others), crops planted, and demand and supply of labour. While some 
benefits may be gained at this level (e.g. through improved physical access to food and 
nutrition and wage labour), further benefits such as financial access to food, 
improvements in household income, welfare, and health will then be dependent upon a 
wide range of further intervening factors, such as storage capacity, local market 
conditions, power asymmetries between buyers and sellers, availability of savings and 
credit facilities, and government food and trade policy. Longer-term effects that may 
arise, such as structural changes in cropping patterns, will be dependent upon earlier 
impacts and the specific modalities of the programme and context-specific factors. In 
brief, a cursory reflection on the impact pathways reveals just how much more 
complicated it may be in achieving some of the desired outcomes in agriculture compared 
to health. 
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2.4.2 Challenges 
Particularly for the purpose of highlighting potential policy-relevant research questions, 
it is helpful to compare and contrast the main design, implementation and impact-related 
challenges identified in both sectors. These are summarised in Table 5, based on the 
systematic search and review of impact studies. As can be seen, a number of similar 
problems are faced, though there appear to be more in the case of AISs, which is in part 
due to the more complex nature of the impact pathways as just discussed. It is also true 
that agricultural input subsidies (particularly fertiliser subsidies) involve products, which 
are of substantial value and demonstrate high levels of demand in local, national and 
international private markets, which may increase the challenges associated with 
diversion, leakage and re-sale, political demands for continuation, and cost containment. 
There are also some differences in the extent to which challenges are recognised and dealt 
with in the respective theoretical and empirical literatures. 
A few key similarities and differences are briefly discussed. One difference is in the 
approach to the private sector. Whereas in agriculture a key challenge is seen to be not 
using it enough or undermining it, in health, while there is some acknowledgement of the 
need not to undermine it, this occupies a far less central position and in addition there is 
a literature highlighting various challenges of using the private sector and the need for 
appropriate regulation, as indicated earlier. With calls in the agricultural sector to increase 
use of the private sector, there may therefore be potential scope for those in agriculture to 
learn from the experience in health. 
Another related difference is found in terms of the common challenge of ensuring 
beneficiaries only pay the intended amount for subsidised goods. Whereas in agriculture 
there has been evidence of price hiking occurring from public outlets, e.g. (Dorward et 
al., 2014, Dorward and Chirwa, 2011b), there are examples in the health sector of it 
occurring in the private sector, e.g. (Sabot et al., 2009). This cross-fertilisation of evidence 
can help to provide both sectors with greater perspective if thinking about making greater 
use of alternative delivery mechanisms to avoid price hiking. 
A further insightful difference is the seemingly different levels of emphasis placed on the 
issue of diversion and rent seeking. Whereas in agriculture these topics generally receive 
considerable attention, they have received far less attention in health. Some exceptions 
include certain internal evaluations, e.g. (Nathan et al., 2007, Nathan et al., 2008) and a 
recent study by Dupas which pointed to an audit study of ITN distribution programmes 
that found limited corruption among prenatal nurses (Dupas, 2014). However, Dupas 
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acknowledged corruption may be a bigger problem and that more research was needed. 
Her concerns seem to be validated by the fact that, since the writing of this thesis began, 
the Tanzanian ITN voucher programme which is the subject of empirical analysis in 
chapter six, has been discontinued due to evidence of systematic corruption in the e-
voucher distribution system. This therefore further underscores the common challenges 
faced by voucher subsidy programmes in both agriculture and health. 
Finally, two of the major inter-related challenges facing both the agricultural and health 
sectors are how to most effectively reach intended beneficiaries and the impact that 
subsidies have on the demand for, and sales of, unsubsidised equivalent products (i.e. 
whether they crowd-in or crowd-out unsubsidised sales). In terms of reaching 
beneficiaries, there has been a particular emphasis in the health literature on measuring 
how equitable targeting outcomes have been. In agriculture, ensuring that wealthier 
households do not capture subsidies has also been a longstanding concern. Regarding 
crowding-in / -out, while there is a common concern over possible impacts, there are 
differences in the level of attention given to the issue empirically, with a greater focus on 
it within agriculture. Closer investigation of the literature on these two topics in the 
following chapter demonstrates particular scope for cross-sector learning as regards to 
the use of methods as well as addressing empirical gaps in the literature. 
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Table 5: Key challenges facing design and implementation of AISs and PHPSs 
from their respective literatures 
 
Key challenges Agriculture Health 
Targeting Reaching intended beneficiaries. 
Avoiding capture by wealthier 
households. 
Reaching intended beneficiaries. 
Ensuring socioeconomically equitable 
outcomes. Reaching the most physically 
remote. 
Leakage, diversion and 
rent-seeking 
Major concern and key criticism of AISs. Limited empirical investigation and 
somewhat less attention given. 
Timeliness of delivery A crucial challenge encountered in 
many programmes for ensuring that 
inputs can be used effectively in the 
upcoming agricultural season. 
Timeliness of access particularly 
important in the case of PHPs used to 
treat medical conditions (e.g. 
antimalarial prophylactics). 
Ensuring beneficiaries 
do not pay above the 
subsidised price. 
Have been concerns over rent seeking 
leading to hiking of beneficiary’s 
financial contribution. 
Some concerns over private retailers 
selling subsidised PHPs for more than 
the suggested price (e.g. AMF-m and 
Tanzania’s TNVS). 
Use of private sector and 
impacts on unsubsidised 
commercial demand 
Concern over governments not using 
private sector appropriately, with 
assumption private provision is more 
desirable than public. 
Also, a longstanding concern due to 
negative effects on private sector and 
lowering production returns and cost-
effectiveness of subsidy programmes. 
Concern arising from a sense that it is 
the private sector that should be 
providing inputs. 
Some concerns over addressing the 
negative aspects to delivering PHPs via 
the private sector. 
Some growing concern since the 1990s 
of subsidies displacing unsubsidised 
demand though is often trumped by 
focus on achieving short-term health 
gains. Some investigation into impact of 
free PHPs. Main concern arising due to 
interest in future sustainability of access. 
Containing fiscal costs 
and high opportunity 
costs 
A major concern given the many 
additional and complementary 
investments also needed to raise 
agricultural productivity as well as many 
criticisms levelled at performance of 
AISs, including capture by local elites or 
politicians, poor targeting, and 
challenge of capturing the full benefits. 
 
Less of a concern. 
Evaluating cost-
effectiveness and 
estimating the full range 
of benefits 
A considerable challenge given the wide 
range of indirect effects. As such, impact 
evaluation has tended to focus on 
particular individual impacts. 
Not such a concern as main impacts 
generally easier to trace, though is a gap 
in the literature on wider impacts, 
including more limited evidence on 
health outcomes. As such, reviews of 
cost-effectiveness of different delivery 
mechanisms relatively straightforward 
by comparison. 
Tendency for subsidies 
to persist due to political 
demands 
Longstanding concern within the 
literature. 
Not really discussed as a problem. 
Sustainability of 
increased access / use 
and how to bring about 
graduation and/or exit 
from subsidies 
Major concern, related to worries over 
impacts of programmes and the 
persistence of subsidies and growing 
fiscal costs. 
Emphasis less on phasing out subsidies 
but how best to maintain coverage and 
use of PHPs using a combination of free 
and partial subsidy policies. 
Ensuring appropriate 
use of inputs / PHPs 
Use of inputs not well considered in the 
literature, with most focus simply on 
reaching intended beneficiaries. Main 
related concern in past has been on 
overuse arising from persistence of 
subsidies. 
 
Sizeable focus within the literature on 
the importance of effective and 
appropriate use of PHPs in terms of 
bringing about intended benefits. 
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Production-related   
Ensuring increased 
production leads to 
increased domestic 
availability and lower 
staple prices 
Noted that fertiliser subsidies may often 
not do much to bring down the market 
price of staple crops to which subsidised 
fertiliser applied. Requires coherent 
grain and trade policies. 
N/A 
How to maximise 
income-related benefits 
for beneficiary 
households? 
Noted in a couple of studies that there 
may be challenges in bringing about 
longer-term wealth impacts. 
N/A 
Crop consolidation or 
diversification? 
Debate over whether AISs hold back or 
encourage diversification of crops. 
N/A 
Negative environmental 
impacts 
Longstanding concern over 
encouraging overuse of inputs and 
intensification of farming leading to land 
degradation. Major questions over how 
to incorporate environmentally 
sustainable practices. 
N/A 
Source: Author. 
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3 Targeting and crowding-in /crowding-out: a review 
Having identified the two inter-related challenges of targeting and crowding-in / 
crowding-out for further investigation, this chapter reviews the specific literatures on 
these two topics in more depth. Through a critical review of these literatures across both 
sectors, the chapter demonstrates the empirical gaps to be addressed by the following 
three chapters of this thesis. The topic of targeting is reviewed first, followed by 
crowding-in and crowding-out. 
 
3.1 Targeting: theory and practice 
The issue of who ends up directly benefiting from AISs and PHPSs is of fundamental 
importance to the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the programmes or policies in 
question. This section critically reviews the empirical literature on who has directly 
benefitted from subsidies in both sectors along with the empirical methods used, leading 
to the identification of a gap in the empirical literature around targeting in AISs. The 
theory and evidence on the determinants of targeting outcomes in agriculture is then 
reviewed. To provide some context, the section first of all reviews current thinking in 
each sector over who should be targeted, different approaches to beneficiary selection, 
and mechanisms for transmission of subsidies to identified beneficiaries.  
 
3.1.1 Targeting in theory and practice: agricultural input subsidies 
3.1.1.1 Who should be targeted? 
There are a few different perspectives within the literature on AISs as to who should be 
targeted with subsidised inputs. Some authors and donors appear to implicitly or 
explicitly believe that it should be the poorest households that are targeted, including 
highly food-insecure farmers (Denning et al., 2009, Houssou and Zeller, 2011, United 
Nations, 2005). This could be seen as a social protection or safety net argument, where 
the emphasis is on household-level poverty reduction objectives. However, it is 
recognised by a number of authors that for the very poorest with labour constraints or no 
land, they may require an alternative or complementary social protection measures such 
as cash transfers (Denning et al., 2009, Dorward, 2009). Others are more sceptical, 
arguing that the use of fertiliser subsidies to pursue welfare goals (alleviating poverty or 
reducing hunger) will often be inappropriate and that there are other more cost-effective 
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instruments for achieving such goals (Morris et al., 2007). However, there is some 
evidence to suggest that input subsidies could be more welfare-efficient compared to cash 
transfer programmes under certain conditions (Filipski and Taylor, 2012). 
An alternative perspective, adopted in Zambia’s Fertiliser Support Programme, starts 
from the assumption that raising aggregate output of food supplies should be a core 
objective of AISs and therefore emphasises the importance of targeting farmers who make 
the most efficient use of subsidised inputs (Mason et al., 2013). A variant of this view 
would argue that subsidies be targeted to areas where additional inputs would contribute 
most to improving yields (Minde and Ndlovu, 2007). However, there is a danger that such 
an approach may lead to targeting of farmers who would purchase inputs anyway, limiting 
the contribution that the subsidy has to incremental use of the inputs and, if subsidised 
inputs are sold through public outlets, crowding-out the private sector input industry 
(Dorward, 2009, Morris et al., 2007, Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011).  
Other authors have noted how sometimes overall programme objectives can explicitly or 
implicitly result in conflicting targeting criteria, most clearly if there is a dual objective 
of boosting aggregate output at the same time as raising incomes among poor smallholder 
households as the groups that should be targeted are not necessarily the same (Kelly et 
al., 2011, Pan and Christiaensen, 2012). 
A further perspective found in the literature is that AISs should be targeted at farmers 
whose input use is constrained by market failures, e.g. those who would not be able to 
afford commercial fertiliser, for the primary reason that it limits costs and would be the 
most efficient way for a programme to contribute to raising incremental input use and the 
development of commercial input markets. Ricker-Gilbert et al. (2011) note a potential 
trade-off of lower national crop output if targeting those who do not already purchase 
inputs, though tentatively conclude that poorer households may be as efficient in using 
fertiliser as wealthier households. However, this may not apply to the very poorest, 
disabled or otherwise labour constrained households. 
Finally, some authors have recently noted that, given the difficulties of effectively 
targeting poor households, in some contexts (e.g. where the cost of commercial inputs is 
high and poverty widespread), better poverty and vulnerability focussed targeting 
outcomes may be achieved by targeting all smallholder households with a tightly rationed 
subsidy (Dorward and Chirwa, 2013b, Holden and Lunduka, 2012b). 
In practice, a range of criteria have been used for beneficiary selection in different 
programmes as summarised in Table 6, including being a member of a farmer or other 
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group, and a combination of being land-poor and belonging to particular vulnerable 
groups. 
 
3.1.1.2 Theory and approaches to beneficiary selection and transmission of 
subsidies to beneficiaries 
Targeting of AISs typically takes place at the area level (i.e. regional, district and below) 
and beneficiary level. The focus here is on the beneficiary level, where a range of 
mechanisms are used to identify beneficiaries (Table 6). One of the more popular 
approaches has been to use community-based targeting (CBT). This typically involves 
village committees, local leaders and / or other stakeholders such as government 
extension agents. Aside from generally having lower administrative costs than means-
based targeting, the main theoretical arguments behind this approach include: benefiting 
from the information that local governments or communities are thought to have about 
the conditions of potential beneficiaries and local needs and preferences (Mansuri and 
Rao, 2012); it being easier to hold local decision-makers accountable compared to 
centralised decision-makers (Bardhan, 2002); and having the potential to strengthen 
social capital, community organisation and beneficiary empowerment (Fox, 1996). 
However, in certain contexts CBT may be prone to elite capture by those who hold 
positions of local authority or be used as a vehicle for patronage (Ellis, 2007, Pan and 
Christiaensen, 2012). 
Another variant of decentralised targeting has been to use extension agents, as in Ghana. 
Some benefits of this approach are thought to include it facilitating dissemination of 
information about extension services including efficient and profitable use of inputs and 
discussions around farming practices (Vondolia et al., 2012). By contrast, programmes in 
Zambia and Nigeria have used membership of farmer or other local groups as criteria for 
eligibility, sometimes with the group leaders playing a central role. This approach may 
help to encourage formation of community groups, which could themselves be of benefit 
to farmers. However, there is a danger that the approach could miss some poorer farmers 
along with some evidence that if there is subsequent distribution within groups then there 
may be a danger of personal relationships playing a role in the amount of inputs 
beneficiaries acquire (Liverpool-Tasie et al., 2010). 
In terms of reaching identified individuals, one of the main recent developments is the 
use of vouchers, which are given to beneficiaries and can then be redeemed, usually 
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following a co-payment, for specific inputs at private or government outlets. Direct 
distribution of inputs does also continue to take place in some cases. 
 
3.1.2 Targeting in theory and practice: public health product subsidies 
3.1.2.1 Who should be targeted? 
The dominant view on targeting within the health literature comes from a public health 
perspective, which focuses on targeting as a means of maximising public health benefit 
(Roll Back Malaria, 2005). From this perspective it would be attractive to target mosquito 
net subsidies, for example, to pregnant women and mothers of young children as this can 
help extend benefits not only to mothers but also young children sleeping with their 
mother. Furthermore, pregnant women and young children are especially susceptible to 
malaria as such women lose their acquired immunity and young children will not yet have 
it. Also, malaria during pregnancy can lead to highly adverse outcomes for both mother 
and child. The emphasis on public health objectives can also be seen in the targeting of 
children through attendance at maternal and child health clinics or immunisation 
programmes as this can provide incentives for their attendance and therefore access to 
health services. Within the public health view, there is also a strong emphasis on reaching 
poorer households and achieving equitable targeting as it is recognised that it is often the 
poorest households that miss out on access to PHPs (Worrall et al., 2005). However, there 
also appears to be a tension between two variants within the public health perspective. 
One is driven in part by international donors and global targets and emphasises the 
importance of achieving rapid short-term equitable gains.7 It is therefore supportive of 
universal (free) campaigns. The other emphasises the importance of targeting so as to 
maintain longer-term improvements by not undermining the private sector upon which 
future access may depend, and to ensure that limited resources are used in the most cost-
effective way (Roll Back Malaria, 2005). In general, the dominant view has been that 
which focuses on increasing access in the short-term (Hanson et al., 2001). 
 
                                                 
7 Personal communication with official working within the Tanzanian NATNETS programme. 
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In practice, targeted PHPS programmes focus on different types of individuals, depending 
on the programme objectives. For example, many subsidy programmes for mosquito nets 
and malaria medication have focused on pregnant women and their children (Agha et al., 
2007, Grabowsky et al., 2007, Hanson et al., 2009, Noor et al., 2007, Webster et al., 
2010); subsidies on nutritional and oral rehydration products have been targeted to 
caregivers of young children (Kassegne et al., 2011, Wang et al., 2011); and some 
contraceptive subsidies are targeted specifically to certain younger age groups (Plautz and 
Meekers, 2007). Such targeting is often referred to as categorical. 
 
3.1.2.2 Theory and approaches to beneficiary selection and transmission of 
subsidies to selected beneficiaries 
A range of mechanisms used for beneficiary selection and transmission of subsidised 
PHPs were shown earlier in Table 4. A number of recent ITN schemes have selected 
beneficiaries on the basis of categorical targeting by giving vouchers to women on 
attending antenatal care clinics (or the opportunity to acquire subsidised ITNs from there 
directly). One of the benefits of this in the case of ITN subsidies is that it is a fairly 
effective way of targeting those who may be particularly at risk of malaria. However, a 
potential downside from an efficiency perspective is that it does not in itself allow for 
targeting on the basis of ability to pay, meaning that subsidised products may end up 
displacing products that would have been purchased anyway. 
Self-selection is the other common method for selecting beneficiaries as used in social 
marketing and other forms of direct subsidy, where individuals effectively select into 
receiving the subsidy by purchasing a subsidised product. Such approaches in theory 
allow for some form of discrimination whereby wealthier individuals may prefer to 
purchase other products that are of a different design or quality. However, in practice 
wealthier households may still prefer to purchase the subsidised product, meaning self-
selection may not be the most efficient means of increasing coverage if it displaces 
unsubsidised sales. 
 
   61 
3.1.3 The empirical evidence on targeting outcomes and methods used 
3.1.3.1 Agriculture 
Most recent studies in agriculture employ the use of multivariate regression analysis to 
measure targeting outcomes by estimating participation equations, where the dependent 
variable represents participation in the programme, such as the receipt of vouchers, 
number of vouchers received or the amount of subsidised inputs received. A number of 
household characteristics and other variables and then included as explanatory variables 
(e.g. farm size, livestock ownership and gender of the head of household). For example, 
concerning Malawi’s FISP, a number of quantitative studies link particular household 
characteristics with targeting outcomes, such as receipt of subsidy coupons or the amount 
of subsidised inputs households have received.8 Results from these studies generally 
suggest that the benefits from the FISP have increased with measures of socioeconomic 
status (SES), such as the value of household assets and land size (Chibwana et al., 2012, 
Holden and Lunduka, 2010a, Holden and Lunduka, 2010b, Kilic et al., 2013, Ricker-
Gilbert and Jayne, 2011, Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011).9 In one of the more recent studies, 
Kilic et al. conclude that ‘the relatively well-off rather than the poor or the wealthiest, and 
the locally well-connected have a higher likelihood of program participation and, on 
average, receive a greater number of input coupons’ (Kilic et al., 2013). This is despite 
the fact that the FISP has formally aimed to target resource poor and vulnerable 
households. 
A review of evidence from AISPs in SSA concluded that in three out of the four countries 
covered (Ghana, Zambia and Malawi), wealthier and more politically connected 
households captured a higher proportion of the overall subsidy (Ricker-Gilbert et al., 
2013a). Only in a pilot project in Nigeria did participants in the voucher subsidy 
programme tend to be poorer than non-participants (Liverpool-Tassie, 2012). 
One exception to the general trend of relying on multivariate regression is the study by 
Kilic et al. (2013), which also calculated two national targeting coefficients, drawing on 
the work of Galasso and Ravaillon (2005) and Stifel and Alderman (2005). The first was 
based on the difference between the share of the ‘eligible’ population participating in the 
programme (coverage) and the share of the ‘non-eligible’ population participating 
                                                 
8 The term coupon is used in the context of the FISP and refers to a subsidy voucher. 
9 Some exceptions to this include Chibwana et al. (2012) finding a negative association between farm size 
and receipt of maize seed and Holden and Lunduka finding a negative association between receipt of a 
fertiliser coupon and value of household assets (2010a). However, these may be due to sample effects, with 
these three studies drawing on a much smaller sample. 
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(leakage). The other coefficient was based on the difference between the average value 
of subsidy received among the eligible population and non-eligible population. Indicators 
of eligibility used included: being in the bottom 40% of either annual household per capita 
consumption expenditure, wealth index values or total landholding.  
A second exception is a study by Osorio et al. (2011), which used benefit incidence 
analysis to investigate the relationship between land size and the proportion of the total 
fertiliser subsidy value received in Indonesia (incorporating the price paid for the 
fertiliser) and found that farmers in the top two quintiles (those with most land) received 
60% of the total subsidy; more than that received by all of those in the poorest three 
quintiles. 
One of the problems in these studies is that many of them tend to focus in particular on 
the relationship between a specific asset (e.g. land or livestock) taking it alone to be a 
reliable proxy for SES. However, there is a danger that reliance on single assets may 
provide misleading results. For example, some recent estimates for Malawi suggest that 
there may be less of a direct relationship between wealth and land size than is typically 
assumed (Houssou and Zeller, 2011: footnote 628). Similarly, ownership of livestock may 
well depend on geographical or other factors.  
A second problem is that the multivariate regression methods used in most studies 
generally provide single coefficients to represent the relationship between a particular 
wealth indicator and targeting outcomes. This tends to present relationships as linear and 
does not allow for a comprehensive understanding of how outcomes may differ as wealth 
indicators change. There are one or two exceptions to this. For example, the study by 
Osorio et al. (2011) on Indonesia does look at how the distribution of subsidy expenditure 
differs across quintiles using benefit incidence analysis and some studies using 
participation equations use categorical variables for wealth groups (Kilic et al., 2013), 
giving different estimates for those in different wealth categories. However, neither offers 
a measurement that fully accounts for the continuous nature of targeting outcomes.  
A further limitation of the studies is that while they focus on the distribution of subsidies, 
they ignore how wider programme impacts as identified in theory and empirical evidence, 
e.g. (Dorward, 2009, Piggott et al., 1993, Tiba, 2010, Tower and Christiansen, 1988) 
accrue among individuals within different socioeconomic groups within society. 
Estimating such effects is clearly a far more challenging task, though is one that should 
be taken up as, unlike PHPSs, some of the main benefits of sufficiently large-scale AISPs 
may arise from impacts on staple food prices and on the labour market (Dorward, 2009). 
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3.1.3.2 Health  
In contrast to the AIS literature, the literature on PHPSs appears to have used some quite 
different methods and tools for estimating targeting outcomes. Given the importance 
attached to equity, a number of studies have incorporated some form of equity analysis, 
which has broadly involved stratifying households into SES groups from poorest to least 
poor based on an asset index and then applying one of a number of methods to estimate 
relative inequality in access to / use of the subsidised PHPs across these groups over time. 
Table 7 provides a basic overview of two of the most common methods in the PHPS 
literature: equity ratios and concentration curves (CCs) and concentration indices (CIs). 
In terms of the general empirical findings the evidence points overwhelmingly to the 
conclusion that PHPSs can help increase the overall equity in coverage or use of the 
particular PHP being subsidised (results are presented more fully for a range a 
programmes in Appendix 5). However, in terms of targeting, a number of studies 
highlight the fact that reaching the poorest with subsidies does remain a challenge 
(Hanson et al., 2009, Sabot et al., 2009). 
While there will be study-specific weaknesses and limitations in addition to those 
mentioned in Table 7, given the limitations noted earlier with regard to methods used in 
the agricultural literature, there may well be useful lessons that can be learnt from the 
application of methods used in the health literature to extend and update estimates of 
targeting outcomes in AISPs. As mentioned, with few exceptions, the AIS literature has 
restricted itself largely to the use of multivariate regression analysis for measuring 
targeting outcomes, which provides a limited and not particularly intuitive output for 
policy-makers. By contrast, CCs would allow for the full distribution of targeting 
outcomes within a given sample to be measured and displayed in an intuitive visual 
manner as a continuous variable in relation to the socioeconomic status of all households. 
These may be used in combination with CIs to allow for numerical statistical testing of 
changes over time or between areas.  
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Table 7: Summary of methods used for measuring equality in PHPS programmes 
Source: Author’s summary. 
 
Malawi’s FISP lends itself to being a particularly good case study through which to apply 
CCs and CIs. As explained further in the following chapter, it benefits from having 
nationally representative household survey data over a number of years since the 
programme began in 2005/06. There is also a need to update the measurement of targeting 
outcomes following a number of changes to the programme using more recent household 
survey data.  
Given that previous evidence has suggested that the direct benefits in the FISP increase 
with measures of socioeconomic status, it is also of interest to know what the key factors 
are which underpin targeting outcomes at the community level. The remaining discussion 
therefore reviews the literature around determinants of targeting outcomes under the type 
of targeting used in the FISP, and the related evidence. 
 
3.1.4 Determinants of targeting outcomes under community-based targeting 
As with a number of other AISPs, Malawi’s FISP uses a form of CBT, as explained in 
more detail in the following chapter. It was mentioned above that while there are a number 
of theoretical advantages to this approach it can also suffer from some significant 
weaknesses, such as elite capture and patronage. 
Method Brief description Main strengths Main 
weaknesses 
Equity ratio A ratio of some measure of access or 
use among the poorest and richest 
groups taken as a relative measure of 
equity. 
Straightforward measure. 
Easy to explain. Allows 
for comparison over time 
or between programmes. 
Ignores the 
distribution among 
middle quintiles 
and may obscure 
inequalities. 
Concentration 
Curves and 
Concentration 
Indices 
A CI is a value ranging from -1 to 1 
giving an indication of how the 
cumulative share of a health outcome 
is distributed by a measure of SES. 
Zero denotes perfect equality and a 
negative (positive) figure suggests a 
concentration among poorer (less 
poor) households.  
 
CIs are derived from a concentration 
curve (CC), which plots the cumulative 
proportion of a health variable (y-axis) 
against the population ranked by SES 
(left to right on the x-axis). The CI 
provides a measure of the area 
between the CC and a 45° line of 
perfect equality. 
CIs are a more 
comprehensive measure 
than equity ratios. Allows 
for comparison over time 
or between programmes. 
 
CIs can be standardised 
to control for the influence 
of ‘legitimate’ causes of 
inequality in a health 
outcome (e.g. age). 
 
Can decompose the CI 
into factors contributing to 
greater or lesser 
inequality. 
Conceptually 
somewhat less 
easily explained 
and understood 
than equity ratios.  
 
CIs presented 
without a CC may 
give a limited or 
misleading idea of 
the actual 
distribution by 
SES. 
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There are a number of theories that are pertinent to the determinants of targeting outcomes 
under CBT and which can help in understanding what outcomes we might expect to see. 
The relevance of these will of course depend upon the specific arrangements and local 
socio-political context. 
One of the key theories of relevance is that around elite capture of the benefits of 
programmes that use decentralised targeting methods. In general, the ‘elite’ is typically 
taken to refer to those who hold positions of power, such as local leaders, committee 
members and officials. Pan and Christiaensen (2012) point out that depending on the 
targeting criteria, elite capture may worsen or improve performance. For example, if the 
elite are themselves more productive then it may improve targeting in a programme where 
productivity is the main criterion, while it may worsen performance if the elite are 
generally wealthier and poverty is the main criterion.  
The same authors cite a number of studies which suggest that a range of political, 
economic, sociological and programme design features can all explain the likelihood of 
elite capture in different contexts. These include the programme’s size, eligibility criteria 
and whether it involves the distribution of public or private goods (Araujo et al., 2008, 
Galasso and Ravallion, 2005), local power structures (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006), 
levels of awareness (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000), income levels and poverty 
(Galasso and Ravallion, 2005) and community homogeneity (Seabright, 1996).  
Pan and Christiaensen (2012) themselves found in their study of an input voucher 
programme in Tanzania that members of the local elite (households containing elected 
village officials) were more likely to be voucher beneficiaries and received around 60% 
of the distributed vouchers after controlling for the programme’s eligibility criteria.10 
Elite capture was found to be more pronounced in communities with more unequal land 
distributions and that were further from rural towns. Trust levels in the village were found 
to be important counteracting factors along with the size of the programme. 
A second theory related to elite capture is that of neo-patrimonialism, commonly used in 
the political science literature. The term has its roots in Weber’s concept of 
patrimonialism, which described forms of traditional top-down authority. Eisenstadt 
(1973) first distinguished this from neo-patrimonialism, which is taken to refer to a form 
                                                 
10 The targeting criteria were aimed at reaching literate households which were able to co-finance the 
partially subsidised inputs and which did not cultivate more than 1 hectare of maize and/or rice. Priority 
was to be given to female-headed households and those which used little or no modern inputs on maize or 
rice over the past 5 years (Pan and Christiaensen, 2012). 
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of organisation in which patrimonial relationships exist within a political and 
administrative system that is constructed formally on rational-legal lines (Clapham, 1985: 
48). In such a system officials hold positions with powers that are formally defined but 
exercise those powers as far as possible as a form of private property rather than public 
service. There is however a form of reciprocity within the notion of neo-patrimonialism, 
with those in positions of authority transferring government resources to ‘clients’ in return 
for support (vanWyk, 2007). While neo-patrimonialism was popularised as a theory to 
explain the overall poor economic performance of Africa during the 1980s and 1990s 
(van de Walle, 2001), it is also applicable at a more local level in that the holders of 
positions of authority within a community or area may choose to distribute state resources 
(e.g. subsidised inputs) in return for some form of political support. 
Very much related to the concept of neo-patrimonialism is the theory of rents and rent 
seeking. Khan (2000) defines the term rent as income which is higher than the minimum 
which an individual or firm would have accepted given alternative opportunities. In 
practical terms it can refer to a wide range of situations whereby those in government or 
who hold some position of power or authority can either be allocated or demand rents for 
a range of reasons, including personal gain or political support. 
Finally, it is important to highlight that targeting performance may also be crucially 
mediated by the simplicity and clarity of the official targeting criteria themselves. Where 
a programme seeks numerous objectives and involves rather broad or conflicting 
targeting criteria, this in itself can create scope for confusion and difficulties in achieving 
any of the individual targeting objectives (Pan and Christiaensen, 2012). 
 
3.1.4.1 The evidence on factors influencing transmission of subsidies to 
beneficiaries in Malawi’s FISP 
There are various pieces of evidence to help build up a picture of what might be important 
influences in determining the transmission and use of subsidised inputs in Malawi’s FISP. 
However, this evidence remains scattered and does not yet provide a sufficiently 
comprehensive picture of the key factors influencing and determining these outcomes 
within specific communities. 
Further details on the operation of the FISP are provided in the following chapter, though 
to interpret the evidence here it is important to understand some of its key features. At its 
core, the FISP involves the distribution of packages of coupons to selected farming 
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households through a CBT approach, which is supposed to involve several actors, 
including Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS) extension staff, local 
leaders and elected Village Development Committees (VDCs).11 The packages are 
intended to provide recipients with a combination of inputs, which have changed over the 
course of the programme but as of 2012/13 included two types of fertiliser, improved 
maize seed and legume seed. Intended beneficiaries are supposed to be resource poor and 
there has been an increasing emphasis since the programme began on targeting vulnerable 
households. The use of ‘open meetings’ was introduced from 2008/09 to sensitise the 
communities about the operation of the FISP and to include them in the targeting process 
and remove power from traditional leaders. Recipients are supposed to redeem their 
coupons at accredited outlets for subsidised inputs, with a small top-up payment required 
for some, depending on the type of input. Inputs are then supposed to be used by the 
beneficiaries exclusively on their own land. 
In terms of the evidence, first of all it was mentioned above that some quantitative studies 
have shown that those who are well connected have been more likely to receive subsidies 
(Kilic et al., 2013), which provides an initial indication of potential elite capture and neo-
patrimonialism. However, this evidence alone does not help to explain the underlying 
processes that may be driving this. 
The main sources of evidence that provide insights into what might explain targeting 
outcomes come largely from the independent FISP evaluation reports that include certain 
questions from quantitative household surveys on coupon allocation, distribution and 
redemption and make some limited reference to findings from focus group discussions 
(FGDs) (Dorward and Chirwa, 2011b, Dorward et al., 2013, SOAS et al., 2008). A fuller 
qualitative report based on focus group discussions, key informant interviews and life 
histories has looked at the challenges of access to the subsidy among the most vulnerable 
groups in the 2010/11 season (Mvula et al., 2011). Lastly, some limited insights are 
available from a separate published paper drawing on different quantitative and 
qualitative data from the central and southern regions (Holden and Lunduka, 2012b). 
In the 2012/13 FISP household survey, the use of open meetings was reported by around 
70% of respondents for coupon allocation and 80% for coupon distribution (Dorward et 
al., 2013). However, when asked who made decisions regarding coupon allocation, over 
70% of households reported it to be the village head or local traditional authority. 
                                                 
11 The MoAFS has since been renamed the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development 
though MoAFS is used here. 
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Respondents from FGDs as part of the same evaluation round also reported traditional 
leaders to be predominant in making coupon allocation decisions as well as VDC 
members with some mention of agricultural staff. This conflicting evidence of local 
leaders making the decisions despite there being open meetings requires further 
explanation.  
The study by Mvula et al. (2011), and to a lesser extent Holden and Lunduka (2012b), 
provide some further insights into beneficiary selection and coupon allocation. For 
example, Mvula et al. do not appear to find that lack of awareness of the targeting criteria 
was a problem, concluding that most people were aware of criteria and that problems in 
coupon access were isolated. However, they did note a number of challenges in the 
poorest accessing coupons, the most common being the splitting of coupon packages and 
sharing of coupons with other households, meaning households end up with less than the 
intended package, sometimes sharing the inputs associated with a single coupon. There 
was some evidence that local leaders may be behind this. Other less commonly reported 
challenges included: some village heads adding their own criteria; there being fewer 
coupons arriving than the number of registered beneficiaries; missing beneficiary names; 
and malpractices by officials and traditional leadership (e.g. capture and sale of coupons). 
Holden and Lunduka (2012b) also find that splitting of packages was common in the 
2007/08 and 2008/09 seasons (as have the aforementioned FISP evaluation reports) but 
they do not explain what was driving this. They also report evidence of a sizeable 
secondary market for coupons, which they argue may partly come from households that 
received coupons but were particularly poor and unable to use them, but mostly from 
leakages occurring before they reach recipients. Overall they argue that the weak targeting 
performance was particularly due to leakages of coupons and fertilisers before they 
reached households that should have been targeted and by unclear targeting criteria.  
Once coupons are allocated they must be redeemed for inputs by beneficiaries. Again, 
there is some quantitative evidence that sheds light into this stage of the process, 
suggesting that the large majority (95%) of fertiliser coupons were used to buy fertiliser 
in 2012/13, with the main reason for non-redemption being lack of stock at selling points, 
though the reasons for lack of stock remain somewhat unclear (Dorward et al., 2013). 
Survey data relating to coupon use may, however, not be entirely reliable as coupon sales 
are a very sensitive issue (Dorward et al., 2013, Holden and Lunduka, 2012b). Reliability 
is likely to particularly affect the findings from large-scale surveys, which tend to be 
carried out quickly in a tick-box fashion without building a particular rapport with the 
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interviewee. However, it may also be a problem in the case of FGDs (where very few 
cases of coupon purchase and sales were reported) as they may not be an appropriate 
forum in which to allow all voices to be heard on sensitive issues and they may not 
encourage the same level of openness as interviews with individuals. Quantitative 
evidence suggesting high levels of redemption is also somewhat at odds with a range of 
quantitative and qualitative data from 2010/11 and 2012/13 that suggest fairly significant 
difficulties in accessing subsidised fertiliser in particular, including long queues, queue 
jumping, clerks and individuals demanding payment of tips and the involvement of 
vendors who have connived with clerks to get subsidised inputs illegally (Dorward et al., 
2013, Mvula et al., 2011). However, it can be difficult to judge from qualitative research 
how extensive these problems are. 
The limited evidence on subsidised input use suggests the large majority of fertiliser 
acquired in 2012/13 was used on farmers’ own gardens (97% of all fertiliser received) in 
2012/13 (Dorward et al., 2013). However, as noted in the evaluation reports, there are 
again potential questions over reliability, with re-sale being a sensitive issue. The use of 
multi-choice answers can also make it difficult to describe how inputs are actually used, 
though FGDs in the 2012/13 evaluation also reported almost universal use on the 
beneficiary’s own field. 
In brief, despite various evidence providing insights into factors that may be influencing 
targeting outcomes, it remains somewhat patchy and scattered. Given the evidence 
referred to above suggesting that intended targeting outcomes are not being achieved in 
the FISP, there is therefore a need to gather new primary data that can help identify and 
assess the importance of the key factors that influence and determine the transmission of 
subsidies to beneficiaries at each of the various stages from beneficiary selection, to 
coupon allocation, coupon redemption and subsidised input use. 
 
3.2 Impact of subsidies on unsubsidised sales and incremental coverage  
A second area in which AISs and PHPS share a common challenge, and where there exist 
certain gaps and weaknesses in the empirical evidence, concerns the issue of whether 
these subsidies crowd-in increased purchases of unsubsidised equivalent inputs or PHPs 
or whether they crowd-out unsubsidised sales that would have gone ahead in the subsidy’s 
absence. The focus here is on sales of the same products, though there may also be impacts 
on sales of complementary or substitute products (see for example Holden and Lunduka 
(2012a) and Carneiero et al. (2012)). Knowledge of crowding-in or crowding-out is 
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crucial for understanding the impact that a subsidy programme has on the incremental 
increase in sales or use of the products being subsidised. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, recent thinking within both sectors emphasises the 
potential for subsidies to help develop private markets for inputs or PHPs through 
stimulating demand. However, the evidence base within health remains limited and that 
in agriculture seems to suggest that crowding-out effects are common and relate to 
targeting outcomes. Given that the extent of crowding-out will crucially determine the 
level of incremental increase in coverage or use arising from a subsidy programme, it is 
of great importance to further investigate crowding-out effects in PHPS programmes. The 
remainder of this section first considers how crowding-in and crowding-out are viewed 
and conceptualised in the agricultural and health literatures before looking at the relevant 
empirical evidence and methods used. 
  
3.2.1 Theoretical background 
3.2.1.1 How are the concepts viewed and conceptualised in agriculture? 
The impact that AISs can have on private input markets has long been considered an 
important issue within the agricultural literature. For example, crowding-out was one of 
the major criticisms levelled against fertiliser subsidies provided through public 
distribution systems in the World Bank’s 1986 World Development Report (World Bank, 
1986). More recently, thinking within the smart subsidy paradigm has suggested that 
subsidising inputs may instead have a positive role to play in helping to crowd-in future 
commercial purchases by stimulating demand for them. On the one hand this is thought 
to operate by encouraging farmers to try inputs and recognise their benefits (IFDC, 2003) 
or by developing links between rural farmers and input suppliers (Liverpool-Tassie, 
2012). On the other, providing the private sector is involved in selling subsidised inputs, 
it is thought that a large-scale subsidy may help to stimulate the development of input 
markets through increased demand helping the private sector to overcome start-up costs 
and capture economies of scale, which in the longer term could help to lower the 
commercial price of inputs, laying the foundations for further future commercial 
purchases (Morris et al., 2007). 
Despite the recent interest in the potentially positive role subsidies might play in 
crowding-in, there is still considerable concern over crowding-out. This is thought to arise 
through a number of mechanisms. The main focus in the current literature has been on 
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subsidies reaching those who would have purchased unsubsidised inputs anyway, as the 
subsidy will then displace those purchases, reducing the effect a subsidy programme has 
on increasing incremental use of the input (Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011, Xu et al., 2009).  
In general, crowding-out within the agricultural input subsidy literature has been 
considered in the context of the public sector being used to sell subsidised inputs, with 
crowding-out therefore generally implying negative impacts upon the private sector. For 
example, in a study of the Zambian government fertiliser subsidy programme, Xu et al. 
(2009) show that where the private sector was already well established, crowding-out was 
more likely compared to where there was lower private sector penetration. A further 
aspect to this is that, even if initial private purchases are low, if a subsidy programme 
operates through government channels and is large enough, it may prevent the emergence 
of a private fertiliser distribution and retail industry. Some authors have also argued that 
subsidy programmes may crowd-out the private sector through lowering the market price 
of unsubsidised inputs through leaked subsidised inputs being resold (Takeshima et al., 
2012). 
In the input subsidy literature, the terms crowding-out and displacement have been used 
synonymously. However, an important contrast may be made between the two terms.  
While crowding-out is generally taken to refer to the potential negative effect a policy 
may have on private sector activity, in the case where the private sector is used to sell 
subsidised inputs, then even if the receipt of a subsidised input takes the place of an 
unsubsidised input that would have been purchased anyway, this might be better termed 
a displacement effect. The reason being that those retailers involved in selling subsidised 
inputs would not actually suffer from a crowding-out effect. They may even benefit from 
temporary or longer increases in demand, in which case it would represent a case of 
crowding-in.12 Also, a distinction could then be made then with potential crowding-out 
of sales among any private sector actors that were not involved in selling subsidised inputs 
and lost sales as a result.   
A second distinction between crowding-out and displacement could also usefully be made 
in terms of the effect a subsidy has on individual consumer preferences, and would depend 
on the period over which any such effects were being observed. If the receipt of a 
subsidised input simply causes someone to purchase the subsidised input (from a 
commercial retailer) over an unsubsidised input in the short-term, but does not affect 
                                                 
12 Though there would of course be an opportunity cost of subsidies reaching individuals who would have 
purchased the products anyway in the absence of the subsidy. 
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longer-term choices, this might be better deemed a displacement effect. By contrast, if 
the receipt of a subsidy leads to longer-term changes in an individual’s willingness to 
purchase future unsubsidised inputs, this would be better deemed crowding-out. 
These nuances have so far not been made in the recent agricultural input subsidy 
literature. 
   
3.2.1.2 How are the concepts viewed and conceptualised in health? 
Within the PHPS literature, crowding-out and crowding-in have received somewhat less 
attention overall and the distinction between displacement and crowding-out is, again, not 
explicitly made. However, similar arguments to those in the AIS literature have been put 
forward recently about the potential for PHPSs to help stimulate or pump prime the 
commercial provision of PHPs through encouraging a culture of use for a product thereby 
demonstrating the commercial viability of trading in the products (Roll Back Malaria, 
2005). At the individual level, Dupas (2010) puts forward a similar argument to that by 
Xu et al. (2009) and Takeshima et al. (2012) in the AIS literature regarding crowding-in, 
which is that subsidising PHPs may help increase longer-term uptake through allowing 
for experimentation and for users to recognise the benefits or dispel unfounded 
expectations, such as costs or negative side-effects. In addition, Dupas argues that 
crowding-in may take place via social learning effects, among those who were not even 
direct beneficiaries. 
In terms of crowding-out, as in agriculture, there is at least some awareness in theory that 
targeting those who would already buy subsidised inputs may crowd-out commercial 
sales (Hanson et al., 2001, Roll Back Malaria, 2005). In addition, Dupas (2010) notes that 
those receiving subsidised PHPs may in theory be less likely to purchase commercial 
equivalents in future due to reference-dependence, i.e. anchoring around the subsidised 
price and not wishing to pay more later. A further crowding-out mechanism suggested in 
the PHPS literature is argued to operate through a large increase in aggregate demand for 
a PHP brought about by a subsidy resulting in retailers raising commercial prices, thereby 
lowering purchases of the same unsubsidised PHPs among those without a subsidy 
(Gingrich et al., 2011a). However, this appears to be predicated upon the assumption that 
supply remains fixed, as otherwise standard neoclassical theory suggests that suppliers 
should respond to an increase in demand by increasing supply, thereby bringing prices 
back down in the medium-term.  
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3.2.2 What is the state of evidence and what methods have been used? 
3.2.2.1 Health 
Hanson et al. (2001: 130) noted some time ago that ‘Very little empirical research has 
considered the impact of subsidised services on the use of commercially priced sources’ 
and that ‘The limited evidence that exists tends to be descriptive and does not allow for 
firm conclusions.’ Around the same time, Mills et al. (2002) also highlighted a similar 
gap in the evidence base relating to social marketing programmes. In the context of the 
growing subsidies on ITNs, it has been noted that there is an urgent need for research into 
the extent to which crowding-out is a problem given the potentially negative effect on the 
commercial market (Roll Back Malaria, 2005). However, since then relatively little 
appears to have changed, with few examples of rigorous empirical studies. Part of the 
reason for this may be that in the case of health there appears to be a clear tension between 
the goal of bringing about rapid gains in access and laying the foundations for longer-
term sustainable access. While there has been a considerable focus on the former, less 
attention appears to have been given to the latter (Hanson et al., 2001: 129).  
The main area where some studies have started to emerge concerns ITNs, reflecting their 
growing popularity since the turn of the century. However, very few have looked at 
impacts of subsidised ITNs on unsubsidised sales. One study has used a partial 
equilibrium model to estimate the impact of Tanzania’s ITN voucher scheme (the TNVS) 
on total ITN coverage in the wider economy (Gingrich et al., 2011a). While described in 
more detail later, in brief the TNVS has involved the distribution of vouchers to pregnant 
women and mothers of young children, entitling them to a fixed discount on an ITN at 
accredited outlets, with the remaining cost covered by the recipient. The fixed discount 
changed to a fixed price from 2009 to limit the effect of future price increases. In the 
partial equilibrium study the authors looked at the impact of the TNVS on total ITN 
coverage by estimating price elasticities of demand based on household survey data from 
2006 and used these estimates with an assumption of homogenous demand preferences 
to simulate ITN purchases under different scenarios with the subsidy vouchers worth 
different amounts. The authors estimated that while the TNVS increased overall 
purchases by around 170,000 nets compared to a counterfactual without the programme, 
the increased demand for nets through the subsidy led to a higher price for unsubsidised 
nets, causing a decline in the number of ‘non-target households’ purchasing a net from 
1.1 million to 769,810. However, while wholesale prices did increase, there are other 
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potential explanations for this, such as inflation and rising oil prices from 2007. A further 
problem of using the partial equilibrium approach is that it does not consider the effects 
of crowding-out that may arise through displacement of unsubsidised sales by subsidies 
reaching those who would have bought nets anyway. The study does also estimate a 
demand model explaining the purchase of ITNs, but includes the receipt of free nets rather 
than partially subsidised TNVS nets as a covariate. It finds the receipt of a free net within 
36 months of the survey being strongly negatively associated with the probability of 
future purchase of ITNs (p<0.01), indicating crowding-out. 
The other study that has looked at the impact of subsidised nets on unsubsidised sales 
looked at the impact of fully subsidised nets and also on reported WTP rather than actual 
purchases (Chase et al., 2009). Using a Tobit model, the authors found ownership of a 
free net to be statistically associated with decreasing demand for unsubsidised nets 
(p<0.10). 
Other related studies have looked instead at the impacts of subsidised nets on subsidised 
purchases. One experimental study in Kenya found that subsidies on LLINs may crowd-
in future purchases through experience and social learning effects (Dupas, 2010). This 
was done by comparing reported and observed WTP for nets among households who 
received different levels of subsidy. However, while there was some evidence of higher 
WTP in a number of groups who received the higher subsidy, the observed WTP was for 
another subsidised net, in some cases even more highly subsidised than the first net 
received, meaning it does not tell us directly about impacts on unsubsidised future 
purchases. 
More recently, there have been a number of studies starting to look at the impact of fully 
subsidised nets on demand for partially subsidised nets in Tanzania (Eze et al., 2014, 
Gingrich et al., 2011b, Gingrich et al., 2014). While two studies found no evidence of 
free net campaigns reducing demand, the 2014 study by Gingrich et al. did find a 
substantial immediate reduction in the number of subsidised nets being sold compared to 
predicted sales following the free net campaign by around 34%, rising to 57% after six 
months. 
  
3.2.2.2 Agriculture 
In contrast to the health literature there have been more attempts in agriculture at 
estimating crowding-in and crowding-out effects on unsubsidised sales. Part of the reason 
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for this is that the private sector in agriculture has for some decades now been considered 
within mainstream economic thinking to be the ideal long-term source of access to inputs 
and, therefore, something to be nurtured and supported. 
All of the studies make use of demand model estimation using household survey data and 
various non-linear econometric estimation methods, following on from Xu et al. (2009). 
In general terms, the models estimate demand for commercial inputs, including an 
explanatory variable that represents ownership of, or access to, subsidised inputs. 
Controlling for various other explanatory factors, the coefficient on this variable is then 
taken as the basis for estimating the level of crowding-in or crowding-out.  
A number of authors have used double hurdle models to study fertiliser subsidy 
programmes in Zambia (Xu et al., 2009), Malawi (Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011) and Nigeria 
(Liverpool-Tassie, 2012). The study from Zambia found that while there was statistically 
significant crowding-out of commercial sales overall and especially in areas of high 
private sector activity, crowding-in also appeared to take place where the private sector 
was less developed and when subsidies were targeted towards poorer households.  
In the case of the Malawi study, there was only evidence of statistically significant 
crowding-out. On average, an additional kilogram of subsidised fertiliser was found to be 
associated with the crowding-out of 0.22kg of unsubsidised fertiliser, ranging from 
0.18kg among the poorest farmers to 0.30kg among the wealthiest.  
In the case of Nigeria, results from the double hurdle model suggest that while receiving 
subsidised fertiliser did not increase the probability of participating in the private fertiliser 
market, it did increase the quantity of fertiliser purchased once the decision to participate 
had been made. Every subsidised bag was associated with an increase of 0.8 bags 
(p<0.01). 
A further study by Takeshima et al. (2012) on Nigeria adopted the same conceptual 
framework as the others but used endogenous Tobit models, treating commercial fertiliser 
prices as endogenous as they believed that subsidised fertiliser led to reductions in the 
market price of unsubsidised fertiliser due to leaked fertiliser being resold. As such, they 
went on to argue that the depression of open market prices may have led to crowding-out 
of the private sector (unless private retailers can reduce procurement costs per unit and 
make a profit selling at lower prices, which they argue is unlikely as not many private 
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dealers have access to leaked subsidised fertiliser).13 The authors also only used single-
source users (i.e. those who either bought from an unsubsidised source or subsidised 
source) and so rather than using observed subsidised fertiliser to measure crowding-out 
they proxied it for expected subsidised fertiliser quantity. Overall, they found that a 
kilogram of subsidised fertiliser reduced demand for unsubsidised fertiliser by between 
0.19 and 0.35kg. 
More recently a number of authors have extended the framework to try and account for 
evidence of diversion of subsidised fertiliser at the wholesale level, which is subsequently 
resold (Jayne et al., 2013, Mason and Jayne, 2013). By accounting for diversion, they find 
that estimates of the impact on incremental use decline. Despite an error in the algebra 
altering their estimates (Dorward and Chirwa, 2014), the general findings still hold and 
suggest that knowledge of the level of leakage occurring is crucial to ensuring more 
accurate estimates of the impact subsidy programmes have on raising incremental use of 
the products being subsidised. 
The review of both AIS and PHPS literatures reveals a number of insights. Of relevance 
here for the purpose of developing the thesis objectives are the following. First, despite 
an awareness of the potential role of PHPSs in pump-priming private input markets, it 
seems that there remains a gap in the empirical literature when it comes to looking at the 
effect PHPSs have on unsubsidised sales. This is an important omission as it means that 
we currently know fairly little about the actual effect of PHPSs in terms of overall 
incremental use. Second, the studies from the AIS literature suggest an alternative method 
to the partial equilibrium model used by Gingrich et al. (2011a) for estimating the impact 
of a PHPS programme such as the TNVS on incremental sales. Crucially, such an 
approach would allow for investigation of the effect a PHPS programme has on household 
level demand for equivalent unsubsidised PHPs. 
The TNVS emerges as an obvious case through which to study these effects. Firstly, the 
programme is of a sufficiently large scale to reasonably expect some crowding-in or 
crowding-out effects. It is also one of the first countries in SSA to have achieved universal 
coverage with a LLIN for every two people and one of the few that demonstrates such a 
strong private sector network selling mosquito nets (NATNETS, 2012). For this reason it 
provides an interesting case study. The TNVS also benefits from a number of large 
                                                 
13 This provides an interesting contrast to the view by Gingrich et al. (2011a) that a subsidy may instead 
lead to increased market prices due to increased aggregate demand, thereby crowding-out from another 
direction. 
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household level datasets containing the information required. Finally, the findings may 
then be compared and contrasted with the existing studies on the TNVS mentioned earlier.  
 
3.3 Research objectives 
Based on the foregoing review, the remainder of the thesis is aimed towards answering 
the following research objectives: 
 
1. To explore socioeconomic-related inequalities relating to coupon allocation, coupon 
redemption, and use of subsidised inputs in the Malawi FISP between 2006/07 and 
2012/13. 
2. To identify and assess the importance of different factors that determined the 
allocation and redemption of subsidy coupons in the FISP and use of subsidised inputs 
among smallholder households. 
3. To estimate the impact that the TNVS had on commercial ITN sales and overall ITN 
coverage between 2005 and 2008. 
4. To assess policy implications arising from the empirical findings for the design and 
implementation of AIS and PHPS programmes. 
 
Chapters four, five and six address the first three objectives respectively, each being based 
upon separate research papers. Objective four is partly addressed within each of the 
discussion sections of these chapters and more fully elaborated in the final overall 
discussion chapter, where there will be some overlap with previous results and discussion 
sections. 
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Preamble to research paper one 
The following chapter presents a quantitative research paper investigating research 
objective one of the thesis, to explore socioeconomic-related inequalities relating to 
coupon allocation, coupon redemption, and use of subsidised inputs in the Malawi FISP 
between 2006/07 and 2012/13. 
Using three rounds of household survey data (2006/07, 2008/09 and 2012/13) the paper 
applies methods drawn from the literature on PHPSs in order to investigate the extent of 
socioeconomic-related inequality in the transmission of fertiliser subsidies to 
beneficiaries in Malawi’s FISP.  
The chapter is adapted from an article being submitted to Agricultural Economics. Luke 
Harman designed the study, analysed the data and drafted the paper. Professor Andrew 
Dorward and Dr Catherine Goodman provided advice and support throughout the 
research process, including comments at the drafting stage. 
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4 Measuring targeting outcomes in Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy 
Programme: an application of concentration curves and 
concentration indices 
 
 
Abstract 
Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) has attracted much attention after being 
credited by some with engineering an agricultural-led boom and reversing the country’s 
chronic food insecurity, and criticism from others as an ineffective and wasteful use of 
government resources. A critical issue for the programme’s effectiveness concerns the 
extent of access to subsidies by intended beneficiaries. While various studies have 
estimated targeting outcomes, they have typically relied on coefficients from particular 
subsidy participation equations, providing a limited insight into how outcomes may vary 
across the full sample of households. This paper applies concentration curves (CCs) and 
concentration indices (CIs), previously unused within the agricultural input subsidy 
literature, offering new insights into the socioeconomic-related inequality of targeting 
outcomes. The study also updates earlier studies by drawing on the 2012/13 household 
survey, allowing for comparisons over time, and looks at a variety of targeting outcomes 
from coupon receipt to input use. Results suggest that, while there have been 
improvements (e.g. CIs for the volume of fertiliser received declined from 0.12 to 0.06 
between 2006/07 and 2012/13), the FISP continues to disproportionately benefit less poor 
households. The findings question the wisdom of continuing with the current approach of 
relying on community-based targeting. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The past decade has seen a renaissance in the use of AISs in LMICs, particularly in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013a). After falling out of favour during 
the period of structural adjustment in the 1980s, it was increasingly recognised during the 
1990s that AISs may be justified in certain situations to address the need for agricultural 
intensification for poverty reduction and food security (Reardon et al., 1995). More 
recently, new thinking has gained ground recognising the potential such policies have for 
helping overcome poverty traps, improving food security, and even supporting broad-
based economic growth in poor agricultural economies (Dorward, 2009). While there 
remain those that are more sceptical of the economic justifications for AISs, they 
recognise that AISs are here to stay and have sought to provide guidance on how to make 
them ‘Market-Smart’ (Jayne and Rashid, 2013, Morris et al., 2007). 
One notable difference between pre-structural adjustment subsidy policies and the new 
wave of AIS programs (AISPs) is the greater emphasis now placed on targeting. Part of 
the reason for this is the need to limit fiscal outlays in the presence of budgetary 
constraints. Another is the attempt to avoid a number of key criticisms levelled against 
fertiliser subsidies, including regressive distribution of benefits, crowding-out of the 
private sector and rent-seeking (Morris et al., 2007). Despite the official move towards 
targeted AISs, a recent review of evidence from SSA concluded that in three out of the 
four countries covered, wealthier and more politically connected households appear to 
capture a higher proportion of the overall subsidy (Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2013a). 
This paper revisits the issue of beneficiary level targeting outcomes in Malawi’s Farm 
Input Subsidy Programme (FISP). Despite a large literature measuring targeting 
outcomes in the FISP, most studies have been based on data prior to 2009/10, though a 
number of significant changes have taken place within Malawi and the FISP since 
2008/09.14 Studies to date have also relied heavily upon the use of multivariate regression 
to estimate particular targeting outcomes, which provide individual coefficients, making 
it difficult to appreciate how relationships may change over the full distribution of a 
continuous indicator such as wealth.15 They also do not explicitly recognise the various 
                                                 
14 Exceptions are Kilic et al. (2013) and evaluation reports (Dorward and Chirwa, 2011b, Dorward et al., 
2013). The re-election of the late President Bingu wa Mutharika in 2009 marked a key turning point in the 
FISP, with an end to supplementary coupons and the continued advocacy of “open meetings” initiated in 
the 2008/09 season. From the 2008/09 season there was also a regional shift in coupon allocation away 
from the northern region (Dorward et al., 2013). 
15 Again, Kilic et al. (2013) is an exception that does use a wider range of methods (see section three of this 
chapter). 
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steps involved in the subsidy allocation-use process. Malawi’s FISP is an interesting case 
as not only has it attracted the greatest amount of interest of the recent AISPs, with a large 
body of evidence against which to compare findings, but the programme is also one of 
the longest running of the recent AISPs, allowing for analysis over time. 
This study draws on methods used in a parallel literature on public health product 
subsidies, namely concentration curves (CCs) and concentration indices (CIs). CCs offer 
a richer and more visual depiction of socioeconomic-related inequality associated with 
targeting, with CIs permitting quantitative comparison over time. The study also adopts 
a more holistic conceptualisation of the targeting process, analysing a range of targeting 
outcome indicators in order to compare inequality at each of the three main stages of the 
subsidy allocation-use process (see section 3). Finally, targeting outcomes are brought up 
to date by using data from the most recent 2012/13 Farm Input Subsidy Survey (FISS), 
therefore allowing for comparison of changing outcomes from 2006/07. 
The paper finds that despite some improvement since 2006/07, receipt of any fertiliser 
coupon still occurs disproportionately among households ranked higher on indicators of 
wealth based on assets and income. Estimated inequality appears to increase according to 
CCs if you take into account the number of fertiliser coupons acquired. While 
socioeconomic-related inequality in redemption of coupons for fertiliser is less 
pronounced, CIs indicate a marginal degree of inequality, and considerable inequalities 
continue to exist in terms of the amount of subsidised fertiliser acquired. Finally, the CI 
for 2008/09 provides some evidence to support the hypothesis that poorer recipient 
households may be slightly more prone to misuse of subsidised fertiliser, though this is 
contradicted by bivariate summary statistics for the 2012/13 season, urging caution in 
what conclusions can be drawn.  
The findings cast serious doubt over the effectiveness of the current targeting mechanisms 
being used to target resource-poor households. Drawing on findings from the qualitative 
work carried in chapter 5, the paper argues that a key part of the problem lies in authority 
held by village leaders in decision-making relating to beneficiary identification and 
coupon allocation. The case for a rationed universal subsidy among smallholder farmers 
is considered along with an alternative proxy means test option. 
The next section reviews the theory on who should be targeted by AISs. Section 4.3 then 
provides a background to Malawi, the FISP and its targeting processes and also reviews 
the evidence on targeting in the FISP. Section 4.4 presents the methods before 
presentation of results in section 4.5 followed by a discussion in section 4.6. 
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4.2 Theoretical background: who should receive input subsidies? 
To get a sense of who should receive AISs from an economic perspective it is important 
to return to one of the underlying economic rationales for input subsidies. As Barker and 
Hayami noted back in the 1970s, the level of modern inputs used in the production of 
staple crops may often be much lower than the economically optimal level, defined as the 
point at which marginal value of production (MVP) equals marginal factor costs (MFC) 
(Barker and Hayami, 1976). Reasons for this include low awareness of the benefits of 
inputs, risk-aversion, and profitability and affordability constraints due to a high input-
output price ratio and lack of access to cash or credit (Barker and Hayami, 1976, Dorward, 
2009, Lele, 1990). Therefore, in the context of poor subsistence-based economies with 
high input costs and limited access to cash or credit, large numbers of poor farmers may 
not apply economically optimal levels of fertiliser or other inputs. In turn, with problems 
of low soil fertility, declining land size per household and a rapidly growing population, 
in countries such as Malawi, households are likely to produce insufficient food and have 
limited options for income generation through sales of surplus staples or other crops. 
A further reason as to why it may be better to target poorer rather than wealthier 
households relates to avoiding overuse of inputs. If wealthier households are more likely 
to use an economically optimal (or near optimal) level of inputs, then reducing the price 
of inputs through a subsidy could lead to an inefficient over-use among such households, 
which would not necessarily lead to any further increase in production but may lead to 
negative environmental impacts. 
A further efficiency-based argument for targeting poorer households is that in doing so 
you are less likely to displace or ‘crowd out’ unsubsidised purchases that farmers would 
have otherwise made, with targeting thus more likely to maximise incremental input use 
and hence the production response and related benefits arising from a subsidy programme 
(Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011). 
All of the above suggest that there may be efficiency, equity, and household food security 
reasons as to why AISs should be targeted to poorer households. One potential counter-
argument questions the productive efficiency of poorer as compared with wealthier 
households and it has been suggested that some governments may be inclined to subsidise 
wealthier larger farmers who may be more likely to produce a surplus, with a view to 
maximising national staple production to feed urban areas (Burke et al., 2012). Whether 
or not wealthier households are more productive, the latter point highlights the crucial 
importance programme objectives play when deciding which farmers to target. 
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4.3 Background to Malawi and targeting in the FISP 
4.3.1 Country background 
Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world. Its Gross National Income (GNI) per 
capita of US$ 320 in 2012 was almost half the weighted average of all low-income 
countries (World Bank, 2012). In 2010, half of the country’s population of 14.5 million 
were below the national poverty line (World Bank, 2012). Malawi’s economy is highly 
dependent upon agriculture, with 85% of the country’s population engaged in agricultural 
activities but with average plot sizes of just 1.4 hectares in 2009/10 (NSO, 2012: 131). 
Maize is by far the predominant staple crop, grown by almost all agricultural households 
(NSO, 2005). 
While Malawi is thought to have been largely nationally self-sufficient in maize 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, often with a surplus to export to the region (Harrigan, 
2008), a combination of factors have led to declining per capita aggregate maize 
availability, until the beginning of the FISP in 2005/06, including but not limited to a 
continued high dependence on rain-fed agriculture, vulnerability to weather shocks, 
damaging effects on smallholder farmers arising from the promotion of large-scale 
(estate) agriculture and a rapidly growing population (Harrigan, 2008: 238, Kydd and 
Christiansen, 1982). It is also acknowledged by a number of authors that the conditions 
of the Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Loans implemented during the 1980s were 
inappropriate and poorly sequenced, with the emphasis on cash crops having a negative 
effect on the production of maize, and removal of fertiliser subsidies in particular 
reducing the profitability of maize production (Harrigan, 2003: 849). 
 
4.3.2 Overview of the FISP, targeting criteria and procedures 
A large number of AISs have come and gone in Malawi throughout the post-independence 
period against a backdrop of fluctuating donor support that has taken a number of ‘U-
turns’ (Harrigan, 2003). The most recent – the FISP – started in 2005/06 following severe 
maize shortages from the previous season. A consistent objective of the FISP has been 
‘to improve resource-poor smallholder famers’ access to improved agricultural inputs in 
order to achieve their and national food self-sufficiency and to raise these famers’ 
incomes through increased food and cash crop production.’ (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013a: 
89). However, since 2005/06 a number of changes have taken place in the programme’s 
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design as well as the social, political and economic setting, addressed in more detail in 
Chirwa and Dorward (2013a). 
The essence of the programme design has involved targeting approximately 50% of 
smallholder farmers in the country with a set of vouchers (known as coupons) redeemable 
for fertiliser and improved maize seed and, from 2007/08, legume seed, at designated 
outlets after payment of a set top-up fee (see Table 8).16 While coupon and input sharing 
between households is discouraged, in practice it is widespread, particularly in the central 
and southern regions (Dorward et al., 2013). 
In 2006/07 and 2007/08 fertiliser was made available through major retailers and two 
parastatals - the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) and 
the Smallholder Farmers Fertiliser Revolving Fund of Malawi. However, since 2008/09 
it has only been available through the two parastatals. Coupons for maize and legume 
seeds have been redeemable at a wide range of seed retailers. Evidence from the study in 
chapter 5 and elsewhere indicates that coupon recipients can face considerable obstacles 
in accessing subsidised inputs (Mvula et al., 2011). 
Targeting in the FISP first involves area-level (district) targeting and then beneficiary 
level targeting. Formal area targeting criteria have been based around acreage under 
maize production (and tobacco until 2009/10) - with higher maize producing districts 
supposed to receive a higher portion of the overall coupons – with increasing attention 
paid to the number of farm households in different areas from 2007/08. By 2012/13, 
poverty levels were also supposed to help determine the number of coupons allocated 
between districts.17 However, one recent report found that in 2013/14, coupon allocations 
to the eight districts that were studied appeared to be based more on farm family 
population rather than poverty incidence (CISANET, 2014), raising questions over how 
equitable district-level targeting is from a socioeconomic perspective. Independent 
programme evaluations from 2012/13 and 2013/14 also highlight the same discrepancies 
(Dorward et al., 2014, Dorward et al., 2013). 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Other inputs such as maize storage chemicals and cotton seed have been available at different times but 
fertiliser, maize and legume seed form the core focus of the programme. 
17 Interview with senior staff member at the MoAFS headquarters, June 2013. 
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Table 8: Overview of subsidy packages for selected years 
 
Sources: (Dorward et al., 2010, Logistics Unit, 2007, Logistics Unit, 2009, MoAFS, 2012, 
SOAS et al., 2008). Notes: (i) For 2006/07 to 2008/09 this includes initial and 
supplementary coupons. (ii) US$ 1 = 385 MWK as of 10th June 2014 (Oanda.com). (iii) 
Absence of certified seed in 2008/09 and 2009/10 meant it depended on what was 
available locally. The number of tobacco packages available until 2008/09 was far 
smaller than for maize. In 2006/07, however, coupons for maize and tobacco fertiliser 
were identical and so those allocated for tobacco could be redeemed for maize fertilisers 
(SOAS et al., 2008). 
 
 
 2006/07 2008/09 2012/13 
Maize fertiliser 
packages 
One 50kg bag of 
Nitrogen 
Phosphorus 
Potassium (NPK) & 
one 50kg bag of 
urea 
As per 2006/7 As per 2006/07 
Tobacco fertiliser 
packages 
One 50kg bag of D 
compound & one 
50kg bag of Calcium 
Ammonium Nitrate 
(CAN) 
As per 2006/7 None 
Fertiliser coupon 
allowance for 
eligible 
households 
One for NPK and 
one for urea (or one 
for D compound and 
one for CAN) 
As per 2006/07 As per 2006/07 
except coupons for 
cash crops not 
available 
Fertiliser 
coupons 
distributed i 
4 million 3.9 million 3.4 million 
Top-up price for 
fertiliser in 
Malawian 
Kwacha (MWK) ii 
950 800 500 
Maize seed 
packages 
2kg hybrid or 3-4kg 
Open Pollenated 
Variety (OPV) 
2kg hybrid or 4kg OPV 5kg hybrid or 8kg 
OPV. 
Maize coupons 
distributed 
2 million 1.5 million 1.7 million 
Top-up price for 
maize seed 
(MWK) 
None None No more than 
150MWK, for hybrid 
only 
Maize coupon 
allowance 
One coupon One coupon One coupon 
Additional 
packages and 
allowances 
None 1m flexi vouchers for 
5kg cotton or 
unspecified sized 
packs of beans, 
pigeon peas, 
groundnuts or maize.iii 
One coupon with face 
value of 680MWK. 
200,000 cotton 
chemical vouchers 
(face value 50MWK). 
Maize storage 
pesticides (no details 
available). 
Legume seed pack 
containing either 2kg 
of groundnuts, 
beans, cowpeas, or 
pigeon peas, or 3kg 
of soya beans. No 
top-up required. 
Each beneficiary 
entitled to 200g 
bottle of maize 
storage pesticide 
(100MWK top-up). 
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During the early years of the programme, the average number of fertiliser coupons 
redeemed per household was considerably higher in the northern region compared to the 
central and southern regions. This changed from 2008/09, with a drop in coupons issued 
in the northern and central regions while those in the southern region continued to rise, 
such that by 2009/10 the number received per household had more or less equalized 
across the regions (Dorward et al., 2013: 14). Prior to 2009/10 a considerable number of 
supplementary coupons were also distributed after the initial allocation (around 30% of 
the initially authorised figure) in a way that has been described as ‘much more opaque as 
regards systems, criteria, and numbers of coupons distributed’ (Chirwa and Dorward, 
2013a: 101). It has been reported that many of the supplementary coupons were allocated 
disproportionately to the northern region, with evidence to suggest it may have been the 
result of political influence (Chinsinga and Poulton, 2014). Another study found districts 
won by the ruling party in the last presidential election received more subsidised maize 
seed and fertiliser in 2006/07 and 2008/09 (Mason and Ricker-Gilbert, 2012). While area 
targeting is a crucially important area of study (given that it ultimately determines how 
many coupons are available within specific villages) this paper focuses on targeting 
outcomes at the beneficiary level. 
From 2006/07 the FISP aimed to target full-time farmers that could not afford one or two 
bags of unsubsidised fertiliser. By 2008/09 the emphasis was on targeting ‘resource poor’ 
land-owning households, with an increasing emphasis on vulnerable households, such as 
those that are female-headed or child-headed, the elderly, guardians of those who are 
disabled, or people living with HIV/AIDS (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013a: 227). 
In 2006/07 a range of different individuals were supposed to be involved in beneficiary 
selection, including local leaders, Traditional Authorities, VDCs and MoAFS staff. 
Systems varied between areas. Attempts were made to bring greater accountability in 
2008/09 by using a farm household register to help identify beneficiaries and encouraging 
open community meetings for allocation, led by the MoAFS. In practice, however, 
evidence from chapter 5 suggests that meetings may often be used to announce who has 
already been chosen by local leaders. 
Since 2009/10, the voter identification numbers of beneficiaries were required to be 
written next to their names, with the list sent to the MoAFS before being sent back to 
extension officers who were supposed to distribute coupons to beneficiaries following 
verification of their voter identification cards (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013a). 
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4.3.3 Review of evidence on beneficiary targeting in the FISP 
A recent review of selected AISPs in Africa writes that ‘…the general finding from 
Malawi is that the most vulnerable households are not sufficiently included in the subsidy 
program, and that the targeting system does not work particularly well’ (Ricker-Gilbert 
et al., 2013a). Most evidence on targeting outcomes in the FISP is based on estimated 
coefficients from subsidy participation equations, in which particular targeting outcomes 
(e.g. receipt of any coupons or amount of subsidised fertiliser received) are explained by 
a range of socioeconomic and other factors (Chibwana et al., 2012, Holden and Lunduka, 
2010a, Holden and Lunduka, 2010b, Kilic et al., 2013, Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne, 2011, 
Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011). Results from these studies generally suggest that the receipt 
of any coupons and the level of benefit received in terms of the number or value of 
coupons or amount of subsidised fertiliser, increases with measures of socioeconomic 
status (SES), such as the value of household assets and land size. There are a few 
exceptions to this, such as Chibwana et al. (2012) finding a negative association between 
farm size and receipt of maize seed and Holden and Lunduka finding a negative 
association between receipt of a fertiliser coupon and value of household assets (2010a) 
and a positive association between application of subsidised fertiliser and being land poor 
and a negative association with farm size per capita (2010b). However, these may be due 
to sample effects, with these three studies drawing on a much smaller sample. Indeed, the 
main general findings above are supported by bivariate associations reported in the 
biennial independent evaluations covering 2006/07 to 2012/13 (Dorward and Chirwa, 
2011b, Dorward et al., 2013, Dorward et al., 2010, SOAS et al., 2008). 
In addition to estimating participation equations, Kilic et al. (2013) also carried out a 
population-share-based decomposition to calculate two national targeting coefficients for 
the 2009/10 season; one based on the difference between the share of ‘eligible’ population 
participating in the programme (coverage) and the share of the ‘non-eligible’ population 
participating (leakage) and another on the difference between the average value of 
subsidy among the eligible population and non-eligible population. Three indicators of 
resource poor eligibility were used: being in the bottom 40% of either annual household 
per capita consumption expenditure, wealth index values or total landholding. Results 
suggest that between 52% and 57% of recipients of ‘any coupon’ were non-eligible and 
the value of subsidy (based on coupons received) acquired by non-eligible households 
was higher than eligible households when based on a wealth index and total landholding. 
They conclude that the programme reaches ‘all socioeconomic strata of rural Malawi’ 
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and that ‘If there is any targeting, it is in the middle of the welfare distribution’ (Kilic et 
al., 2013: 4). 
One limitation of the studies above is that outcomes may be dependent upon the choice 
of outcome indicator used, which could lead to different estimates depending on which 
stage of the subsidy allocation and use process one focuses on. For example, in the 
2012/13 Farm Input Subsidy Survey (FISS) 7.7% of fertiliser coupon holders did not 
successfully redeem all of their fertiliser coupons (Table 12). This means that receipt of 
coupons or number of coupons received may not always be a good measure of targeting 
outcomes. Therefore, what is needed is a more holistic approach to measuring 
participation in the FISP from receipt of coupons to their redemption and eventual use of 
subsidised inputs. Within each of these stages, there may also be differences depending 
on the specific indicator used (e.g. whether it is receipt of any coupon or number of 
coupons received). 
A further limitation of the body of evidence is that most studies focus on targeting 
outcomes from 2009/10 or before (though the programme evaluations for 2010/11 and 
2012/13 use more recent data), although there have subsequently been a number of major 
changes to programme modalities as well as to the socio-political and economic context 
in Malawi. There is therefore a need to update our understanding of targeting outcomes 
using more recent data. This also allows us to look into how targeting outcomes have 
changed over the years. 
Finally, aside from the above study by Kilic et al., the use of alternative methods for 
estimating targeting outcomes of the FISP or other recent AISPs has been limited, with 
one known exception being the use of Benefit Incidence Analysis by Osorio et al. (2011) 
to estimate the share of subsidy captured by those in different wealth categories in 
Indonesia. While regression analysis is certainly useful for measuring targeting, the 
individual coefficients it produces do not always provide a clear or intuitive sense of 
actual targeting outcomes and how they might vary across the full distribution of a 
particular sample or population. 
This paper uses concentration curves and concentration indices (CCs and CIs) to estimate 
the socioeconomic-related inequality of a range of targeting outcomes in 2006/07, 
2008/09 and 2012/13 with a wealth index used to rank households by SES. These 
methods, explained further below, have been widely used in the health literature on public 
health product subsidies and other health interventions, e.g. (Dingle et al., 2013, Noor et 
al., 2007, Webster et al., 2005), but so far have not been used in the AISP literature. 
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4.4 Methods 
4.4.1 Summary of methods 
Given the importance attached to achieving pro-poor outcomes in many health 
interventions, a number of methods are used within the health literature to estimate the 
socioeconomic-related inequality of health outcomes. These include equity ratios, benefit 
incidence analysis and - the two methods used in this paper – CCs and CIs.  
A CC represents how the cumulative percentage of an outcome (e.g. receipt of a subsidy 
voucher) (y-axis) is distributed among the cumulative percentage of the population when 
ranked by some measure of SES, from poorest to richest (x-axis). If the outcome is 
distributed perfectly equally among all households regardless of their SES, the CC would 
lie directly on an upwards sloping 45-degree line of perfect equality (see Figure 10). 
A CC lying above (below) the 45-degree line indicates the outcome is disproportionately 
distributed among the poor (rich). A dominance test can then be run to determine whether 
a particular CC can be said to lie above another, or above or below the 45-degree line, 
with a degree of statistical confidence. The test is described further below. Given this 
visual representation of how an outcome changes across the full distribution of a given 
population, CCs overcome the problems associated with the individual coefficients that 
are provided by regression estimates, providing a richer, more visual and intuitive insight. 
To facilitate comparison across space and time, CIs can be derived from the CCs, with 
the CI being calculated as ‘twice the area between the concentration curve and the line of 
equality’ (O'Donnell et al., 2008: 95). Therefore, if the CC lies at every point directly on 
the line of equality, the CI will be zero. If the CC lies everywhere above (below) the line 
of equality, the CI takes a negative (positive) value. Given that a CI may also equal zero 
if a CC crosses the 45-degree line and if the areas above and below cancel each other out, 
it is important to interpret a CI in combination with its respective CC. 
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Figure 10: Concentration curve as measure of equity  
 
Source: Adapted from Webster et al. (2005) 
 
 
 
4.4.2 Application of concentration curves and concentration indices 
CCs, dominance tests and CIs were estimated for the 2006/07, 2008/09 and 2012/13 
seasons using Stata 13. The analysis drew on the .ado files glcurve, dominance and 
conindex.18 After estimating CCs, dominance tests were carried out at the 5% significance 
level. Two decision rules were used: the Multiple Comparison Approach (MCA) and a 
more restrictive Intersection Union Principle (IUP). Both approaches checked for a 
statistically significant difference between two curves at 19 quantile points. While MCA 
will reject the null hypothesis of non-dominance if just one significant difference exists 
between the curves in one direction (providing there is no significant difference in the 
other), IUP requires a significant difference between the curves at all quantile points 
(O'Donnell et al., 2008: 88). 
To facilitate comparison of inequalities over time, CIs were then calculated. One must be 
careful of making comparisons across outcome indicators, especially those with different 
                                                 
18 Glcurve and dominance are available using the findit command. Conindex has not yet been released and 
was developed by Stephen O’Neil, Brendan Walsh, Tom Van Ourti and Owen O’Donnell 
(National University of Ireland, Galway and Erasmus University Rotterdam). 
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means, given how the CI is calculated. As per Equation 1, a CI can be defined in terms of 
the covariance between the outcome variable (o) and the fractional rank in the living 
standards distribution (r), which is simply 𝑖
𝑁
 where i is the rank of a particular observation 
within the population N (Kakwani, 1980). The variable μ represents the mean of the 
outcome variable. 
 
𝐂𝐈 =  
𝟐
𝝁
 𝒄𝒐𝒗 (𝒐, 𝒓) 
 
Equation 1 
 
As this definition shows, a CI does not depend on any variation in the living standards 
variable itself, just on the relationship between the outcome indicator and rank in the 
living standards variable. This means that, providing the rankings remain unchanged, a 
CI need not change in response to a change in the degree of income inequality (O'Donnell 
et al., 2008). 
To calculate the CI, the convenient regression method in Equation 2 was used based on 
the covariance definition in Equation 1, following Kakwani et al. (1997). Equation 2 was 
estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), where σ2r is the variance of the fractional 
rank, oi is the outcome variable for the ith observation and μ is the mean of that variable. 
The estimated β then becomes the CI, α is a constant and εi are the estimated residuals. 
Sample weights were applied in calculating the covariance, mean of the outcome variable 
and fractional rank. Given the likely autocorrelation arising form the ranked explanatory 
variable, a Newey-West regression was adopted to provide standard errors robust to 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (O'Donnell et al., 2008). 
 
𝟐 𝝈𝒓𝟐  (
𝒐𝒊
𝝁
) =  𝜶 + 𝜷 𝒓𝒊 + 𝝐𝒊 
 
Equation 2 
 
One complication in calculating CIs arises when using dichotomous variables. While for 
continuous variables the CI is bounded between -1 and 1, with dichotomous variables the 
bounds of the CI depend on the mean of the variable (Erreygers, 2009a, Wagstaff, 2005). 
This can complicate comparison of CIs for the same outcome across different samples 
where the means are different.  
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As described below, some of the outcome variables considered in this study are 
dichotomous. Where this was the case, the standard CIs were corrected using both 
Wagstaff’s normalisation and Erreyger’s correction (see Appendix 6 for further details). 
Both approaches produced CIs, which ranked outcomes equally over time but 
demonstrated differences in absolute values, with Wagstaff’s normalisation resulting in 
higher estimates. This may be due to the tendency of Wagstaff’s approach to exaggerate 
the levels of measured inequality for distributions with high or low means (Erreygers, 
2009b). As such, only results using Erreyger’s correction are presented as the levels 
produced appear to be most consistent with the CCs and original CIs.  
Finally, p-values for z-scores were used to identify whether the CIs were statistically 
different from zero at the 5% significance level. The conindex command was then used 
to estimate statistical difference between curves for different years, also at the 5% 
significance level. 
 
4.4.3 Data  
The paper draws on three rounds of household survey data from the Agricultural Input 
Subsidy Surveys (AISSs), later renamed FISSs, gathered as part of an ongoing external 
evaluation commissioned by the UK’s Department for International Development. 
Interviews were carried out every two years from 2007, covering the previous agricultural 
season. As the sample size of the household survey for 2010/11 was relatively small and 
not nationally representative it is excluded from the analysis.19 Interviews for the 2006/07 
and 2008/09 surveys were carried out in May and June with those for the 2012/13 survey 
in April and May. 
The 2006/07 sample consisted of a 3,298 household subsample of the earlier Integrated 
Household Survey 2, stratified by district and livelihood zone. Within each district, 175 
clusters known as Enumeration Areas (EAs) were selected randomly based on probability 
proportionate to size. Within each EA, 20 households were then randomly selected, with 
between 16 and 21 households interviewed per EA. The total sample covered what was 
at the time 26 districts (SOAS et al., 2008: 16). As with all subsequent surveys, only rural 
households were sampled. The 2008/09 sample was drawn from the 2006/07 survey, 
though due to a smaller budget, it used a subsample of 60 EAs and 1,982 households. 
                                                 
19 While the 2009/10 data from the Third Integrated Household Survey (IHS3) could be used to fill the gap, 
the significant sampling differences with the other surveys used here would themselves likely introduce 
heterogeneity in the results. 
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Finally, the 2012/13 survey was not designed as a panel follow-up, though it drew from 
13 of the 14 districts included in the 2008/09 AISS, with a similar sample size of 2,001 
households. Table 9 provides a summary of each sample, including composition by 
region. The numbers of households interviewed by district and by livelihood zone are 
presented in Appendix 8 and Appendix 9 respectively. 
 
 
Table 9: Summary statistics from households surveys 
 
Dataset AISS-1 AISS-2 FISS-4 
Year of data collection 2007 2009 2013 
Reference season for coupon receipt 2006/07 2008/09 2012/13 
Households interviewed 
Part of previous panel i 
3,298 
2,874 
1,982 
1,546 
2,001 
0 
Households by region 
Northern 
Central  
Southern 
 
529 (16%) 
1161 (35%) 
1608 (49%) 
 
380 (19%) 
719 (36%) 
883 (45%) 
 
360 (18%) 
720 (36%) 
921 (46%) 
Total individuals 17,145 10,889 9,530 
Average household size 
Mean 
Median 
Standard deviation 
 
5.2 
5 
2.4 
 
5.5 
5 
2.4 
 
4.8 
5 
2.1 
Gender of household head ii 
Male 
Female 
 
2,433 (74%) 
865 (26%) 
 
1,454 (74%) 
521 (26%) 
 
1,479 (74%) 
522 (26%) 
Highest educational qualification of 
head iii 
None 
Primary School Leaving Certificate 
Junior Certificate Examination  
Malawi School Certificate in 
Education 
Non-University Diploma  
University Diploma/Degree  
Other certificates 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
1,224 (76%) 
198 (12%) 
114 (7%) 
 
58 (4%) 
11 (1%) 
3 (0.2%) 
8 (0.5%) 
 
Source: 2006/07 and 2008/09 AISSs and 2012/13 FISS. Statistics are un-weighted. 
Notes: (i) Households part of the previous survey. For AISS-1 this means part of the 
Integrated Household Survey 2. (ii) In AISS-2, seven households with both a male and 
female head were excluded for this statistic. (iii) No questions were asked regarding 
education in AISS1 or AISS2 and a number of missing observations exist in FISS4. 
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4.4.4 Indicator selection 
The main measure of SES used to rank households was a wealth index covering the 
amount of land owned, counts of household assets and livestock, and binary variables for 
the quality of housing (see Appendix 7). The index was compiled using Principal 
Components Analysis (PCA) (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001). The inclusion criteria for 
household assets was that at least 5% of the sample must have reported ownership as any 
less would not have contributed significantly to the index. The same variables were then 
used for the 2008/09 and 2012/13 indices. The weights used are taken from the first 
component of the PCA, which is the linear combination that maximises the variance in 
the observed indicators (Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006). The first principal component 
accounted for approximately 23% of variation across the samples. In a small number of 
cases where missing values were reported for housing in 2008/09 and 2012/13, the modal 
housing characteristics for the village were applied.  
While the asset index is the preferred indicator, A second and third measure of SES were 
also used to check that findings were robust to choice of welfare indicator, as choice of 
indicator has been found to be important in measuring inequality in other work using CCs 
and CIs (Lindelow, 2006). The measures were total (net) household income and 
household income per capita. However, reporting of household income is known to suffer 
from potentially significant measurement error both non-intentional and intentional, and 
there is some recognition that it is likely to often be underreported (Psacharopoulos, 1997, 
World Bank, 2010: 67). Therefore the asset index was used as the preferred primary 
indicator of SES. 
A small proportion of sampled households reported not owning any land (3% in 2006/07, 
2% in 2008/09, and 6.3% in 2012/13). As according to FISP criteria these households 
should not be targeted, an argument could be made that they should be excluded from the 
analysis as if such households were also among the poorest, including these technically 
ineligible households may overstate the otherwise unfair inequalities. However, 
landlessness turned out to be evenly distributed across wealth quintiles and removing 
them made no difference to results and so they were kept in the sample. 
A number of outcome indicators were constructed covering each stage of the subsidy 
allocation-use process in order to investigate the importance of indicator selection (Table 
10). The focus on fertiliser and fertiliser coupons was decided on the basis that they 
represent by far the most financially valuable aspect of the FISP to beneficiaries. 
   95 
Table 10: Outcome indicators used in estimation of concentration curves and 
concentration indices 
 
Stage in subsidy 
allocation-use 
process 
Outcome indicator Type of 
variable 
Coupon allocation Receipt of any fertiliser coupon Dichotomous 
Number of fertiliser coupons received Count 
Access to subsidised 
inputs 
Redemption of all fertiliser coupons 
received (among coupon recipients) 
Dichotomous 
Volume of subsidised fertiliser received 
(among coupon recipients) 
Continuous 
Use of subsidised 
inputs 
If no ‘other use’ was reported for any 
subsidised fertiliser received (among those 
who redeemed at least one fertiliser 
coupon) 
Dichotomous 
 
 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Summary statistics 
Table 11 shows the percentage of households reporting receipt of different numbers of 
coupons and the average volumes of subsidised fertiliser acquired. One immediate 
observation is that outcomes are not consistent with MoAFS guidelines that each 
beneficiary household should receive two fertiliser coupons plus either one maize seed 
coupon (2006/07) or a maize coupon and additional ‘flexi’ or legume coupon (2008/09 
and 2012/13 respectively). What this indicates, along with the decreasing average number 
of fertiliser coupons among beneficiary households and the declining average volume of 
subsidised fertiliser per recipient household, is increased sharing of packages. Given this, 
we might hypothesise that in so far as there is any socioeconomic-inequality in targeting, 
it will be better explained by looking at the number of coupons or amount of inputs 
received rather than the dichotomous variables for the same stages.20 One can also see a 
peak in fertiliser coupon receipt in 2008/09, demonstrated by the lowest proportion of 
households reporting receipt of no coupons with only a small fall in the average fertiliser 
receipt per recipient household. 
                                                 
20 The higher proportion of households reporting receipt of a full package in 2012/13 appears due to the 
much increased access to seeds as the proportion getting two fertiliser coupons was statistically lower, by 
around half. 
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Table 11: Weighted percentage of households by number of coupons received and 
average quantity of subsidised fertiliser received per household 
 
 AISS1 AISS2 FISS4 
 06/07 
n=3298 
08/09 
n=1982 
12/13 
n=2001 
Fertiliser coupons % 
[95% CI] 
%  
[95% CI] 
%  
[95% CI] 
0 43.8 
[40.6, 46.9] 
29.3 
[25.4, 33.6] 
39.4 
[35.7, 43.3] 
0.5 0 2.3 
[1.4, 3.6] 
10.2 
[7.4, 14.1] 
1 26.2 
[23.7, 28.9] 
35.4 
[31.2, 39.8] 
32.9 
[29.2, 36.8] 
2 24.1 
[21.5, 26.9] 
28.7 
[25.0, 32.5] 
16.9 
[14.2, 19.9] 
>2 5.9 
[4.8, 7.3] 
4.4  
[3.3, 5.8] 
0.6 
[0.3, 1.2] 
Average fertiliser coupons    
Mean fertiliser coupons per 
recipient household 
1.8 
[1.68, 1.93] 
1.6 
[1.50, 1.66] 
1.2 
[1.15, 1.28] 
Average fertiliser volume 
(kilograms)   
 
Mean fertiliser among 
recipients 
 
Modal fertiliser among 
recipients 
88.4 
[84.3, 92.4] 
 
50 
75.58  
[71.5, 79.6] 
 
50 
58.2  
[54.9, 61.5] 
 
50 
Seed coupons (maize or 
legume) 
% [95% CI] % [95% CI] % [95% CI] 
0 92.6 
[91.0, 93.9] 
50.2 
[46.1, 54.3] 
54.4 
[50.5, 58.2] 
0.5 0 1.0 
[0.5, 1.9] 
4.5 
[3.2, 6.3] 
1 6.3 
[5.2, 7.7] 
43.3 
[39.5, 47.2] 
17.7 
[15.4, 20.1] 
2 0.7 
[0.4, 1.2] 
4.3 
[3.4, 5.4] 
22.5 
[19.7, 25.6] 
>2 0.3 
[0.1, 0.8] 
1.2 
[0.5, 2.8] 
1.0 
[0.6, 1.6] 
Full coupon package    
Percentage receiving full package 
(or more) 
4.1 
[3.1, 5.3] 
0.6 
[0.2, 1.4] 
11.9 
[10.1, 14.3] 
 
Source: AISS and FISS datasets. Notes: Confidence intervals in square brackets. 
Estimates account for household weights and stratification based on sample design. 
Fractions of coupons have been rounded up to the nearest half coupon such that 0.3 of 
a coupon becomes 0.5 and 0.8 becomes 1 
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Given the various stages involved in the targeting process, it is also useful to get a sense 
of any attrition that might be taking place. Table 12 looks at this issue by showing the 
weighted percentage of households in 2012/13 reporting receipt of any fertiliser coupon, 
successful redemption of all fertiliser coupons, and whether any ‘other uses’ of the 
subsidised fertiliser were reported. It also looks at the bivariate relationship between these 
outcomes, SES and demographic factors. Results for other years can be found in 
Appendix 10 and Appendix 11. 
Results from Table 12 suggest that approximately two thirds of households in 2012/13 
received at least some share of a fertiliser coupon, though 7.7% of these households did 
not redeem all of the fertiliser coupons received. If multiplied by the estimated number 
of farm households in Malawi receiving any subsidised fertiliser, this suggests that around 
135,786 households may not have redeemed all fertiliser coupons. This compares to a 
much lower 59,859 in 2006/07 and 60,731 in 2008/09, largely due to the lower reported 
levels of non-redemption.21 It is possible that non-redemption may also be underestimated 
in cases where fertiliser coupons were sold, given that sale of coupons is illegal and a 
highly sensitive topic (Holden and Lunduka, 2012b). The main reported reason for non-
redemption of fertiliser coupons in 2012/13 was overwhelmingly that there was no stock 
in the selling point (68% of non-redeemed fertiliser coupons). 
The large majority of subsidised fertiliser acquired was reported to have been mainly used 
on the household’s own land, with 4.3% reporting other uses, mostly sharing. However, 
from what we know about how coupon packages are split and how numbers of coupons 
are reported, it appears that survey responses to reported fertiliser use will not account for 
this initial splitting of coupon packages and can generally be considered as indicating 
what the household did with inputs after initial sharing has been taken into account. As 
with coupon redemption, reported use may diverge from actual use and underreport re-
selling given the sensitivity of the issue. 
As the total allocation of coupons per household was roughly equal across regions by 
2012/13 (Dorward et al., 2013), the lower percentage of reported receipt of any fertiliser 
coupons in the northern region (p=0.08) highlights the lower levels of sharing taking place 
there, relative to the central and southern regions. 
                                                 
21 This is calculated as the proportion of the Malawian smallholder household population receiving any 
fertiliser coupon based on the FISS household surveys and NSO population estimates, which are then 
multiplied by the proportion of households reporting non-redemption of all fertiliser coupons (NSO, 2008) 
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Of particular relevance for this study, results for receipt of fertiliser coupons by SES in 
Table 12 show that a higher proportion of households in the wealthiest category received 
at least a share of a fertiliser voucher compared to those in the poorest (p=0.01). The 
difference between the poorest and those in the second and third wealthiest categories 
was also highly significant (p=0.03). We might therefore expect inequalities in the CCs 
and CIs relating to fertiliser coupons in 2012/13. 
Regarding use of all fertiliser coupons (among those receiving coupons), there was no 
statistical difference between those in the poorest and wealthiest quintile, even at the 10% 
significance level. Concerning subsidised fertiliser use (among those using coupons), 
those in the poorest quintile were statistically less likely to report other uses of subsidised 
fertiliser in 2012/13 than those in the wealthiest quintile (p=0.04) with no difference 
between the poorest and second wealthiest. However, the proportions of ‘other uses’ were 
very small, the main one being ‘shared with others’ (2.7% of all fertiliser coupons 
redeemed) and it is not entirely clear how reliable responses on coupon use or input use 
are. 
 
4.5.2 Concentration curves, dominance tests, and concentration indices 
This section presents the CCs, dominance tests and CIs for each of the outcome indicators 
in Table 10, with households ranked according to the wealth index. Results using 
household income are provided in Appendix 12. 
 
4.5.2.1 Fertiliser coupon receipt  
Figure 11 and Figure 12 show that while there was some improvement after 2006/07, by 
2012/13 wealthier households continued to benefit disproportionately from the receipt of 
fertiliser coupons. However, while the inequality associated with the receipt of any 
fertiliser coupon became very minimal, inequalities in the number of fertiliser coupons 
received appears considerably higher according to the CCs (it is not possible to compare 
absolute values of CIs across different outcomes). The findings are reflected in the 
dominance tests in Table 13 and inspection of CIs in Table 14. The dominance tests show 
that the CC for 2012/13 dominates (i.e. lies above and indicates less inequality than) the 
2006/07 curve for the number of fertiliser coupons received, even when using the more 
restrictive IUP criteria. CIs decrease over time, from 0.20 to 0.08 for receipt of any 
fertiliser coupon and 0.19 to 0.09 for the number of fertiliser coupons received. 
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Table 12: Attrition and its relationship to wealth during the subsidy allocation-use 
process (2012/13) 
 
 Received any fertiliser 
voucher 
Successful use of all 
fertiliser vouchers (among 
those receiving coupons) 
No reported ‘other use’ for any 
subsidised fertiliser (among 
those using coupons) 
 % [95% CI] N %  [95% CI] N % [95% CI] N 
All 
households 
60.6 
[56.7, 64.3] 
2001 92.3 
[87.8, 95.2] 
1162 95.7 
[93.3, 97.2] 
1105 
Quintile 1 
(poorest) 
53.2 
[46.5,59.7] 
400 88.7 
[80.1,93.8] 
211 97.9 
[93.9,99.3] 
193 
Quintile 2 60.6 
[53.9,67.0] 
400 94.1 
[87.2,97.4] 
227 94.4 
[89.5,97.1] 
217 
Quintile 3 61.8 
[55.6,67.5] 
400 92.9 
[86.2,96.4] 
236 94.0 
[87.8,97.2] 
226 
Quintile 4 64.0 
[57.0,70.5] 
400 92.4 
[86.6,95.9] 
242 98.8 
[96.1,99.7] 
234 
Quintile 5 
(wealthiest) 
64.2 
[57.7,70.3] 
400 93.3 
[85.6,97.0] 
245 93.3 
[88.0,96.4] 
234 
Male-
headed 
59.6 
[55.2,63.7] 
1479 92.0 
[87.3,95.1] 
845 95.6 
[92.9,97.4] 
804 
Female- 
headed 
63.5 
[58.7,68.1] 
522 93.0 
[86.3,96.6] 
317 95.8 
[92.3,97.7] 
301 
Household 
size    
1-3 
 
 
4-6 
 
 
 >6 
 
 
54.5 
[48.7,60.1] 
 
63.2 
[59.4,66.9] 
 
63.8 
[56.9,70.2] 
 
600 
 
 
1009 
 
 
392 
 
 
90.7 
[83.3,95.0] 
 
93.3 
[89.6,95.7] 
 
91.9 
[83.9,96.2] 
 
311 
 
 
608 
 
 
243 
 
 
96.3 
[93.4,98.0] 
 
95.4 
[92.0,97.4] 
 
95.4 
[91.5,97.5] 
 
293 
 
 
581 
 
 
231 
Land size      
Up to 0.499 
ha 
 
0.5 to 0.99 
ha 
 
1 to 1.99 ha 
 
 
2 ha and 
above 
 
59.5 
[52.5,66.0] 
 
62.9 
[58.1,67.4] 
 
59.9 
[54.6,65.1] 
 
59.3 
[52.1,66.2] 
 
354 
 
 
572 
 
 
654 
 
 
421 
 
95.0 
[88.6,97.9] 
 
92.9 
[88.0,95.9] 
 
91.3 
[85.9,94.8] 
 
90.5 
[83.6,94.6] 
 
204 
 
 
340 
 
 
380 
 
 
238 
 
 
95.9 
[90.4,98.3] 
 
97.1 
[94.2,98.6] 
 
95.2 
[91.2,97.4] 
 
94.1 
[90.1,96.6] 
 
198 
 
 
323 
 
 
357 
 
 
227 
No 
livestock 
56.2 
[50.8,61.6] 
592 91.8 
[86.6,95.1] 
320 96.1 
[92.7,98.0] 
300 
Own 
livestock 
62.5 
[58.3,66.6] 
1408 92.5 
[87.6,95.6] 
839 95.5 
[92.6,97.3] 
802 
Northern 51.7 
[41.5,61.8] 
360 99.7 
[97.5,100.0] 
192 82.1 
[66.6,91.3] 
191 
Central 61.3 
[54.5,67.7] 
720 87.9 
[79.9,93.0] 
428 97.3 
[94.4,98.8] 
388 
Southern 62.0 
[57.1,66.7] 
921 95.1 
[88.9,98.0] 
542 97.0 
[93.4,98.7] 
526 
Source: AISS 2006/07 and 2008/09 and FISS (2012/13) datasets. 
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The shape of the CCs for number of coupons received suggests that the very poorest are 
receiving far from a perfectly equal share (even though there should actually be a pro-
poor bias) as the curves move away from the 45-degree line quite quickly as you move 
rightwards across the horizontal axis. The sharp return to the 45-degree line at the upper 
end of the wealth scale for ‘receipt of any fertiliser coupon’, particularly in 2012/13, 
indicates the very wealthiest were not disproportionately benefitting, with the CCs for 
number of coupons indicating instead that it was those in the middle wealth categories 
that were. 
When households are ranked by household income the results remain similar except that 
the 2012/13 curve just crosses the line of equality for receipt of any fertiliser coupon, 
suggesting a marginally more pro-poor distribution than indicated by the wealth index. 
When using income per capita, receipt of any fertiliser coupon becomes most pro-poor, 
at -0.05 (p=0.05), though any pro-poor bias is lost when you look at the number of 
fertiliser coupons, with the distributions for all years being pro-wealthy, though slightly 
less so than when using the wealth index (Appendix 12). 
 
4.5.2.2 Redemption of fertiliser coupons and purchase of subsidised fertiliser 
The second set of indicators looked at redemption of fertiliser coupons (among those who 
received any fertiliser coupon) and access to subsidised fertiliser (among those that 
acquired some amount of subsidised fertiliser).22 
The CCs for any coupon redemption show distributions that essentially lie on the 45-
degree line and so are not presented here. This suggests that, among those that acquired 
fertiliser coupons, there is no clear SES-related inequality in redemption of all coupons. 
The lack of any visible wealth-related inequality fits with the earlier bivariate results for 
2012/13 (Table 12) of no statistical difference between wealth quintiles in terms of 
fertiliser coupon redemption. Dominance tests suggest no statistical difference between 
the years. However, looking at the CIs we can see some slight pro-wealth inequality not 
visible in the CCs, declining from 0.04 to 0.02 between 2006/07 and 2008/09. By 2012/13 
it was not statistically different from a CI of zero. This suggests the redemption of all 
fertiliser coupons tended to slightly favour wealthier households in earlier years, though 
                                                 
22 Receipt of fertiliser coupons and receipt of subsidised fertiliser were recorded in separate modules of the 
household survey that were not linked. 
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by 2012/13 successful redemption largely cut across SES. There is almost no difference 
when using household income indicators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Concentration curve for receipt of any fertiliser coupon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Concentration curve for number of fertiliser coupons received 
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Higher levels of inequality are picked up when using the volume of subsidised fertiliser 
acquired as the outcome indicator. This is to be expected, as it is simply a function of the 
number of coupons received, which was found to exhibit notable inequalities, and the 
redemption per coupon received. Closer inspection of the CCs for this outcome indicator 
(Figure 13) indicates that the main inequalities are arising due to households in the upper-
middle wealth categories gaining particularly disproportionately.23 One can also observe 
a very marginal improvement in inequality over time, though dominance tests suggest no 
statistical change over the years. CIs show this decline more clearly, from 0.12 in 2006/07 
to a still statistically positive 0.06 by 2012/13 (Table 14). 
When income is used to rank households, the SES-related inequalities are again less 
pronounced than when using the wealth index, though do not become negative and remain 
statistically different from zero (Appendix 12). This reinforces the notion that subsidised 
fertiliser still accrues disproportionately among wealthier households, despite targeting 
objectives aiming for a pro-poor bias. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Concentration curve for kilograms of subsidised fertiliser acquired 
 
                                                 
23 It is important to note that this does not take into account those benefitting from subsidised fertiliser that 
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0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
cu
m
ul
 s
ha
re
 o
f s
ub
si
di
ze
d 
fe
rti
liz
er
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
cumul share of subsidised fertiliser (poorest first)
conc curve 06/07 N=1718
conc curve 08/09 N=1365
conc curve 12/13 N=1067
line of equality
   103 
4.5.2.3 Use of subsidised fertiliser 
The final outcome indicator looked at whether, among households reporting successful 
redemption of a fertiliser coupon, there was any reported ‘other use’ of the fertiliser 
acquired besides being applied to the household’s own land. It should be remembered 
from Table 12 that numbers formally reporting such other uses were small, which may 
make identification of any inequalities difficult to identify if present. 
The CCs do not pick up any clear SES-related inequality. Curves for all years lie more or 
less directly on the 45-degree line and so are not presented here. However, dominance 
testing indicates dominance of the curve for 2012/13 over 2008/09. CIs show a shift from 
0.01 in 2006/07 to 0.07 in 2008/09, then dropping to -0.02 by 2012/13, with neither the 
index in 2006/07 nor 2012/13 being statistically different from zero. This suggests 
reported other uses were disproportionately concentrated among poorer households in 
2008/09 but were equal across wealth categories in other years. When ranking households 
by income, CIs for 2008/09 were not statistically different from zero. 
 
Table 13: Dominance tests for all outcome indicators 
 
  Outcome indicator 
Years Criteria Receipt of 
any 
fertiliser 
coupon 
Number of 
fertiliser 
coupons 
Redemption 
of all 
fertiliser 
coupons 
Volume of 
subsidised 
fertiliser 
acquired 
No reported 
‘other use’ of 
any 
subsidised 
fertiliser 
2006/07 & 
2008/09 
MCA 2008/09 
dominates 
    
IUP      
2006/07 & 
2012/13 
MCA 2012/13 
dominates 
2012/13 
dominates 
   
IUP  2012/13 
dominates 
   
2008/09 & 
2012/13 
MCA     2012/13 
dominates 
IUP      
Source: Author’s analysis. Note: Empty box implies non-dominance. Results are 
significant at the 5% significance level. 
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Table 14: Concentration indices using wealth index ranking 
 
Stage Outcome indicator Year N Concentration 
index 
[95% Confidence 
Intervals] 
Z-test for 
difference with 
previous year 
1 Receipt of any fertiliser 
coupon (D) 
2006/07 3298 0.20* 
[0.18, 0.22] 
 
  2008/09 1982 0.09* 
[0.06, 0.11] 
p=0.00 
  2012/13 2000 0.08* 
[0.05, 0.10] 
p=0.82 
 Number of fertiliser 
coupons 
2006/07 3298 0.19* 
[0.15, 0.22] 
 
  2008/09 1982 0.10* 
[0.08, 0.13] 
p= 0.00 
  2012/13 2000 0.09* 
[0.06, 0.12] 
p=0.38 
2 Redeemed all fertiliser 
coupons (D) 
2006/07 1817 0.04* 
[0.03, 0.04] 
 
  2008/09 1386 0.03* 
[0.02, 0.04] 
p=0.59 
  2012/13 1161 0.02 
[0.01, 0.03] 
p=0.70 
 Volume of subsidised 
fertiliser acquired  
2006/07 1718 0.12* 
[0.09, 0.14] 
 
  2008/09 1365 0.09* 
[0.07, 0.11] 
p=0.02 
  2012/13 1067 0.06* 
[0.04, 0.08] 
p=0.02 
3 No ‘other use’ of 
subsidised fertiliser (D) 
2006/07 1760 0.01 
[0.00, 0.02] 
 
  2008/09 1360 0.07* 
[0.06, 0.08] 
p=0.00 
  2012/13 1104 -0.02 
[-0.02, -0.01] 
p=0.00 
Source: Author’s analysis. Note: For the dichotomous outcome indicators (D), Erreygers’ 
correction is used to standardise them. *Indicates concentration indices were statistically 
different from zero at the 5% significance level. The null hypothesis of the z-test for 
statistical difference between years is that there is no difference and so a p-value less 
than 0.05 indicates a statistically significant difference at the 5% significance level. 
 
 
 
 
 
   105 
4.6 Discussion 
4.6.1 What do the results say and how do they fit with existing evidence? 
A number of important conclusions can be drawn from the results. Firstly, results show 
that although there has been some reduction in the socioeconomic-related inequality in 
the targeting of fertiliser coupons and access to subsidised fertiliser since the start of the 
FISP, as of 2012/13 both coupons and fertiliser were still disproportionately captured by 
less poor households. The number of coupons accessed (and in turn the amount of 
subsidised fertiliser acquired) represents a major problem in terms of the FISP reinforcing 
existing socioeconomic-related inequalities, with wealthier households better able to 
capture a larger number of coupons, which translates into them acquiring a larger volume 
of subsidised fertiliser. 
Closer inspection of the CCs for coupon and fertiliser receipt in 2012/13 suggest that 
while receipt of any fertiliser coupon is fairly evenly distributed by wealth, it is those in 
the middle of the wealth distribution that benefit disproportionately from a higher number 
of fertiliser coupons and those in the upper-middle who benefit disproportionately from 
access to subsidised fertiliser. The lower inequality in access to any coupons indicates 
sharing processes in which a wide cross-section of households acquire something, though 
wealthier households end up gaining more coupons (Dorward et al., 2013). This is 
supported by the findings in chapter 5. While these inequalities are most pronounced 
when households are ranked according to the wealth index, the general findings are robust 
to the use of alternative income-based indicators. The slightly lower levels of inequality 
in income-based indicators may be explained by the recognised phenomenon of 
underreporting of income in household surveys, which we might reasonably assume 
would have a greater proportionate impact on those households with higher income 
(Psacharopoulos, 1997, World Bank, 2010: 67). 
The above conclusions raise serious questions about the wisdom of spending considerable 
time and resources on a coupon and community-based targeting system, which continues 
to produce outcomes not only at such odds with the FISP targeting aims, but worse than 
what would be achieved by an equal distribution across income categories.  
The improvement from 2006/07 could reflect a large number of factors, though it is 
difficult to isolate one in particular. For example, 2006/07 was a year with an extremely 
high number of supplementary coupons that were distributed through opaque processes 
and so it is understandable that wealthier and more politically connected households may 
have been better able to benefit from the FISP. However, there have also been changes to 
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targeting criteria and allocation mechanisms, as well as shifts in the regional distribution 
of coupons. 
The results on access to coupons and subsidised fertiliser are broadly consistent with the 
existing evidence mentioned in section 3 and suggest that relatively little had changed by 
2012/13 since Kilic et al. (2013) looked at outcomes using 2009/10 data and found that 
the FISP was not particularly poverty targeted, reaching all socioeconomic strata of rural 
Malawi. 
The results on coupon redemption show that, to a limited extent, the redemption process 
itself favoured wealthier households in 2006/07 and 2008/09, which fits with existing 
evidence (Mvula et al., 2011). However, by 2012/13 the data do not show a statistical 
difference by wealth, which may represent the fact that some of the major obstacles to 
redemption can cut across SES. A further important point relating to coupon redemption 
emerges from the bivariate analysis in Table 12, which is that approximately 135,786 
households appear to have not redeemed all of their fertiliser coupons in 2012/13, the 
main given reason for which was lack of stock in the depots. Estimates for 2006/07 and 
2008/09 were 59,859 and 60,731 respectively. This represents a major problem for 
achievement of the FISP’s objectives yet it has so far not received the attention it 
deserves. Levels of redemption of all coupons (including seeds) are reported in one study 
to be around 60% in 2011/12 increasing to 80% by 2012/13, though while this is taken to 
be encouraging and evidence that beneficiaries are ‘using coupons as intended’, in 
practice the 20% non-redemption by 2012/13 should be viewed with concern (CISANET, 
2014). 
In terms of subsidised fertiliser use, CIs show that in 2008/09 poorer households were 
more likely to report some ‘other use’ of subsidised inputs, though the finding only holds 
when households are ranked by wealth and there was statistically no difference based on 
wealth in the other years. The main reported other uses in that year were ‘shared with 
others’ or ‘kept for next crop’. However, it is not clear how reliable and informative these 
responses are. Other evidence, including that from chapter 5, points to some households 
being prone to selling a portion of inputs (Dorward and Chirwa, 2011b, Holden and 
Lunduka, 2013). Given that input use is ultimately what determines the production-
related impacts arising from the FISP, the issue clearly warrants further investigation in 
order to maximise returns to input use. 
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4.6.2 Some reflections on concentration curves and concentration indices 
The results highlight a number of methodological lessons. Firstly, the study demonstrates 
the advantages of using CCs and CIs to measure targeting outcomes. CCs offer a 
comprehensive and intuitive visual insight into how targeting outcomes are distributed 
across a full sample or population ranked against a particular targeting criterion such as 
wealth status. This represents an advantage over single coefficients on variables estimated 
using regression analysis or a group of coefficients (e.g. representing wealth quintiles). 
An advantage of CIs compared to coefficients on grouped independent variables in 
regression is that the latter can tend to encourage a focus on comparing the two extreme 
categories (e.g. poorest and wealthiest), whereas CIs incorporate information right across 
the full sample of households. As such, CCs and CIs together facilitate rich quantifiable 
comparisons over time. Finally, it should be noted that CIs can be extended in various 
ways, such as including factors which may be considered a source of legitimate inequality 
(standardisation) and, with enough data, decomposing the importance of underlying 
determinants of SES-related inequalities (O'Donnell et al., 2008). 
Some weaknesses of these methods should also be recognised, however. One is that where 
dichotomous outcomes are used and normalisation is required, one must be cautious of 
comparing the resulting corrected CIs with the standard CIs derived from continuous 
outcome indicators. More broadly, one must be careful of comparing CIs across different 
outcome variables in general given that they depend on the mean of the outcome. Even 
when comparing inequalities in the same outcome over time, one should be aware that 
large changes in the prevalence (mean) of that outcome would affect the CI. Nevertheless, 
comparisons in relative inequality over time can still be made in combination with CCs. 
Another limitation is that CCs and CIs appear to be most appropriate in cases, like the 
FISP, where it is reasonable to assess targeting outcomes against one key indicator, 
against which households can be ranked (e.g. wealth or productivity). For policies where 
a large number of distinct criteria are involved or if households cannot be ranked against 
them, it would make sense to use other methods. 
A more general reflection is that, as results for receipt of any fertiliser coupon and the 
number of fertiliser coupons received demonstrate, the choice of indicator clearly matters 
when it comes to measuring targeting outcomes. This suggests that future studies on 
targeting outcomes need to consider carefully the choice of outcome indicators used and 
what they are really showing and what they may be hiding. In the case of voucher subsidy 
programs, a dichotomous variable representing receipt of any coupon is likely to be a 
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poor outcome indicator as it lacks information and can underestimate the full extent of 
errors of inclusion (non-eligible households receiving subsidies) and errors of exclusion 
(eligible households not getting subsidies). It will also ignore the outcomes of possible 
sharing, which can obscure the fact that it may often be poorer households that share 
coupons with each other (Dorward et al., 2013). 
 
4.6.3 Study limitations 
Some limitations of the study should be highlighted. Firstly, as with all household surveys 
one must acknowledge the potential presence of reporting bias. There is reason to believe 
this may have arisen for questions such as non-redemption of coupons and the use of 
inputs given that coupon re-sale is illegal and sale of subsidised inputs a highly sensitive 
topic. 
Secondly, the CC and CI approach used has been a bivariate one that does not directly 
account for other factors that may be considered sources of potential ‘fair inequalities’, 
e.g. if households were not chosen because they did not own land or if vulnerable 
households were targeted in spite of being wealthier than non-vulnerable households. 
However, as noted earlier, removing households with no land makes little difference to 
the results and it is unlikely that accounting for vulnerable households would make a 
difference, as the data suggest they also tend to be among those ranking lowest on 
indicators of SES. Nevertheless, future research could be carried out to decompose the 
factors driving (or at least associated with) the observed inequalities. 
Thirdly, while it was not within the scope of the study, it should be recognised that the 
receipt of inputs represents only the direct benefits arising from the subsidy programme. 
Future research should look into the distributional aspects of wider benefits arising from 
indirect and general equilibrium effects and, for example, the impacts of differential 
displacement rates, of differential marginal productivity of incremental fertiliser, and of 
differential income multipliers. 
 
4.6.4 Policy implications 
The results provide clear evidence that the shift towards community-based targeting and 
open community meetings has not fully achieved the pro-poor targeting outcomes 
intended by the FISP. This puts into serious question the wisdom of the continued 
financial and opportunity costs of the FISP’s targeting procedures. 
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Before considering how best to address this problem, one must ask whether in fact the 
current targeting outcomes are indeed undesirable. It could be argued, for example, that 
by targeting those in the middle of the wealth distribution, the FISP may be reaching those 
who are still poor enough to not be able to afford unsubsidised fertiliser (one 50kg bag of 
Nitrogen fertiliser cost US$ 45 in April 2014),24 but wealthy enough to be able to 
effectively use the inputs. However, even if some poorer and more vulnerable households 
do struggle to use inputs as effectively as wealthier households, if the objectives of the 
programme continue to include achieving household food security, then the current 
targeting outcomes are indeed a problem. While there is still a case for less poor 
households getting subsidised fertiliser if they cannot afford the extremely high costs of 
fertiliser in Malawi, particularly given the challenges of reducing the market price, one 
must still address the failure to reach poorer households with sufficient inputs. 
Based on findings from chapter 5 there appears to be a strong rationale in the context of 
Malawi for removing authority of beneficiary selection from village leaders, though there 
are practical and cost challenges in the implementation of targeting based on proxy means 
tests (PMT) of observable wealth indicators. For example, in order to minimise scope for 
interference by local leaders, it may require external enumerators to carry out data 
collection. However, this does not overcome the challenge that households have been 
known to give misleading information if they believe it will improve their chances of 
receiving transfers (Abdoulayi et al., 2013). Indicators would therefore need to be selected 
carefully to minimise the scope for misreporting. Furthermore, while involving 
considerably greater costs, according to estimates by Houssou and Zeller (2011) it may 
still fail to reach just under a third of households living under the poverty line even under 
the assumption of flawless implementation, due to limitations in the predictive power of 
PMT models used to identify cut-off points for the wealth indicators. However, it has 
been noted that combining a PMT approach for targeting in both the FISP and Malawi’s 
Social Cash Transfer Programme could result in significant cost savings (Matita and 
Chirwa, 2014). 
Given the exclusion errors and challenges that exist with the PMT approach, there is a 
case to be made for taking a look at a smaller rationed universal subsidy (i.e. a limited 
package available per beneficiary) open to land-owning smallholder farmers. There are 
many advantages to such an approach, including but not limited to: eliminating current 
errors of exclusion (the poorest not benefitting) without needing to increase the total 
                                                 
24 Monthly national price for NPK 23 21 0 + 4S in April 2014 (AMITSA, 2014). 
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quantity of fertiliser going to less poor households, removing costs and difficulties of 
targeting, and increasing transparency and accountability (providing there are adequate 
communication campaigns) (Dorward and Chirwa, 2013b). Concerns over increased 
displacement of unsubsidised sales may well be misplaced as, while there would be some 
increase in less-poor households getting inputs, calculations suggest that if fertiliser 
coupons from 2012/13 were distributed evenly among wealth groups, the total quantity 
of fertiliser going to such households would actually remain at a similar level or decline.25 
One of the crucial challenges with a rationed universal subsidy would be getting the trade-
off right between making sure that each household has sufficient inputs to be able to ‘step 
up’ and ‘step out’ of poverty rather than simply ‘hanging in’, while at the same time 
remaining fiscally manageable.26 Ideally, the returns to input use would also be 
maximised through greater investments in extension services promoting more efficient 
input use.  
As with any effective targeting approach, it would also require a much-needed national 
identification scheme to address the problems with using voting cards and existing farm 
family registers, including inflation of farming household figures. A further challenge 
would be securing the political will and leadership given possible fears among political 
parties of adopting a policy that appeared similar to the earlier ‘Starter Pack’ implemented 
by a previous government in 1999/2000 and 2000/01 (Dorward and Chirwa, 2013b: 12). 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This paper has adopted an alternative approach to measuring beneficiary targeting 
outcomes in Malawi’s FISP, applying CCs and CIs to three rounds of household survey 
data from 2006/07 to 2012/13. The results bring our understanding of the FISP targeting 
outcomes more up to date and, by looking at various stages in the targeting process, offer 
new and richer insights into the complexities of the FISP’s targeting processes. Moreover, 
the study shows how the use of CCs and CIs, increasingly used in the health economics 
literature, can provide policy makers with a useful set of tools for understanding 
socioeconomic inequality associated with targeting outcomes. As well as CCs providing 
a rich and intuitive visual insight into targeting outcomes that cover the full distribution 
                                                 
25Calculations available upon request. 
26 The notions of ‘hanging in’, ‘stepping up’ and ‘stepping out’ are discussed by Dorward et al. (2009). 
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of households, when combined with CIs they allow for quantitative comparisons over 
time. 
Overall, results show that, despite some improvements since 2006/07, less poor rural 
households in Malawi continued to disproportionately benefit from the FISP by 2012/13, 
in particular those in the middle to upper-middle of the wealth distribution. This is despite 
the fact that the programme aims to realise specifically pro-poor targeting outcomes and 
despite the shift towards more localised community-based targeting and the advocacy of 
open community meetings for beneficiary selection. The inequalities arise partly through 
unequal access to fertiliser coupons, with wealthier households better able to acquire a 
larger number of coupons and, in turn, a disproportionate amount of subsidised fertiliser. 
Results also indicate that a higher number of poorer households may have had particular 
trouble in redeeming all fertiliser coupons in the early years of the programme and in 
using all of their subsidised fertiliser. However, further research is required to investigate 
this, ideally through a more qualitative approach. 
The results ultimately raise serious questions over the ability of the community-based 
targeting approach used in the FISP to deliver pro-poor outcomes. The paper has also 
highlighted major weaknesses in the ability of households to redeem all of their fertiliser 
coupons at local depots. Urgent attention is required to address these problems in order 
to ensure that the programme achieves its intended aims and maintains credibility. 
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Preamble to research paper two 
 
The previous chapter investigated the socioeconomic-related inequality in the 
transmission of fertiliser subsidies to beneficiaries in Malawi’s FISP. It demonstrated 
how, despite attempts to improve targeting outcomes, for example, by introducing open 
meetings for sensitisation and beneficiary selection, as of the 2012/13 season it was those 
households nearer the middle of the wealth distribution that continued to benefit 
disproportionately. 
The following chapter goes beyond measurement of targeting-related outcomes to try and 
understand the reasons why the FISP has struggled to achieve greater improvements in 
such outcomes. It is adapted from an article written by the author (currently under 
submission to Forum for Development Studies) and based on a qualitative research study 
that set out to investigate research objective two of the thesis, to identify and assess the 
importance of different factors that determined the allocation and redemption of subsidy 
coupons in the FISP and use of subsidised inputs among smallholder households. The 
study is based around primary research carried out by the author in Malawi in July and 
August 2013, involving 31 semi-structured interviews in villages and with Ministry of 
Agriculture staff at a number of different levels.  
Luke Harman designed the study, analysed the data and drafted the paper. Professor 
Andrew Dorward and Dr Catherine Goodman provided advice and support throughout 
the research process, including comments at the drafting stage. 
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5 ‘No room for talking’: Explaining Beneficiary Level Targeting 
Outcomes in Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy Programme 
 
 
Abstract 
Contrary to policy objectives, evidence suggests that less-poor households are more likely 
to directly benefit, and to benefit more than poorer households do from Malawi’s Farm 
Input Subsidy Programme. Understanding why is essential for guiding appropriate policy 
improvements. To investigate, in-depth interviews were carried out in four villages from 
two districts within the central and southern regions. Beneficiary and non-beneficiary 
farmers and village heads were interviewed, along with Ministry of Agriculture staff from 
village, sub-district, district and national levels. Coding and analysis of the interview 
transcripts reveal the crucial importance of power and informational asymmetries in 
determining the allocation of subsidy coupons, access to and use of subsidised fertiliser. 
In particular, village leaders and fertiliser depot staff hold privileged positions in which, 
under certain circumstances, they are able capture benefits for themselves and/or 
distribute benefits on the basis of favouritism, patronage or rent seeking. Village heads 
also enforce sharing, in some cases potentially as a means of covering up malpractices. 
Poverty was also found to be an important determining factor in how households used 
coupons and any subsidised fertiliser received, given the pressing cash constraints and 
pressing needs poor households face, raising questions over whether greater integration 
with other social protection measures is required. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Since the turn of the millennium there has been a renewed political and policy drive to 
tackle the persistence of extreme poverty and food insecurity. In addressing these issues, 
agriculture has been singled out as a sector deserving special attention. There has been a 
particular renewal of interest in the use of agricultural input subsidies (AISs), with a 
recent review documenting nine AIS programmes (AISPs) that started within sub-
Saharan Africa since the early 2000s (Jayne and Rashid, 2013). 
Universal input subsidies were a pervasive element in policies underpinning ‘Green 
Revolution’ transformations in the 1960s and 1970s, though some argue they ended up 
becoming expensive, inefficient and disproportionately captured by better-off farmers 
and / or input industries (Gulati and Narayanan, 2003). In response to the rising number 
of AISPs introduced in recent years, there have been calls to learn from this experience 
and develop AISPs that are ‘Market Smart’ (Morris et al., 2007). The key elements of 
such an approach are that subsidies are temporary, do not distort the relative price of 
inputs in a way that would encourage excessive use, and that they support rather than 
undermine the development of private sector input markets. 
One implication of the market smart approach is that subsidies should generally be 
targeted to farmers who would not otherwise purchase commercial inputs, as a means of 
both limiting fiscal costs and improving efficiency while stimulating demand and use. 
Subsidies reaching wealthier households are more likely to displace unsubsidised 
commercial sales, lowering incremental input use and potentially undermining private 
sector input suppliers (Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011, Xu et al., 2009). Among recent AISPs, 
such targeting is often done through decentralised targeting processes and the use of 
vouchers (coupons) (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013a, Dorward, 2009).27  
Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) is the most researched and well-known 
example of recent AISPs, with a growing evidence base relating to targeting outcomes, 
much of this based on large quantitative surveys. However, while such surveys help 
measure targeting outcomes, aside from a few multiple choice questions on processes, 
they say fairly little about the underlying determinants of the allocation and use of 
subsidised inputs, which is essential knowledge for policy-makers wishing to make 
improvements to the programme.  
                                                 
27 The terms voucher and coupon are used interchangeably in the paper. 
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A more qualitative approach can be an important complement to quantitative research. 
As Prowse and Camfield (2013: 55) note, qualitative methods are able to shed light on 
the questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ and, as such, ‘are good at capturing processes and pay 
greater attention to why certain individuals benefit from an intervention and others do 
not’. While some limited qualitative evidence on targeting processes in the FISP does 
exist, e.g. (Dorward et al., 2013, Holden and Lunduka, 2012b, Mvula et al., 2011), these 
studies have not directly focused on explaining the key determinants of outcomes at each 
of the three stages of beneficiary identification, coupon use / access to inputs, and 
subsidised input use (see Figure 14). The qualitative work to date has also not been widely 
circulated, leaving an important gap in wider awareness about how subsidies are being 
distributed and used in Malawi’s FISP. 
This paper therefore seeks to build upon the limited qualitative research on the FISP by 
identifying and assessing the importance of different factors that determined the 
allocation and redemption of subsidy coupons and use of subsidised inputs during the 
2012/13 season.28 In doing so, it also contributes to the wider literatures on decentralised 
targeting and elite capture, providing a specific case study through which to investigate a 
number of theoretical assumptions around the advantages of community-based targeting 
(CBT). 
The paper draws on new primary data gathered by the author from 31 in-depth semi-
structured interviews with a wide range of actors covering four separate villages across 
two districts. Interviews were coded and then analysed using Framework Analysis to 
identify key themes explaining outcomes at three levels: beneficiary selection, use of 
subsidy coupons and use of subsidised inputs. While the study does not allow us to 
generalise findings to a national level and caution should be taken in interpreting 
responses from interviews, the study does make an important contribution to the literature 
on explaining targeting outcomes in the FISP including why the objective of pro-poor 
targeting is not being effectively met, and to the broader literature on the use of CBT in 
development programmes. 
The next section provides a conceptual background to the use of CBT and voucher 
subsidies, including theoretical advantages and trade-offs. Section 5.3 gives a background 
to Malawi, the FISP and related evidence on targeting outcomes. Section 5.4 then 
describes the methods used in this study before section 5.5 sets out the main findings. 
                                                 
28 2012/13 describes an agricultural season as the main agricultural season in Malawi covers two calendar 
years, from around November to May. 
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Section 5.6 draws together the main contributions of the study and considers implications 
for policy. 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Overview of main stages in the subsidy allocation and use process 
Source: Author. 
 
5.2 The use of CBT and vouchers in AISPs 
The targeting process in AISPs involves the following main stages: 
(1) Agreement on who should be targeted;  
(2) Establishment of criteria / indicators for beneficiary identification; 
(3) Beneficiary identification and selection; and 
(4) Transmission of subsidised inputs to identified beneficiaries. 
Stages 2 to 4 form the main focus of this paper, though the findings suggest implications 
for stage 1. While the establishment of targeting criteria depends on programme 
objectives, a range of alternative targeting mechanisms can be used to identify and select 
beneficiaries These range from means tests (based on information about income), to 
proxy-means tests (PMTs) (based on observable proxy characteristics of wealth such as 
quality of housing), categorical targeting (all those in a particular group or area), CBT 
   117 
(beneficiaries being chosen at a local level) or self-selection (Coady et al., 2004). A useful 
conceptualisation by Houssou and Zeller (2011) considers the choice of mechanism as 
representing a trade-off between accuracy and practicality, with a means test theoretically 
allowing for the most accurate targeting but being least practical, especially in most low-
income country (LIC) settings given the absence of, and high costs of obtaining and 
maintaining, up-to-date information (Besley and Kanbur, 1990). Partly for this reason, as 
well as an alignment with the narrative on decentralisation and democratisation, as well 
as for political reasons, CBT has become a particularly popular choice in AISPs. 
Theoretical advantages of CBT include it being able to draw on local knowledge and 
preferences (Mansuri and Rao, 2012), local decision makers being more accountable than 
centralised decision makers (Bardhan, 2002), and benefits from strengthening of social 
capital, community organisation and beneficiary empowerment (Fox, 1996). One large 
cross-country review of targeting approaches in development programmes found 14 cases 
of CBT, associated with ‘good results on average’, though there was considerable 
variation and it was believed the examples found may have performed unusually well, in 
part due to other forms of targeting often being used alongside CBT (Coady et al., 2004). 
However, while cross-country evidence can provide useful insights, one must be careful 
of drawing general conclusions about broad targeting approaches.  
Indeed, on the other side, CBT holds a strong political appeal in systems based on 
patronage as it can present an opportunity for local decision makers to divert and use 
transfers to their benefit, leading Mansuri and Rao (2012) to suggest CBT involves a 
trade-off between benefitting from local information and the hazard of ‘local capture’. 
One of the problems with CBT is if those in positions of power (e.g. local leaders and 
those involved in decision-making) are able to extract rents through their privileged 
positions. Bardhan and Mookherjee describe the phenomenon of ‘elite capture’ as when 
inequalities between different socio-economic classes (e.g. in terms of political rights, 
awareness and political participation) translate into ‘higher implicit welfare weights 
assigned to wealthier and more powerful classes in policy-making and implementation’ 
(Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2012: p. 2). In contrast to the findings by Coady et al. (2004), 
Platteau et al. (2014) note that a major result emerging from the economics literature on 
intra-community preferences is that ‘the resource allocation process typically reflects the 
preferences of elite groups’. They note that more unequal communities tend to fare worse 
‘especially when there is a concentration of political, economic and social power in the 
hands of a few’. Pan and Christiaensen (2012) also cite a number of studies which suggest 
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that political, economic, sociological and programme design features can all influence the 
likelihood of elite capture in different contexts, including the programme’s size, 
eligibility criteria and whether it involves the distribution of public or private goods, local 
power structures, levels of awareness, income levels and poverty and community 
homogeneity. 
In Malawi, there is reason to believe that elite capture and patronage may play a key role 
in FISP’s CBT. For example, previous research finds neo-patrimonialism and social 
relationships based on inequality and a large ‘power distance’ to be characteristic features 
of the country’s political economy (Booth et al., 2006). In addition, in a study of the FISP, 
Kilic et al. (2013) found evidence that those in positions of local authority have indeed 
benefitted disproportionately from CBT mechanisms.  
Drawing on the literature around decentralised targeting and elite capture, Figure 15 sets 
out a framework to help conceptualise the various factors that may influence targeting 
outcomes, and specifically beneficiary selection, under CBT. Central to eventual 
targeting outcomes are the programme or policy design features and the local context, 
and how these both interact. These underlying conditions can be seen to then determine 
which of the theoretical advantages or disadvantages of CBT emerge (see ‘intermediate 
behaviours/outcomes’), which in turn influence overall targeting outcomes. Finally, 
depending on these outcomes, this may lead to a strengthening or deterioration in 
community cohesion and levels of conflict, feeding back into the community-level 
context.  
In terms of programme design and implementation, a number of features have been 
suggested to influence CBT outcomes, including those mentioned above. For example, 
Coady et al. (2004) have argued that CBT may work best ‘when the community is asked 
to choose only a few members for program receipt, say five or ten per cent, rather than 
when closer to half the community might benefit’ (Coady et al., 2004: 62). 
In terms of local context, Pan and Christiaensen (2012) found evidence of elite capture in 
an AISP in Tanzania, and for it to be more pronounced in communities with more unequal 
land distributions and that were further from rural towns. In their study of Sierra Leone, 
Acemoglu et al. (2014) found that, in areas with fewer ruling families, a number of socio-
economic outcomes were significantly worse. They argue that this is due to chiefs being 
less constrained and better able to ‘engage in economically undesirable activities through 
their control of land, taxation, regulation and the judicial system’ (Acemoglu et al., 2014: 
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31). By contrast, Turley et al. (n.d.) found little evidence that more powerful chiefs 
diverted more than less powerful ones in Sierra Leone, though this evidence emerged 
from a controlled field experiment, which may have been more likely to suffer from the 
Hawthorne (observer) effect. It is also possible that those who are better educated and 
connected may benefit from greater information and be better able to ‘work the system’ 
to capture benefits. This is similar to the notion of ‘middle-class’ capture, as discussed by 
Bertram (1988). 
 
 
 
Figure 15: A framework for understanding beneficiary selection using community-
based targeting 
 
 
Source: Own conception. 
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Regarding transmission of subsidies (stage 4), vouchers have become a particularly 
popular means of providing indirect subsidies. These have typically been paper-based 
vouchers though there has been increasing use of e-vouchers using mobile phones in 
recent years. After issuing selected beneficiaries with vouchers, they must then redeem 
them at designated outlets, sometimes with a co-payment or ‘top-up’.  
A range of theoretical advantages of this approach have been put forward such as helping 
to target specific groups of individuals, facilitating demand-led growth of private sector 
input markets where vouchers can be redeemed among private sector retailers (Roll Back 
Malaria, 2005), and assisting in graduation away from subsidies over time by reducing 
voucher values (Morris et al., 2007: 107-108).  
However, there are also potential major weaknesses, with vouchers being prone to capture 
and misuse, creating secondary markets for both the coupons themselves and the products 
for which they are redeemed (Holden and Lunduka, 2012b). Controlling such corruption 
also represents a considerable financial cost (Morris et al., 2007: 107-108). Evidence from 
voucher-based PHPSs highlights that various obstacles may prevent voucher redemption, 
especially among the poorest, including vouchers being lost, lack of perceived need for 
the subsidised products and lack of knowledge over where to redeem the vouchers and 
lack of stock in retail outlets (Jones and Mponda, 2006, Kanya et al., 2014). The 
framework developed in Figure 15 above is also likely to apply in general terms to the 
use and redemption of vouchers, for example, in terms of the role of inequalities and 
power asymmetries in influencing outcomes. 
 
5.3 Malawi’s FISP and evidence on targeting outcomes 
5.3.1 A background to Malawi and the FISP 
The Malawian economy relies heavily upon agriculture, with around 85% of households 
engaged in the sector (NSO, 2012). Maize is the predominant staple crop, grown by nearly 
all agricultural households in 2005 (NSO, 2005) and the average cultivated area was 1.4 
hectares in 2009/10 (NSO, 2012). 
For a range of reasons including high dependence on rain-fed agriculture and 
vulnerability to weather shocks, poor soil fertility, high input and transport costs and a 
rapidly growing population, up until the start of the FISP Malawi had faced declining per 
capita maize availability (Harrigan, 2008), plus a number of devastating food crises 
(Figure 16). 
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AISs have played a major part in post-independence Malawian agricultural policy and 
have been implemented against a background of fluctuating donor support (Figure 16). 
While AISs had fallen out of favour in mainstream international policy circles during the 
1980s and 1990s, due to problems of chronic food insecurity a rationed universal subsidy 
(the Starter Pack) was introduced in 1998, which evolved into more targeted scaled-down 
programmes in subsequent years (Levy, 2005). Most recently, after a particularly bad 
episode of food insecurity hit the country in 2002 and again in 2005-06, President Bingu 
Wa Mutharika went against considerable opposition from some donors to implement a 
larger scale targeted input subsidy programme - The Agricultural Input Subsidy 
Programme - later renamed the FISP. 
 
5.3.2 FISP objectives and key features 
By 2012/13 the FISP had been running for seven years and had undergone a number of 
changes (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013a). Given the focus of this study on 2012/13, this 
section focuses on modalities and guidelines for that season.29 
As of 2012/13, the purpose of the FISP was ‘To increase resource poor smallholder 
farmers’ access to improved agricultural farm inputs’ and its objective was ‘To achieve 
food self-sufficiency and increased income of resource poor households through 
increased maize and legume production.’ (MoAFS, 2012). The programme involved the 
distribution of subsidy coupons, which could be redeemed at designated outlets across 
the country for specific agricultural inputs. Each beneficiary was supposed to receive four 
coupons: one each for a 50kg bag of Nitrogen-Phosphorus-Potassium (NPK) and urea, 
one for a 5kg (hybrid) or 8kg (Open Pollenated Variety) bag of maize seed and one for 
either a 2kg pack of groundnuts, beans, cowpeas or pigeon peas or 3kg of soya beans. 
Beneficiaries were also entitled to a 200g bottle of maize storage pesticide, though there 
were no coupons for these and they are not discussed further. 
The total amount of subsidised fertiliser allocated consisted of 75,000 metric tonnes (mt) 
of NPK and 75,000mt of urea, to cover a total of 1.5 million beneficiary households.  
Fertiliser was to be made available through outlets of two parastatals: the Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) and the Smallholder Farmers 
Fertiliser Revolving Fund of Malawi. Each bag was to be sold to beneficiaries for 500 
Malawian Kwacha (MWK) (approximately US$ 1.60) upon presentation of a valid 
                                                 
29 Further contextual and other details on 2012/13 can be found in (Dorward et al., 2013). 
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coupon.30 While there is geographical variation in market prices, this represented an 
average subsidy per 50kg bag of around 96%.31 1.5 million coupons for maize seeds and 
the same for legume seeds were also allocated, redeemable at licensed agro-dealers, with 
a ‘top-up’ charge of up to 150MWK (US$ 0.47) permitted for hybrid seed but none for 
composite seed or legumes. 
 
5.3.3 Official targeting guidelines and processes 
According to the 2012/13 guidelines, within each district the District Agricultural 
Development Officer (DADO) had overall responsibility for ‘constituting teams … 
[facilitating] farmer sensitization, beneficiary identification and coupon distribution 
exercises in an open forum on given and well publicized dates’ (MoAFS, 2012). Key 
members of these teams were Agricultural Extension Development Coordinators 
(AEDCs) who were overall responsible at the Extension Planning Area (EPA) level and 
in turn supervised a team of Agricultural Extension Development Officers (AEDOs), 
responsible for a number of villages within an EPA. It is the AEDOs who were expected 
to ‘facilitate community mobilization for beneficiary identification and coupon 
distribution exercises’, ‘facilitate the identification of beneficiaries and coupon 
distribution at an open forum’ and distribute coupons to registered beneficiaries. The open 
forum was intended to ‘ensure transparency and accountability’. Dates and locations for 
registration were supposed to be announced in advance through ‘media’ and local leaders. 
Communities were also supposed to be sensitised by Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
Security (MoAFS) staff on the programme details at the open forum, such as those 
relating to overall processes, targeting criteria, the subsidy package and the number of 
beneficiaries that year. 
Other actors supposed to be involved in identifying beneficiaries were the District 
Commissioner or their representative, Village Development Committees (VDCs), Area 
Stakeholder Panels and community policing members and police officers. Village heads 
and Traditional Authorities, both of whom form part of the traditional chieftaincy 
hierarchy in Malawi, were only supposed to be ‘providing support during [the] farmer 
                                                 
30 Based on an exchange rate of US$1 =320 MWK covering December 2012 and January 2013 (months 
when inputs are typically purchased). This rate is used for all reference to prices from the 2012/13 season. 
31 Based on the combined average market price for NPK and urea of 14,185 MWK for 2012/13. Figures 
from the Fertiliser Association of Malawi. 
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sensitization and beneficiary identification exercise’ and faith group leaders and political 
leaders were also allowed a role in providing support during these stages.32 
In 2012/13, the FISP aimed to target ‘resource poor Malawian[s]’, ‘resident in a village’ 
and ‘own[ing] a piece of land’ to be cultivated in the 2012/13 season. Beneficiaries were 
supposed to hold a valid voter registration card. The definition of resource poor was not 
defined further, though the guidelines stressed that the following vulnerable groups 
‘should also be considered’: 
x elderly resource poor household heads; 
x HIV-positive resource poor household heads; 
x resource poor female-headed household heads; 
x resource poor child-headed and orphan-headed households; 
x resource poor physically challenged headed household heads; and 
x resource poor household heads looking after the elderly and physically 
challenged. 
Only one beneficiary per household was supposed to be registered and the MoAFS was 
clear that any sale of coupons was illegal. In addition, coupon sharing (and therefore input 
sharing) was ‘absolutely discouraged’ as it was believed to jeopardise the objectives of 
the programme. Once beneficiaries had redeemed their coupons they were supposed to 
use all of the subsidised inputs they acquired on their own land. 
                                                 
32 Emphasis added. 
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5.3.4 Evidence on beneficiary level targeting outcomes in Malawi’s FISP 
A number of studies have measured beneficiary level targeting outcomes in the FISP with 
results indicating that the FISP’s CBT approach has been failing to effectively target 
resource poor and vulnerable households, with land size, livestock and asset ownership 
generally positively and statistically associated with receipt of coupons or the amount of 
subsidised fertiliser received (Chibwana et al., 2012, Chirwa et al., 2011b, Holden and 
Lunduka, 2010a, Kilic et al., 2013, Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne, 2011, Ricker-Gilbert et al., 
2011). The disproportionate benefit identified in these studies might suggest elite capture 
or rent seeking but they do not tell us what is actually happening. 
Some questions from household surveys do provide further insights though still leave 
many questions unanswered. Table 15 below presents data from the 2012/13 FISS, which 
lead to the following observations and questions: 
x Allocation of coupons. Most but not all of those surveyed appear to have received 
some coupon but less than the full package, indicating sharing, and there was quite 
a range of different combinations received. What explains this? 
x Redistribution of coupons. Many respondents suggest redistribution took place, 
but what does it mean and how is it done?  
x Open meetings and importance of people involved. Open meetings were often 
reportedly used for allocation of fertiliser coupons and even more so for 
distribution of fertiliser coupons. However, when asked who decided on who got 
vouchers, village heads were those most commonly reported to have decided 
despite the guidelines that they should merely provide ‘support’. What explains 
this? 
x Use of coupons. Most coupons were reportedly redeemed for intended inputs, 
though there were some cases of coupons not being used. The main reported 
reason for non-redemption was lack of stock. What causes this and what else 
might explain non-redemption? Are some coupons sold and under-reported? 
Some qualitative evidence does exist on targeting processes and challenges facing access 
to subsidy coupons and access to subsidised inputs. This comes from FGDs, life stories 
and key informant interviews as part of the independent monitoring and evaluation of the 
FISP (Dorward et al., 2013, Mvula et al., 2011) with some further insights from separate 
surveys (Holden and Lunduka, 2012b). These studies raise a number of important 
additional findings, such as village heads adding their own criteria, there being fewer 
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coupons arriving than registered beneficiaries, malpractice by officials and leaders, 
secondary markets for coupons and inputs and a range of challenges in accessing 
subsidised fertiliser. However, the studies do not provide an overall picture of the main 
factors that are driving targeting outcomes in the FISP and the heavy reliance on FGDs 
runs the danger of people holding back in what they say, marginalised voices being 
missed, and distortion of actual events. 
 
Table 15: Selected data from 2012/13 Farm Input Subsidy Survey 
Source: Farm Input Subsidy Survey 4 (FISS4). Note: All questions apart from how 
fertiliser coupons and subsidised fertiliser were used and reasons for non-redemption of 
coupons use household weights. 
  
N= 
Percentage 
[95% confidence intervals] 
Number of households sampled 2001  
Households getting any share of a fertiliser coupon  60.1   [56.7, 64.3] 
Range of fertiliser coupons received   
Under one  11.2   [8.2, 15.1] 
One  31.9   [28.2, 35.8] 
Over one to two  16.9   [14.2, 20.0] 
More than two  0.6     [0.3, 1.2] 
How fertiliser coupons were used 2044  
Used to buy inputs  95.0 
Did not use  4.3 
Other   0.7 
Reason for not buying fertiliser with coupon  
(Two most common answers) 
101  
No stock in selling point  67.3 
No money to buy inputs  6.9 
Main use of fertiliser acquired with coupon 1942  
Used in own garden  96.1 
Shared with others  2.7 
Sold  0.4 
Other  0.8 
Who decided which households in your village would 
receive fertiliser vouchers? (Two most common answers) 
1964  
Village head  73.2   [70.1, 76.1] 
Village Development Committee  9.7     [7.8, 11.9] 
Use of open meetings in allocation of fertiliser vouchers 1964  
Yes  71.1   [67.8, 74.2] 
No  27.6   [24.4, 31.1] 
Don’t know  1.3     [0.7, 2.2] 
Use of open meetings in distribution of fertiliser vouchers 1964  
Yes  80.1   [77.7, 82.3] 
No  18.7   [16.4, 21.1] 
Don’t know  1.2     [0.7, 2.2] 
Redistribution of fertiliser coupons in the village 1964  
Yes  60.9   [55.8, 65.7] 
No  35.3   [30.6, 40.3] 
Don’t know  3.8     [2.7, 5.3] 
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5.4 Methodology 
As noted above, the study adopts a qualitative approach in order to move beyond 
measurement of targeting outcomes towards an understanding of what explains 
beneficiary selection and the transmission of subsidies to final beneficiaries. Semi-
structured interviews were chosen for data collection in order to elicit richer and more 
open responses than may have been possible with focus group discussions. They were 
also a practical option, offering the flexibility to consistently investigate the same key 
themes with a wide range of stakeholders, including staff from the MoAFS, through the 
same format. 
Semi-structured interviews were carried out in July and August 2013 in the central and 
southern regions of Malawi, which contain around 87% of the Malawian population 
(NSO, 2008). These regions can be further decomposed into a number of different 
Livelihood Zones in which households show commonalities in the way they obtain food 
and income. Within each of the central and southern regions, one district was purposively 
selected to ensure that two of Malawi’s most populated Livelihood Zones were included 
in the sample. In each of the two districts, two villages were then purposively selected 
from a list of those included in the FISP’s 2010/11 household monitoring and evaluation 
survey. Given evidence cited above suggesting elite capture may be more pronounced in 
areas further from rural towns, one village was randomly selected out of a list of those 
very close to a trading centre and one from those that were further away. The four villages 
are referred to as village A, B, C and D. Summary data are provided in Table 16. 
In each village, four farmers were selected, including two recipient households from the 
2012/13 programme and two non-recipients. Beneficiaries were randomly selected from 
the beneficiary register, which is the official list of all those formally selected as coupon 
beneficiaries within the village.33 Non-beneficiaries were randomly selected from a list 
provided by the village head. Table 17 presents summary information of the farmers 
interviewed. In each village the village head (also a farmer) was interviewed. This 
position of traditional authority is generally passed on through an ancestral line. From the 
MoAFS, the AEDOs responsible for each of the four villages and the AEDCs responsible 
for each of the four EPAs in which the villages were located were interviewed. Along 
                                                 
33 Completion of the beneficiary register is carried out before individuals actually receive coupons and, 
because of this and subsequent sharing arrangements, it cannot be taken as an accurate list of actual 
beneficiaries. For sampling purposes, however, it was the most reliable source available. 
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with two district-level MoAFS employees and one MoAFS officer from the ministry 
headquarters, this brought the total number of interviews to 31.  
It is important to note that the sampling method is not intended to be statistically 
representative of any administrative areas but instead aims to gather a more in-depth 
understanding of targeting processes from the views of a wide range of different 
individuals from four separate areas across the country. 
Interviews involved questions on processes for coupon allocation, access to inputs, and 
input use. A sample template from interviews with farmers is given in Appendix 13. 
Interview transcripts were imported into NVivo and analysed following the Framework 
Approach (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). The initial coding framework was structured 
around determinants of coupon allocation, coupon use and input use, based on a priori 
themes from the input subsidy literature. Further themes were allowed to evolve from the 
data itself. After coding, the data were charted to build up a picture for each area and to 
identify differences between actors. 
Interviews with villagers, village heads and AEDOs were carried out in Chichewa using 
consecutive interpreting with the assistance of a Malawian interpreter. Interviews with 
MoAFS employees from the EPA level upwards (AEDCs) were carried out in English 
where the interviewee was comfortable doing so. Informed verbal consent was given by 
each interviewee, with each individual interviewed separately and without use of audio 
recording so as to elicit free and open discussion and encourage trust, confidence and 
openness during interviews. 
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Table 16: Summary of villages visited 
 
 
Source: Interviews. Notes: Village heads gave higher household estimates than AEDOs, 
which could be due to more up-to-date information or incentives to inflate numbers to 
secure a higher number of coupons. It was noted by one district level MoAFS official how 
heads had learnt to cheat the system by inflating their farm family figures. * Estimate by 
village head not reported as it referred to distances to a new trading centre which had 
opened after the 2012/13 FISP coupon allocation. + AEDOs in village A and B both noted 
they would be responsible for considerably more villages in the 2013/14 season. The 
AEDO for village B indicated a 13 % increase (from 69 to 78). 
NA = not available. 
 
 
 
 
 District 1 (Central region) District 2 (Southern region) 
 Village A Village B Village C Village D 
Number of farm households in 
village (2012/13) 
(Village head estimate) 
(AEDO estimate) 
 
 
62 
NA 
 
 
51 
48 
 
 
362 
NA 
 
 
180 
127 
Average household size  
(From 2010/11 FISS) 
 
4 
 
5 
 
4 
 
5 
Approximate village population 
based on: 
(Village head estimate) 
(AEDO estimate) 
 
 
248 
NA 
 
 
255 
240 
 
 
1448 
NA 
 
 
900 
635 
Gender of village head Female Male Male Male 
Number of years head has held 
position 
13 19 10 6 
Distance to nearest trading 
centre 
(Village head estimate) 
(AEDO estimate) 
 
 
30 min walk 
3km 
 
 
1.5km 
1km 
 
 
0.5km 
1.5km 
 
 
* 
5.5km 
Distance to nearest ADMARC 
fertiliser depot 
(Village head estimate) 
(AEDO estimate) 
 
 
2 hour walk 
15km 
 
 
2km 
4km 
 
 
1km 
1.5km 
 
 
* 
5.5km 
Number of coupons village 
received according to head 
2012/13 
2011/12 
2010/11 
 
 
21 
8 
NA 
 
 
18 
19 
20 
 
 
80 
64 
43 
 
 
49 
49 
74 
Number of villages in the EPA 
(from AEDC) 
 
861 
 
731 
 
340 
 
150 
Number of smallholder families 
in EPA (from AEDC) 
 
26,000 
 
21,293 
 
35,663 
 
23,706 
Mean number of families per 
village in the EPA 
 
30 
 
29 
 
105 
 
158 
Mean village to AEDO ratio in 
the EPA 
 
43 
 
52 
 
49 
 
30 
Villages sampled AEDOs were 
responsible for in 2012/13 + 
 
79 
 
69 
 
25 
 
16 
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Table 17: Characteristics of coupon recipients and non-recipients interviewed (not 
including village heads) 
 
Gender of 
household 
head 
Household 
size 
Fertiliser 
coupons 
Other 
coupons 
Cement 
floor, 
concrete 
walls or 
iron roof 
Livestock Total 
hectares 
Highest 
education 
within 
household 
Coupon recipients  
Female 4 NPK Maize No No 0.2 Standard 5 
Male 6 NPK, Urea Maize Yes No 0.6 Standard 7 
Male 3 NPK, Urea Maize Yes No 1.8 Form 4 
Male 8 NPK, Urea Maize, 
Legume 
Yes No 2.9 Form 1 
Male 2 NPK Maize No Yes 1 Standard 8 
Female 2 Unspecified 
(farmer got 
CAN) 
Maize No No 0.3 None 
Male 5 Urea Maize No No 1 Standard 7 
Female 3 NPK Maize No No 0.7 Standard 4 
Female 6 NPK, Urea, 
Unspecified 
Maize No Yes 1.1 Standard 8 
Male 4 Urea, 
Unspecified 
Legume No Yes 0.5 Standard 8 
Non-recipients 
Female 5   No Yes 0.2 Standard 8 
Male 3   No Yes 0.9 Standard 8 
Female 5   No Yes Unsure Standard 5 
Male 2   No Yes 2.4 Standard 7 
Female 4   No No 0.6 Standard 2 
Female 2   No Yes 0.8 Standard 6 
 
Source: Interviews. Notes: (i) interviews revealed that while certain farmers are not 
formal beneficiaries, they end up being coupon recipients through redistribution 
(sharing). However, the non-recipients interviewed in this study were those who had not 
received any share of a coupon. (ii) 20 out of the 27 coupons were shares of a single 
coupon. Land ownership is that which household owns or has cultivation rights over, 
excluding land rented in. Education levels increase in chronological order from Standard 
1 to Form 4.  
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5.5 Key findings 
The findings are structured around the three stages of beneficiary level targeting from 
Figure 14. Each section starts with a brief overview describing outcomes across the 
villages, leading into the common factors explaining the outcomes for that level. 
  
5.5.1 Selection of beneficiaries and coupon allocation 
Based on their housing, ownership of livestock, land and other assets, most recipients 
appeared to fit the criteria of being ‘resource poor’. However, two beneficiaries from 
village C were clearly among the wealthiest in the area, one owning a TV and satellite 
dish and another running a beer brewing enterprise and local bar. In addition, it was 
noticed when going through the beneficiary register for Village A that the head, who was 
far from resource poor, was registered as the first person on her village’s beneficiary list. 
It was widely recognised by AEDCs that heads consider themselves entitled as 
beneficiaries. One AEDC explained, ‘When it is time for registration, instead of writing 
names they start with themselves as one or they put their wife’s name down the list. Others 
have been very clever; you give them a figure of twenty, they just register fifteen and keep 
five.’ Although the interviews did not reveal clear evidence that elite capture was more 
pronounced in more remote locations, they did suggest that certain factors associated with 
distance may be important, such as whether the village head is strong, the extent to which 
the AEDO provides adequate oversight and whether there are business people nearby to 
whom the head may be tempted to give or sell coupons. 
At the same time, a number of the non-beneficiary farmers interviewed appeared 
particularly resource poor and vulnerable, met the land-owning criterion, yet still received 
no share of any coupons in 2012/13 (Table 17). This included four female-headed 
households, one of which was headed by an elderly woman looking after two orphans 
(village C). These households reported either never having received the subsidy or not 
receiving it often.  
No households reported receiving the full package of coupons. It was reported by farmers 
and heads in all villages that the head asked beneficiaries during coupon allocation to 
share the inputs associated with the coupons with other specific households. The highest 
share of coupons received was one respondent reporting a 50% share of all four coupons 
and one reporting a 50% share of all but the legume seed. These were the two wealthy 
individuals mentioned above. The remaining recipients got various combinations of 
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fertiliser and seed coupons, with some sharing inputs among three or four households. 
The main explanation for sharing was that there were too few coupons for the number of 
poor households in the village. It was noted by farmers in two villages that those with 
whom the inputs were to be shared were either ‘favoured’ (village A) or from the head’s 
own ‘clan’ (village D).34 The head of village A explained that she asked beneficiaries to 
share among those involved in ‘development activities’ within the village (i.e. communal 
activities such as making roads, communal gardens or moulding bricks). 
The interviews revealed the most important determinants of targeting outcomes to be the 
inclinations of village heads and village politics, discussed below in turn. 
  
The inclinations of village heads 
‘The biggest problem is involvement of the village leaders. If they start selling coupons 
this programme will never work. Also, ordinary villagers cannot go to the government 
without going through the village head, so they depend on him. If he is not doing things 
right then the whole programme is in a total mess.’ -Male beneficiary farmer 
 
In terms of processes, in all four villages the heads were central to decision making and 
played a gatekeeper role to the outside world. Three heads suggested they were assisted 
in choosing beneficiaries by a VDC, one of them also involving the nduna (the head’s 
relative and next-in-line). The remaining head explained a VDC had not been functioning 
for a long time and reported choosing with a birth attendant and the nduna. However, 
farmer interviews could not always corroborate the involvement of a VDC and the large 
majority, along with MoAFS staff, agreed that heads often wield most influence while a 
smaller minority, including two heads, suggested that the VDCs can be as or more 
influential. 
The central importance of the head was reinforced by findings of limited involvement of 
ordinary farmers. Across all four villages, farmers (and village heads) explained that 
farmers were not involved in actual decision making. In three villages, they were simply 
called once decisions had been made regarding who should get coupons and with whom 
they should share. In village D, villagers received more information as a meeting was 
                                                 
34 The term clan refers to individuals coming from a particular ancestral line. The number of different clans 
in a village may be large or small depending on its history. Within the Chewa ethnic group, the term 
mbumba mbumba is also used to refer to children from the same mother who together comprise a particular 
family. 
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organized by the AEDO, though even there the village head simply read out who should 
receive coupons and with whom they should share. It was generally recognised by 
farmers, heads and certain MoAFS staff that farmers were then not able to question 
decisions made. As one AEDO remarked, ‘Even if there are open meetings, the village 
head is the owner of the village. People can be angry but at the end of the day his say 
goes’. All AEDOs were clear that, even if villagers are present, the village head, 
sometimes with a VDC, ultimately makes the decisions. Two AEDOs encouraged this 
approach as being more streamlined in order ‘to avoid problems and quarrelling’. One 
said it would be very hard to follow the procedure of an open forum, saying, ‘It will be 
chaos’. 
A lack of awareness among most farmers about the official criteria, entitlements and 
procedures for selection further underscored the degree of power held by village heads. 
In three villages nearly all farmers interviewed were unaware of the formal criteria. The 
two farmers that were aware of the formal criteria were the two wealthy individuals 
mentioned previously. Two other farmers interviewed believed that beneficiaries should 
be receiving just one bag of fertiliser and one bag of maize seed. Lack of awareness seems 
to be explained by the fact that, in three of the four villages, sensitisation activities were 
implemented through village heads rather than by AEDOs with the community as a 
whole. Indeed, in village D most of the selected farmers were aware of the criteria because 
of the meeting organized by the AEDO, though this awareness did not stop favouritism 
from being reported by all farmers interviewed (see below).  
The power and informational asymmetries in turn created scope for favouritism and 
personal relationships to influence targeting outcomes. A common response by farmers 
in all four villages was that some element of favouritism was involved, with family 
favouritism reported by all farmers interviewed in village D, in spite of farmers and 
MoAFS staff being present when selected beneficiaries were read out. This example 
highlights the degree and significance of village-level power asymmetries. One farmer 
explained this by saying ‘there is no room for talking’, inspiring the title of this article. 
AEDCs and district level officers agreed that relationships have an important influence 
on who receives coupons. Three AEDCs suggested they were ‘extremely important’ and 
one said it would be difficult to get a coupon without a good relationship with the head. 
AEDCs and district officers also believed family relationships (‘chibale’) were important, 
with one AEDC explaining heads give coupons to relatives ‘a lot, a lot, a lot’ as he has 
had to subsequently reason with village heads to encourage a fairer distribution. These 
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and other divergences from formal guidelines were suggested by the AEDC and other 
MoAFS staff to particularly occur where the village head is ‘strong’. 
Given the above findings, it was unsurprising that one of the most common findings from 
the interviews concerned how the current targeting system is leading to considerable 
enmity within villages. 
 
Community politics 
‘There was a lot of fighting, pulling each other, between me and the villagers, because 
everyone wants to benefit and there are few coupons, people link the coupon programme 
to other programmes, like making roads and community gardens. People say “how come 
you used us for that development activity and now we are not getting a coupon?”’ -
Village head 
 
In spite of the power and informational asymmetries between village heads and ordinary 
villagers, it was evident that the heads were subject to a range of competing demands 
from community members. So, while relationships were reported to be important, one 
AEDC noted that heads were not always able to show complete favouritism as there could 
be pressure on them from those involved in development activities who can threaten to 
withhold future involvement. Another AEDC explained ‘Some are not happy, even 
though they are better off, they would like to receive a coupon. They say “I am involved 
in community projects so I should receive one”’. One AEDC also referred to a few cases 
where villagers had stopped the decision-making process and torn up the beneficiary list 
because they felt the decisions were unfair. 
The idea of pressures to share subsidies also came out among MoAFS staff explaining 
the ‘village politics’ that sometimes takes place, of sharing between clans. One district 
officer even mentioned ‘Sometimes it is working better where there are many clans in 
order to avoid coupons going to one clan… Majority rules.’ Another said, ‘There are 
village politics attached- everybody likes to think they are poor.’ 
It was also mentioned by one of the district level officers that sometimes people can pay 
individuals involved in coupon distribution beforehand in order to access coupons. 
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5.5.2 Redemption of coupons and access to inputs 
Table 17 provides information on coupons received (some of which were to be shared 
with other households). While the majority were reportedly used to buy inputs, just over 
20% were not redeemed, all of them fertiliser coupons. The majority of these were 
reportedly sold, the reason given in all cases being that fertiliser was not accessible at the 
local depot. Of the others, one held by an elderly lady was stolen by someone in the queue 
at ADMARC who had taken payment from her to help her redeem it. The other was given 
to the village head and never returned after its owner was unable to redeem it. 
Interestingly, despite it being played down by a number of researchers, the issue of non-
redemption came at the very top of the concerns of both district level MoAFS officers. 
Among all interviewees, key factors reported to determine use of coupons emerged at the 
level of the beneficiary, the local-level and macro-level.  
At the level of the beneficiary, the most commonly suggested reason for non-redemption 
was lack of access to money. Farmers and MoAFS staff noted that poverty can be a strong 
determinant of whether a beneficiary chooses to sell a coupon. It was mentioned in a 
number of cases how the poorest were particularly vulnerable to selling coupons because 
of the need to access cash for food and other items, especially if there was a long gap 
between getting a coupon and being able to redeem it. 
On the whole, however, farmers generally seemed reluctant to sell coupons and, when 
asked how much money they would accept as payment for a hypothetical fertiliser coupon 
given to them in November, the majority could not imagine doing so because they knew 
it was better to use the inputs. This majority were all women. One said, ‘In the first place, 
I would not sell a coupon. It is like killing yourself because, as you can see, I am very 
poor and there is nowhere I can get money, so the only way is to rely on subsidised inputs’. 
Another pointed out it did not make sense economically, because to buy a 50kg bag of 
fertiliser would cost them 17,000 MWK (around US$ 53). Of the respondents who could 
imagine a price for selling a coupon, all were male. One of them did actually sell his 
coupon for 6000MWK (US$ 18.75) due to an expected inability to redeem it. The idea of 
men being more willing to sell coupons was supported by the views of an AEDO who 
said, ‘Men are less responsible here. If they get a coupon they will go and not use it 
properly’. 
A range of local level factors also came up as playing a key role in influencing the ability 
to redeem coupons at the parastatals. The two most common ones are discussed. Firstly, 
across all villages it was reported by farmers, village heads, AEDOs and AEDCs that 
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there were ‘vendors’ involved who buy and sell coupons and subsidised inputs. In general, 
these are local businessmen, some of whom own small agro-dealer outlets. A number of 
farmers and heads explained how vendors occupy positions at the front of the queue at 
the fertiliser depot at the time beneficiaries redeem coupons, restricting access. It was 
frequently commented how they have close working relationships with ADMARC 
officials, allowing them to access subsidised inputs. When asked how this could happen, 
one AEDC explained you do not need identification to redeem coupons if you have 
money to give ADMARC staff. Another AEDC echoed this, explaining he had 
confiscated fertiliser found on non-beneficiaries and suggesting that out of 300 bags as 
much as one third could go to vendors. An account by one AEDO described how he had 
known of a truck that dropped off inputs to vendors through an agreement with the team 
leader of the local ADMARC depot. Farmers from different villages explained how 
vendors would sometimes come to ask people if they wanted to sell coupons and an 
AEDC explained how vendors get coupons from the poor, acquire the inputs and then re-
sell them at below market prices. Among farmers, village heads and MoAFS staff up to 
AEDC level, over half reported buying and selling of coupons to be either ‘very common’ 
or ‘fairly common’ in their area. 
Secondly, across all villages there were reports of top-up prices being hiked well above 
the official level. Payments reported to have been asked for either by ADMARC officials 
or vendors ranged from between 1500 MWK (US$ 4.69) to 3500 MWK (US$ 10.93) per 
coupon. Of the villagers who reported accessing subsidised inputs, a third reported paying 
a ‘tip’ to vendors and an ADMARC employee of between an additional 1000 MWK (US$ 
3.13) and 3000 MWK (US$ 9.38). Interviews from village C suggested that the use of 
community policing in 2012/13 helped to prevent bribes reportedly requested by local 
police at depots the year before. 
Macro-level factors influencing supply of fertiliser to local levels and therefore access, 
were also mentioned, particularly in interviews with MoAFS staff. Specific emphasis was 
made relating to challenges of timing in terms of getting inputs out before the rains started 
when some areas become impassable. A second key macro theme was the large-scale 
leakage of fertiliser from district-level or above, specifically involving private 
transporters. One district level officer explained how in 2012/13 more than ten trucks 
containing 4,000 bags of fertiliser (200mt) had been diverted in this way. This appears to 
have been part of a bigger problem in 2012/13, with the Logistics Unit aware of a total of 
608mt of fertiliser lost or stolen in transit (Dorward et al., 2013: 11). While this represents 
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only 0.4% of the overall 150,000mt procured for 2012/13, the district level officer 
explained that because of the fixed budget, no new fertiliser was arranged to replace the 
missing bags. This means that, based on the level of diversion that was known about, at 
least 12,160 coupon holders lost out on access to subsidised inputs, with substantial 
implications for the livelihoods of them, their families and the wider local economy. 
  
5.5.3 Use of subsidised inputs 
The final stage of the transmission process studied was factors influencing use of 
subsidised inputs. All beneficiaries who reported successfully acquiring subsidised 
fertiliser reported sharing it with other households based on the sharing arrangements 
mentioned earlier. The only cases of recipients reporting to have not shared inputs were 
among farmers in village B and for maize seed only. After sharing, all farmers claimed 
to use their remaining share of inputs on their own land, except one farmer who reported 
eating his legume seeds (groundnuts) out of hunger. 
In general discussions regarding the resale of inputs (as opposed to coupons), the common 
view was that among genuine beneficiaries it ‘never happened’ or was ‘fairly uncommon’ 
as inputs are highly valued and hard to come by. Most farmers said that if they can access 
fertiliser then they would use it on their own land. One farmer pointed out that ‘selling is 
not the best idea – fertiliser helps you produce more maize – selling it is like you are 
putting yourself into poverty’. A village head also pointed out ‘people cry for fertiliser, 
why would they sell it?’ and an AEDC pointed out that ‘here they take it as a blessing 
because to find fertiliser now, it’s expensive’.  
However, some MoAFS staff, farmers and village heads still reported sale of inputs as 
‘fairly common’ or ‘very common’ and there was an acknowledgement among a number 
of MoAFS staff and farmers that, sometimes, poorer farmers choose to sell a portion of 
their inputs because of poverty, using the cash for immediate needs. An interesting insight 
came from one farmer who explained that, while farmers in the area had previously sold 
subsidised fertiliser because they had no food, since a World Food Programme (WFP) 
project started distributing free maize in the area, they stopped selling fertiliser. 
When farmers were asked to offer a price for a hypothetical 50kg bag of fertiliser given 
in November, just three respondents said they could imagine selling it, for between 10,000 
MWK (US$ 31.25) and 15,000 MWK (US$ 46.89). Again, as with those who could 
imagine selling coupons, all were male. 
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5.6 Discussion 
This final section returns to the paper’s core research questions in the context of the above 
findings and earlier conceptual framework, and asks what we can reasonably infer from 
the findings. The section considers the study’s novel contributions and discusses policy 
implications. First, some limitations of the study are considered. 
 
5.6.1 Limitations of the study 
One of the main limitations of the study is its relatively small sample size, which limits 
the extent to which findings may be generalised beyond the areas visited. However, the 
purpose of the study was not to identify nationally representative results, but rather to 
investigate and explain in greater depth than before the underlying informal targeting 
processes and transmission mechanisms, explaining outcomes in a number of specific 
areas by drawing on the views of a wide range of stakeholders. Nevertheless, some 
validation of the results can be found through their consistency with quantitative 
household survey results, as discussed below.  
A second limitation is that, despite attempts to build a closer rapport than is possible with 
large-scale closed-ended household surveys, some respondents may have still been 
reluctant to disclose the full scale of malpractices. It is also possible that any reports based 
on hearsay may exaggerate actual events, though care was taken during the interview 
process to minimise this through triangulation and probing. 
Finally, this study has focused on what explains targeting outcomes at the village level. 
Processes relating to area-level targeting, which crucially influence the amount of subsidy 
locally available, have remained outside its scope. 
 
5.6.2 Summary and discussion of main findings 
Before discussing the findings in relation to existing evidence, it is helpful to briefly 
synthesise the main findings of the study. The key factors identified as explaining 
targeting outcomes are summarised in Table 18. 
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Table 18: Summary of key challenges relating to targeting outcomes 
 
Stage of the 
subsidy allocation-
use process 
Key factors explaining targeting outcomes 
Selection of formal 
(and informal) 
beneficiaries and 
coupon allocation35 
x Concentration of decision making power in hands of village heads 
x Limited community awareness of selection criteria and beneficiary 
entitlements and limited participation in decision making 
x Role of community politics in mediating outcomes 
Redemption of 
coupons and access 
to inputs 
x Lack of local access to subsidised fertiliser due to involvement of 
unscrupulous vendors who have relationships with depot staff, leading to 
diversion and hiking of official top-up prices 
x Lack of access to subsidised fertiliser resulting from leakages within the 
transport system and logistical supply challenges 
x Poverty-related constraints to coupon redemption creating incentives for 
coupon sale, exacerbated by uncertainties arising from other obstacles in 
accessing subsidised inputs and presence of vendors 
x Possible gender-related differences in willingness to sell coupons 
 
Use of subsidised 
inputs 
x Enforced sharing of inputs within villages driven by village heads 
x Poverty-related constraints meaning poorer households may sell portions 
to access cash for basic needs and expenditures 
x Possible gender-related differences in willingness to sell inputs 
 
Source: Author. 
 
5.6.2.1 Identification of beneficiaries 
While open meetings have been encouraged since 2008/09 to sensitise farmers about the 
operation of the FISP and remove power from traditional authorities including village 
leaders (Dorward et al., 2013), this study suggests that the mere promotion of open 
meetings is neither adequate nor sufficient for effective beneficiary identification and 
selection. In the four separate areas studied, decision-making remained non-participatory 
and meetings were merely a formality for the village head to communicate decisions that 
had already been made. This finding supports the hypothesis of Dorward et al. (2013) that 
open meetings may typically be a place for village heads to communicate decisions that 
have been made already. The findings shed new light on earlier empirical evidence by 
Chirwa et al. (2011b) that communities which held open meetings had an improved 
allocation to households ranking themselves as poor by 10% compared to areas where no 
meetings were held. Findings from the present study indicate that rather than it being the 
                                                 
35 The formal and informal distinction refers to how selection of formal beneficiaries was linked to 
agreements orchestrated by the village head on sharing with other households. 
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open meetings themselves improving outcomes, these villages may have simply been 
areas in which the village head felt inclined to at least hold a meeting, reflecting instead 
the role of pre-existing power asymmetries and other local contextual features. 
The findings are consistent with and help to explain evidence from the 2012/2013 Farm 
Input Subsidy Survey presented in Table 15, which showed that while over 70% of 
respondents reported the existence of an open meeting, 72% of respondents also 
suggested it was village heads that decided on who received fertiliser coupons. This study 
helps explain that apparent contradiction. The findings of elite capture, favouritism and 
village politics are also consistent with the quantitative analysis by Kilic et al. (2013), 
which found that having a village head, VDC member or traditional authority in one’s 
household network increased the probability and number of coupons received in 2009/10. 
They also fit with previous research on Malawi indicating that neo-patrimonialism and 
social relationships characterised by inequality and a large ‘power distance’ are common 
features within the country’s political economy (Booth et al., 2006). 
The interviews found that a further explanation for how weak targeting outcomes can 
arise is that there were low levels of awareness among ordinary villagers about the official 
criteria, entitlements and procedures for selection due to the gatekeeper role played by 
the village head, who can restrict access to information. This finding contrasts with earlier 
findings from a qualitative evaluation of the 2010/11 season (Mvula et al., 2011). This 
could be an artefact of the areas visited and farmers interviewed, though it was a common 
finding in three of the four villages. An alternative explanation is that the individual semi-
structured interviews used were able to elicit concerns of more marginalised individuals 
which may not have emerged in the study by Mvula et al. (2011), which drew heavily on 
FGDs and interviews with village heads for the question of awareness of targeting criteria. 
As per the conceptual framework (Figure 15), key reasons explaining the observed 
outcomes can be found in the interactions between local contextual factors and 
programme design. Contextually, the position of, and deference to, traditional authorities 
within the rural Malawian setting is crucial, as highlighted in various quotes cited above, 
including reference to the village head as the ‘owner of the village’, how there was ‘no 
room for talking’ and how ‘ordinary villagers cannot go to the government without going 
through the village head’. This fits with previous research highlighting the importance of 
cultural reverence to traditional authorities in Malawi (Chirwa et al., 2012). It also helps 
to explain the findings of favouritism and the suggestion by MoAFS staff that 
relationships and family ties can be particularly important, especially where the village 
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head is ‘strong’. While this contrasts with findings by Turley et al. (n.d.), who found little 
evidence to support any elite capture or to suggest that greater power of a local leader was 
associated with increased elite capture, the present study provides evidence in the context 
of a longstanding national government programme, and so is less likely to be subject to 
an observer effect. 
However, the study also found that, in some places more than others, this power might be 
mediated by demands on local leaders. For example, where people hold power through 
providing labour or services to the village, they can threaten to withhold it. In addition, it 
was suggested by MoAFS staff that ‘Sometimes it is working better where there are many 
clans in order to avoid coupons going to one clan’, consistent with findings of a study by 
Acemoglu et al. in Sierra Leone (2014). 
In Malawi’s FISP, the position of local leaders interacts with programme design and 
implementation features leaving it somewhat flexible as to how beneficiary selection 
should actually take place. While village heads are formally supposed to ‘provide 
support’, the findings showed how some extension officers were happy to allow village 
heads to exercise their traditional authority and there appeared to be no consistent 
determined effort to impose alternative structures to counteract the influence of traditional 
authorities, as in Malawi’s Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP). A further important 
contextual explanatory feature of the areas visited was that agricultural extension staff 
were responsible for covering, on average, 30 to 52 villages (Table 16). It is not clear 
whether the fact that the two more remote villages were also those where favouritism was 
reported (consistent with Pan and Christiaensen (2012)) was related to this or not. Further 
qualitative fieldwork covering a larger number of villages would be useful in this regard. 
However, the fact that favouritism was consistently reported in Village D despite the 
extension officer facilitating a meeting indicates that such oversight and monitoring alone 
may be insufficient to counteract the power of village leaders in Malawi. 
The above factors also help explain the other observed outcomes, including: wealthier 
households getting coupons and even getting higher proportions; village heads seemingly 
being able to access coupons for themselves (consistent with Kilic et al.  (2013)); and 
village heads exhibiting family and other favouritism, sometimes to the detriment of 
genuine beneficiaries. 
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5.6.2.2 Access to inputs 
The study found systematic involvement of vendors across the areas visited and close 
relationships and collusion with depot staff, fitting with a previous programme evaluation 
from 2010/11 that found vendors purchased inputs from traditional leadership or 
agricultural officials (Mvula et al., 2011). The study also supports the quantitative 
programme evaluation data, which suggested that lack of stock was a crucial obstacle 
preventing coupon redemption (Table 15). Crucially, however, the findings support a 
previous hypothesis by Mvula et al. (2011), linking vendor involvement to stock-outs. 
Additional findings supported by previous research include findings of secondary markets 
for coupons (Holden and Lunduka, 2012b) and the demand for ‘tips’ for coupon 
redemption, reported as ‘common’ in a quarter of the life stories recorded in Mvula et al. 
(2011). 
Looking further at what seems to explain the findings, two key interacting features 
emerge particularly strongly. Firstly, the FISP’s design in 2012/13 saw parastatals 
exercise an effective local monopoly for subsidy coupon redemption, generating strong 
power asymmetries between depot staff and coupon holders. This appears to be played 
upon by depot staff and vendors, able to use their position and fear to extract rents and 
capture coupons. This is reinforced with the contextual feature of widespread poverty and 
a lack of empowerment, which also creates incentives, particularly among poorer 
households, to sell coupons, especially in areas where there is risk and uncertainty over 
being able to redeem coupons for fertiliser. 
 
5.6.2.3 Use of inputs 
In terms of subsidised input use, the findings are consistent with previous evidence of 
splitting coupon packages (Chirwa et al., 2011b, Mvula et al., 2011), but go beyond this 
by highlighting the crucial role that village heads can play in shaping input use, in so far 
as the selection of formal beneficiaries was linked to agreements arranged by the head for 
these beneficiaries to share inputs with other informal beneficiary households. It was 
found in village D how this process of making formally registered beneficiaries share 
with others can even be used to cover up enforced sharing with those favoured by the 
village leader. 
Key factors that explain this are, again, related to programme design and contextual 
factors. Firstly, Malawi is a country in which there are a very high number of potentially 
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eligible resource poor households. The poverty rate is around 56% in rural areas (NSO, 
2012), making it difficult to distinguish between poor households for targeting purposes 
in the FISP given the very broad criteria. The fact that the programme in 2012/2013 aimed 
to formally target approximately just one third of households (with a full package) in each 
village, appears to have therefore encouraged sharing of inputs in a context where village 
leaders and local politics play such a central role in beneficiary selection, with minimal 
scope for effective oversight and enforcement. 
The other main finding, of poorer households being potentially more prone to selling a 
portion of their fertiliser, offers a new insight into subsidised input use within the FISP. 
 
5.6.3 Implications for theory and policy 
As well as contributing to the literature on the FISP, this study also contributes to the 
wider literatures on decentralised targeting, elite capture and rent-seeking. Firstly, the 
study reinforces the findings by Pan and Christiaensen (2012) and others that resource 
allocation in certain settings can end up being driven by and reflecting the preferences of 
elite groups. More specifically, the study provides evidence that this may be likely to 
particularly occur in contexts where there is:  
a) strong cultural reverence to local leadership structures and/or power asymmetries 
between those with access to the resources being distributed and potential 
beneficiaries; 
b) limited administrative or cultural scope for government oversight or intervention; 
and 
c) where the design of the programme or policy itself leaves the targeting mechanism 
guidelines and eligibility criteria very broad, with a high proportion of potentially 
eligible beneficiaries.  
Nevertheless, elite capture at the village level was not found to translate into complete 
capture of resources, as targeting outcomes appeared to reflect some attempt at spreading 
resources in a way to maintain local support, or to avoid local conflicts, and/or reward 
familial or friendship ties. 
In terms of rent-seeking, the case of the FISP seems to underscore the particular danger 
for rent-seeking and diversion to take place, not just where there are power asymmetries 
between beneficiaries and those involved in distribution, but where there is a particularly 
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high differential between the subsidised price and the market price, leading to incentives 
for capture and re-sale on secondary markets as has been found elsewhere, such as in 
India’s public distribution system (Davala et al., 2015). 
Overall, the findings highlight the utility of the earlier conceptual framework (Figure 15), 
which emphasises the crucial importance of interactions between local context and design 
features in determining targeting outcomes under CBT. 
From a policy perspective, four main implications arise, relating to the choice of 
subsidising inputs compared to other options, choice of targeting criteria, beneficiary 
selection and redemption of subsidy coupons.  
On the first point, given the substantial challenges identified at various stages from 
beneficiary selection to coupon redemption and use of subsidised inputs, the findings 
raise the question of whether an alternative approach of providing direct cash transfers 
may be a more efficient means of achieving the FISP’s objectives. Such an approach 
would help to avoid the challenges associated with coupon redemption, secondary 
markets (for coupons and subsidised inputs) and crowding-out of private sector input 
suppliers. However, targeting outcomes would still crucially depend upon the targeting 
mechanisms used. The provision of cash transfers over subsidised inputs would also open 
up the possibility that transfers were used for alternative goods and services (e.g. 
livestock), unless they were made conditional upon purchasing subsidised fertiliser, 
though monitoring and enforcement mechanisms would be challenging to implement. 
Therefore, while cash transfers could potentially represent a more efficient approach, it 
could end up prioritising the achievement of household food security (among 
beneficiaries) over national self-sufficiency in maize production. 
Regarding targeting criteria, the study finds some support for the proposal by Matita and 
Chirwa of more narrowly targeting subsidised inputs to households unable to afford 
commercial fertiliser but most able to effectively use it, while targeting the very poorest 
with cash transfers (Matita and Chirwa, 2014). One of the reasons for this is that, aside 
from helping address the sale of coupons and subsidised inputs identified to take place 
partly among some of the poorest, it would also ensure those that do receive inputs were 
better able to realise longer-term livelihood-related benefits. Such an approach is in fact 
planned for the 2015/2016 season, with vulnerable households to be removed as target 
beneficiaries and a shift towards considerably higher top-up payments. However, the 
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crucial challenge will be to ensure that poorer households (nearly all of which also rely 
on agriculture for their livelihoods) are still able to access affordable inputs, which is 
unlikely given the low levels of cash transfers and high market prices for inorganic 
fertiliser. Otherwise the move will represent a considerable step backwards in terms of 
promoting socio-economic equality in Malawi and is likely to lead to major food 
insecurity among poorer households. 
Regarding selection processes, the findings indicate that without effectively curtailing the 
power exercised by village leaders, targeting outcomes will likely continue to diverge 
from policy intentions. Furthermore, this study and evidence from FGDs suggests that, 
rather than building social capital, the current targeting approaches being promoted are 
leading in many cases to resentment and enmity (Dorward et al., 2013: 89). As attempts 
to introduce open forums appear to have failed to effectively curtail the dominance of 
village leaders in the areas visited, one option would be to adapt lessons from the targeting 
approach used in Malawi’s SCTP, which has shown a greater commitment to establishing 
and training independent selection committees (Community Social Support Committees). 
Nevertheless, this has not completely removed the ability of local leaders to still influence 
beneficiary selection (Handa et al., 2015), including where their relatives become 
committee members. A further benefit of the SCTP targeting approach is that, alongside 
CBT, it is combined with a proxy means test applied at the district level, which again can 
go some way to counter-balance the influence of local leaders. As mentioned earlier, a 
cross-country study by Coady et al. (2004) indicated that combined CBT approaches had 
worked well on average in the past. Furthermore, significant cost savings could be made 
if targeting costs could be shared between the FISP, SCTP and other social protection 
measures. 
One alternative to CBT involves implementing a smaller rationed universal subsidy 
among all smallholder farmers (Dorward and Chirwa, 2013b, Holden and Lunduka, 
2012b). For example, Dorward and Chirwa have discussed universal provision of a 50kg 
bag of fertiliser as ‘effectively legitimising and extending the widespread practice of 
redistribution’ (Dorward and Chirwa, 2013b: 10-12). Some of the main benefits of such 
an approach have been highlighted elsewhere (SOAS et al., 2008) and include: 
x increasing access to fertiliser among the poor by eliminating exclusion errors or 
undercoverage; 
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x increasing transparency and accountability (providing everyone knows of their 
entitlement, which this paper suggests would be a challenge); and  
x eliminating the costs and difficulties of targeting. 
 
In contrast to the earlier universal programmes mentioned in the introduction, a rationed 
universal subsidy would restrict the amount of subsidised inputs available per household, 
restrict the inputs to smallholder farmers only and could impose a maximum duration of 
subsidy support. Universal programmes need not be prohibitively expensive; a recent 
review of nine AISPs suggests average programme costs per mt of fertiliser distributed 
were around 20% lower for universal as compared with targeted input subsidy 
programmes (Jayne and Rashid, 2013). 
While a rationed universal subsidy would require trade-offs in terms of a smaller package 
per beneficiary, given existing sharing arrangements and inequalities in the amount of 
subsidy accruing to different wealth groups (Harman et al., 2015), resource poor 
households may well receive more than they do at present. Also, while there would be 
some increase in less-poor households getting inputs, if fertiliser coupons from 2012/2013 
were distributed evenly among all wealth groups, overall, the total quantity of fertiliser 
going to less poor households could remain at a similar level or even decline.36  
However, some important issues would require further analysis before implementing a 
rationed universal approach. Firstly, whether the smaller input package per recipient 
household would realistically be enough to allow for graduation and a permanent shift 
out of poverty and the ‘maize dependency trap’ (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013a). Secondly, 
whether it would increase or decrease crowding-out of commercial fertiliser sales. Thirdly 
(and relevant to all targeting approaches), success would crucially depend on developing 
and maintaining an accurate list of farm households and the effective introduction of 
national identification cards. 
An alternative to CBT and the rationed universal subsidy is a pure PMT approach that 
would identify beneficiaries using a small number of observable socioeconomic 
indicators (e.g. housing characteristics, land and asset ownership). This could be 
combined with categorical targeting through household assessments to ensure that cash 
transfer alternatives were provided to households unable to engage in agricultural 
production. Regarding the PMT component, some proponents have argued that, while it 
would involve considerably higher administrative costs, it could reduce errors of 
                                                 
36 Calculations are available upon request. 
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exclusion and inclusion without necessarily becoming cost-ineffective (Houssou and 
Zeller, 2011). However, it must be recognised that ‘there are potential major costs and 
challenges in gathering accurate and reliable data on household indicators and in ensuring 
that these indicators are used properly in the processes of subsidy allocations to 
households’ (Dorward and Chirwa, 2013b). For example, while it has been suggested that 
data could be collected as part of the annual update of the farm household registry (Kilic 
et al., 2013), interviews with MoAFS staff highlighted considerable problems and 
reliability issues even simply updating the farming population (see footnote to Table 16). 
Furthermore, it has been noted how households have been known to give misleading 
information on indicators if they believe it will improve their chances of receiving 
transfers (Abdoulayi et al., 2013). Indicators would therefore need to be selected 
extremely carefully to minimise the scope for misreporting. 
One way of reducing the cost of PMT targeting would be to spread the costs with existing 
social protection programmes, such as the SCTP (Matita and Chirwa, 2014), by 
developing a single registry of all households below a certain socioeconomic threshold. 
This approach has been used in many successful conditional cash transfer programmes, 
where the same household targeting systems are used for various programmes even with 
different criteria and thresholds, seen by some to constitute major ‘institutional capital’ 
for the countries concerned (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009: 70). 
Finally, the study has highlighted the need to overcome the substantial challenges in 
accessing subsidised fertiliser. Crucially, this involves tackling the secondary market that 
exists for coupons and removing power from parastatal depot staff and unscrupulous 
vendors. Interviews from village C suggest that the use of community policing could go 
some way to tackle the problem and more effective communication campaigns of 
grievance mechanisms available to report malpractices could also prove useful. A 
potential step forward in tackling the above challenges is currently in place for the 
2015/16 season, through plans to privatise the procurement and distribution of fertiliser 
for use in the FISP. In so far as this removes the stranglehold on subsidised fertiliser 
access that has been held by parastatal depot staff and introduces some competition at a 
local level, this could help address the problem of fertiliser coupon redemption. However, 
in some areas private outlets may retain an effective monopoly and careful attention will 
need to be paid to ensuring private outlets stock sufficient fertiliser at the right time (even 
though there would be a profit incentive for them to do so). Moreover, the late delivery 
of subsidised fertiliser in 2015/16 also highlights the continued challenges associated with 
   148 
government commissioning of contracts for subsidised inputs, raising the question of 
whether a more purely private sector led approach would be more beneficial. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
This study set out to identify the key underlying factors driving and influencing outcomes 
at various stages in the transmission of subsidised agricultural inputs to beneficiaries in 
Malawi’s FISP. It did this through gathering new primary data from a wide range of 
stakeholders covering four separate localities in the central and southern regions. The 
findings reveal that power and informational asymmetries play a crucial role in 
influencing targeting outcomes and the redemption of subsidy coupons, with local 
leaders, depot staff and vendors all occupying positions of authority that can permit the 
extraction of rents and distribution of patronage, ultimately restricting access to 
subsidised inputs among intended beneficiaries. Poverty was also identified as an 
important factor that can work against farmers redeeming their coupon or using all of 
their inputs. Addressing these power imbalances and opportunities for rent seeking as 
well as providing alternatives for the poorest households unable to engage in productive 
agriculture were identified as key priorities for a more cost-effective and efficient FISP. 
Using the case of Malawi’s FISP, the study contributes to the literatures on decentralised 
targeting and elite capture, providing evidence which supports the theoretical dangers of 
elite capture and displacement of official programme targeting criteria under a specific 
form of CBT, in a specific local context.  
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Preamble to research paper three 
The previous two chapters have focused on the issue of targeting in the case of an AISP. 
The next and final empirical chapter continues with the theme of targeting, but from a 
different angle and within the context of a PHPS programme. The chapter looks at 
whether or not the Tanzanian National Voucher Scheme for mosquito nets crowded-in or 
crowded-out demand for unsubsidised nets. 
The chapter is based on a research paper written to address research objective three of the 
thesis – to estimate the impact that the TNVS had on commercial ITN sales and overall 
ITN coverage between 2005 and 2008 – and which is currently under submission to 
Health Economics. 
As with Chapter 4, the impetus for the study and its study design are informed through a 
cross-sector approach, this time drawing on the heavy emphasis placed on the issue of 
crowding-out in the AISP literature. While the issue has been recognised within the PHPS 
literature it has received less attention and there are very few studies focussing directly 
on the effect partially subsidised PHPs have on unsubsidised sales. Drawing on 
approaches used in the AISP literature, a household demand model is estimated 
econometrically using non-linear multivariate regression methods and nationally 
representative household survey data covering 6,918 households. 
Luke Harman designed the study, collected and analysed the data, and drafted the paper. 
Professor Andrew Dorward and Dr Catherine Goodman provided advice and support 
throughout the research process, including comments at the drafting stage. 
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6 The Impact of Voucher Subsidies for Mosquito Nets on Incremental 
Net Coverage in the Tanzanian National Voucher Scheme 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper uses a household demand model, estimated econometrically using a range of 
estimators and a nationally representative household survey, to calculate the extent of any 
crowding-in or crowding-out in Tanzania’s National Voucher Scheme (TNVS) for 
mosquito nets. The results provide robust evidence that, between 2004 and 2008, the 
receipt of partially subsidised nets reduced the purchase of future unsubsidised nets. 
Estimates suggest that, on average, every 100 subsidised nets led to an incremental 
increase of between 88 and 90 new nets. The reduction in the purchase of unsubsidised 
nets was considerably higher among the wealthiest households, suggesting that the receipt 
of subsidised nets displaced unsubsidised sales that would have gone ahead in the 
subsidy’s absence. However, the same effect also occurred among the bottom four wealth 
quintiles, indicating that wealth may be an imperfect determinant of demand for ITNs and 
that factors, such as high unsubsidised ITN prices, may have prevented the TNVS from 
crowding-in future unsubsidised purchases. Furthermore, incremental coverage may have 
been even lower than the estimates suggest if there was substantial diversion of coupons 
away from receipt by intended beneficiaries (which would not be picked up by the 
household survey data). There is some evidence to suggest such diversion took place. The 
study’s findings highlight how, due to the impact a public health product subsidy 
programme can have on unsubsidised sales, it must not be assumed that such programmes 
lead to a one-for-one increase in overall coverage and use, and raise the important 
question over whether long-term efficiencies could be gained by using alternative 
targeting approaches and taking complementary steps to lower commercial prices. 
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6.1 Introduction 
The subsidisation of public health products (PHPs) has become a popular and increasingly 
common policy in low-income countries as a means of tackling major public health 
concerns such as malaria. The basic idea behind subsidising such products is that by 
reducing their market cost, their coverage and use may be rapidly increased, thereby 
improving the health of a population. The justification is further reinforced where the 
products address communicable diseases given the wider social benefits of assuring 
private health (Dupas, 2014).  
It has also been argued that, subsidising products may provide an opportunity for 
individuals to experience the benefits of their use, either directly or via social learning, 
thereby promoting or ‘crowding-in’ future purchases (Dupas, 2010). By stimulating 
increased demand, recent thinking has suggested that this ‘demand-side financing’ 
approach may also help to pump-prime private sector supply chains, thereby laying the 
foundation for sustainable future access to PHPs (Roll Back Malaria, 2005). 
However, another strand in the literature suggests that the provision of subsidised 
products may, in certain circumstances, ‘crowd-out’ commercial provision of the same 
products. For example, if subsidised products reach those that would have purchased the 
product commercially anyway (Hanson et al., 2001), or from any inflationary impact that 
increased aggregate demand may have on the market price of unsubsidised equivalent 
products (Gingrich et al., 2011a). 
Despite theoretical claims that subsidies may either crowd-in or crowd-out unsubsidised 
purchases, to date there has been very limited empirical research looking into the effects 
of partially subsidised PHPs on demand for unsubsidised equivalent products, with 
Carneiero et al. (2012) concluding that there are few examples from ‘developing 
countries’ in the literature. Hanson et al. have previously noted that one reason for the 
lack of empirical research may be due to research and policy priorities, saying that ‘The 
potential for this “crowding out” of the private sector has traditionally received less 
weight than concerns for increasing access’ (Hanson et al., 2001: 129). The gap that this 
represents is a problem, however, as it leaves important unanswered questions over the 
impact that subsidy programmes are having on raising the incremental coverage of health 
products. 
This study contributes to the limited empirical research on the effect PHP subsidies have 
on unsubsidised commercial demand, looking specifically at the case of the Tanzanian 
National Voucher Scheme (TNVS) for insecticide-treated mosquito nets (ITNs). It is the 
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first that the author is aware of which uses a household demand model to estimate the 
impact of partially subsidised mosquito net purchases on purchases of unsubsidised 
mosquito nets. 
The following section provides a conceptual background to the issue of crowding-in and 
crowding-out before section 6.3 reviews the existing evidence. Section 6.4 then describes 
the TNVS in the context of Tanzania’s experience with ITNs and section 6.5 sets out the 
methods used in this study. Section 6.6 reports the results before section 6.7 concludes by 
discussing the main findings and policy implications. 
 
6.2 Crowding-in, crowding-out and displacement 
The concept of crowding-out is a long-established one in the Public Economics literature, 
referring to a situation where the public provision of a good or service has a negative 
impact on the private provision of the same or a substitute good or service (Abrams and 
Schitz, 1978). More recently, the idea has been applied in the context of agricultural input 
subsidy programmes (AISPs), with a growing number of studies investigating the impact 
of fertiliser subsidies on unsubsidised fertiliser purchases (Liverpool-Tassie, 2012, 
Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011, Takeshima et al., 2012, Xu et al., 2009). Within the AISP 
literature, the main mechanism through which crowding-out is thought to take place 
relates to targeting. Specifically, if a government subsidy goes to an individual who would 
have already purchased the product in question at a commercial price and the subsidy 
discourages them from making a commercial purchase then the subsidy is considered to 
have crowded-out the unsubsidised purchase (Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011).  
What has not been well discussed in the AISP literature, however, is the conceptual 
distinction that should be made between crowding-out and displacement. Whereas 
crowding-out typically refers to the idea of a subsidised government good or service 
taking the place of one in the private sector, with a negative effect on the private sector, 
if the subsidised good or service is itself being delivered through the private sector, it may 
make more sense to talk of a displacement effect. That is, the subsidised good or service 
takes the place of the commercially provided one, but without the negative effect on the 
private sector. However, where certain private retailers are not involved in the subsidy 
distribution, a subsidy programme may still crowd-out purchases that people would have 
previously made from them. 
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A second dimension to the crowding-out versus displacement distinction relates to the 
impact a subsidy has on individual preferences. If the effect is simply for people to choose 
to purchase a subsidised product (from a commercial retailer) instead of an unsubsidised 
one, but then revert to purchasing unsubsidised products in the future, this may be better 
termed displacement. By contrast, if the subsidy reduces an individual’s willingness to 
purchase unsubsidised equivalent products in the future, this would be better termed 
crowding-out. 
This distinction has not been well defined in the PHPS literature and so in what follows 
below the term crowding-out is used as a general term, though the term displacement is 
used where reference to it is specifically intended. 
The degree of crowding-out (or displacement) is in turn recognised to have important 
implications for the impact that a subsidy has on incremental ownership or use of the 
product as, if one unit of subsidised product simply replaces one unit of an equivalent 
unsubsidised product that would have been bought in the subsidy’s absence, it cannot be 
said that the subsidy has led to an incremental increase in ownership. In such a scenario, 
while the subsidy recipient will benefit, the targeting outcome effectively becomes a 
transfer from the funder to the recipient, which is unlikely to raise overall welfare as much 
as if it led to an incremental increase in coverage of the product. 
Within the PHPS literature, the targeting pathway to crowding-out has also been 
acknowledged (Hanson et al., 2001, Roll Back Malaria, 2005), though rarely given much 
attention in practice due to an overriding concern with achieving rapid improvements in 
public health. Gingrich et al. (2011a) have suggested that a large scale subsidy programme 
may also discourage unsubsidised commercial sales though raising prices of unsubsidised 
products. Using a partial equilibrium framework, they estimate that widespread increases 
in demand for ITNs arising through the TNVS led to retailers raising their prices, which 
the authors argue ‘crowded-out’ sales among those who did not get a subsidy (Gingrich 
et al., 2011a). However, according to the same neoclassical supply and demand 
framework used, increased prices should in theory only hold in the short-run until 
suppliers respond by increasing supply. 
Crowding-out is often thought of in the context where there is some existing level of 
private sector commercial supply and demand. However, it is important to recognise that 
a large-scale subsidy may also crowd-out entry of private sector retailers into the market, 
which could limit access and lower competition (Hanson, 2004). Such crowding out is 
more difficult to investigate and has so far received little attention in the literature. 
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As the above distinction between crowding-out and displacement indicates, the 
implications of crowding-out will differ depending on whether the private sector is 
involved in the sale of subsidised products or not. If it is, any resulting displacement may 
simply shift profits away from unsubsidised commercial sales to subsidised sales. The 
loss in this scenario is borne by the funder and society in that there could have been greater 
incremental coverage achieved with better targeting.37 However, if the private sector is 
not involved in selling subsidised products then it may be more appropriate to talk of a 
crowding-out effect, if it involves the active undermining of the private sector through 
taking sales away from it. 
While fears of crowding-out have tended to dominate in much of the economic literature, 
one of the recent arguments in favour of targeted health and agricultural subsidy 
programmes is that, if implement correctly, they may instead help to crowd-in 
unsubsidised sales. There are different possible mechanisms through which this may take 
place. Firstly, by guaranteeing certain levels of demand a large scale subsidy programme 
that involves the private sector may help reduce the average fixed costs faced by private 
firms, thereby allowing them to establish themselves and potentially attain economies of 
scale (Roll Back Malaria, 2005, Xu et al., 2009). In so far as this leads to increased access 
and affordable commercial prices, this could help crowd-in future commercial purchases. 
A second crowding-in mechanism may operate via the process of allowing beneficiaries 
to experience the benefits of particular products, providing that the experience 
demonstrates lower non-monetary costs (side effects) than individuals had anticipated 
(Dupas, 2010). Dupas also argues that where the benefits of using subsidised products are 
observed by non-beneficiaries, crowding-in may occur through social learning effects. 
Carniero et al. (2012) argue that even the act of a government subsidising a product may 
help encourage demand by altering beliefs held about the returns to private health 
investments. For example, indoor residual spraying could raise awareness of malaria and 
have the effect of crowding-in private sector purchases of goods such as mosquito nets, 
which are normally considered substitutes.  
These various mechanisms aside, there is a recognition that subsidies may not necessarily 
lead to such effects. This may happen, for example, if the subsidy leads to an ‘anchoring’ 
or ‘entitlement’ effect whereby individuals come to value the products at subsidised price 
                                                 
37 Of course, even a transfer to an individual who would have already made a commercial purchase will 
increase their disposable income, which may then be used to purchase other goods in the economy. 
However, in terms of increasing overall use of the products being subsidised, such targeting outcomes will 
be sub-optimal. 
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and are not willing to pay a higher price in the future (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006, 
Simonsohn and Loewenstein, 2006, Simonson and Tversky, 1992). 
 
6.3 Review of the evidence on crowding-in and crowding-out 
As mentioned already, there has been limited empirical research looking into the effects 
of partially subsidised PHPs on demand for unsubsidised equivalent products. This 
section reviews the related evidence as a means of understanding the gaps in the literature. 
While some studies have looked at the impact of particular health products or services on 
different products traditionally thought to be substitutes, e.g. (Carneiro et al., 2012), the 
present study is concerned with the impact that subsidised PHPs have on their 
unsubsidised equivalents.  
The area where most studies have emerged concerning crowding-in and crowding-out 
relates to ITNs. ITNs were first produced from the 1980s following a number of 
entomological trials, after which a number of efficacy and effectiveness trials found them 
to be highly effective both at protecting those sleeping underneath them and in the same 
house and, when coverage levels are high enough, even those in the wider community 
(Hawley et al., 2003, Lines et al., 1987, Magesa et al., 1991, Schellenberg et al., 2001). It 
is now known that regular use of ITNs in Africa reduces overall child mortality by around 
20% (Lengeler, 2004). Originally, ITNs had to be dipped in a pyrethroid insecticide once 
or twice a year to maintain effectiveness. More recently, long-lasting ITNs (LLINs) have 
been developed which maintain effective levels of insecticide for three years or more even 
after washing. 
The author is aware of only two studies that have looked at impacts of subsidised ITNs 
on coverage or demand for unsubsidised nets. The first looked at these effects in the 
context of the previously mentioned TNVS using a partial equilibrium model and 
estimated that the increased demand for nets brought about by a price subsidy may crowd-
out sales by leading to a higher market price for unsubsidised nets (Gingrich et al., 2011a). 
The authors estimate that, although the TNVS increased overall purchases by around 
170,000 nets during the period studied, the increased demand for nets led to a higher price 
for non-subsidised nets, causing a decline in the number of non-target households 
purchasing a net from 1.1 million to 769,810. However, while ITN prices did indeed 
increase, the causal link between increased demand and prices was not adequately proven 
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in the paper and there are many other sources of potential prices increases.38 Furthermore, 
the same neoclassical theory used would suggest that price increases should only hold 
until suppliers respond by increasing supply. In addition, the study relied on data covering 
just one year (2006) and so does not consider dynamic longer-term effects, which are 
likely to be crucial when it comes to crowding-in and crowding-out, especially concerning 
durable products such as ITNs that are not purchased with great frequency. 
The other study on effects of demand for unsubsidised nets looked at impacts of fully 
subsidised (free) nets rather than partially subsidised nets, and was based on reported 
willingness to pay (WTP) rather than actual purchases (Chase et al., 2009). Using a Tobit 
model, the authors found ownership of a free net to be statistically associated with 
decreasing demand for unsubsidised nets, suggesting crowding-out. However, in theory 
the effect of free nets should differ to the effect of partially subsidised nets as while the 
former should not fundamentally affect a household’s budget constraint, the latter will. 
Other studies have focused on the impact of free or partially subsidised nets on subsidised 
purchases (Dupas, 2010, Eze et al., 2014, Gingrich et al., 2011b, Gingrich et al., 2014). 
An experimental study by Dupas found that the provision of a subsidy of between 40% 
to 100% on the price of an ITN affected the reported and observed WTP for bed nets in 
that, one year after the subsidy, WTP was statistically higher in a number of groups who 
had received the higher subsidy in the first round. However, increases in declared WTP 
were still well below the market price of the nets, which means it cannot be considered 
evidence of crowding-in unsubsidised sales. Regression-based analysis using revealed 
preferences (i.e. the purchase of a second subsidised LLIN) suggested that those who had 
received free nets in the first round were not less likely to purchase another net. They also 
found that households were more likely to purchase LLINs when the density of 
households around them that received a free or highly subsidised net was higher, 
indicating evidence of social learning effects. 
A study by Eze et al. (2014) using a generalised estimating equation model found 
evidence of free net campaigns being associated with improving redemption rates of 
subsidy vouchers for ITNs in Tanzania between 2007 and 2011. However, Gingrich et al. 
(2014) find contrasting evidence using a multivariate Logit model, which suggested that 
free ITNs reduced demand for ITNs by voucher recipients in the short term. An earlier 
                                                 
38 In an interview with a senior National Insecticide-Treated Nets programme (NATNETS) official from 
Tanzania, it was argued that the particular price increase in Tanzania was likely to have been strongly 
associated with the spike in oil prices at the time. 
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study by Gingrich et al. (2011b) also found that free nets had a negative and statistically 
significant effect on sales in 2006 through their Logit model estimation on women 
purchasing subsidised ITNs through the TNVS. 
While studies on the impact of free nets on demand for unsubsidised or subsidised sales 
may be informative, as mentioned above, there are reasons to assume that findings may 
well be different to the impact of partially subsidised ITNs on demand for unsubsidised 
ITNs, indicating that further research is needed. 
 
6.4 Background to the Tanzania National Voucher Scheme 
6.4.1 Tanzania’s history of malaria interventions 
Tanzania is one of the most populated countries in Africa, with a population of 
approximately 45 million in 2012 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014). With a Gross 
National Income per capita of US$ 630 in 2013, it is classified by the World Bank as a 
low-income country (World Bank, 2013), and in 2012 around 28% of the population were 
living beneath the national poverty line (World Bank, 2012).  
With around 80% of the population estimated to live in areas prone to stable seasonal 
transmission of malaria, the disease has been one of the leading causes of morbidity and 
mortality in the country (Donaldson and Thiede, 2011). Given this, considerable attention 
has been given to various malaria control initiatives in the country. 
By the time the TNVS began in October 2004, Tanzania already had a fairly long history 
of mosquito net use and was an early pioneer in market development for the product. The 
country was an early testing site for a number of efficacy trials from the early 1980s, 
which were followed by effectiveness trials from the 1990s (Magesa et al., 2005: 2).  
One of the first large scale mosquito net interventions in Tanzania – the Kilombero Net 
(KINET) project – was a social marketing field trial launched in 1996 that sought to 
demonstrate the effects of bet net use on health (Schellenberg et al., 1999). The project 
used social marketing methods to sell subsidised nets and insecticide treatment kits. 
KITNET ran until 2000 with results showing a correlation between regular use of ITNs 
and a 27% increase in child survival in children aged one month to four years 
(Schellenberg et al., 2001). Even at this early stage, there was some limited evidence 
indicating that the KINET programme may have had a crowding-out effect on 
unsubsidised sales (Hanson, 2004). 
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Following KINET a social marketing programme was launched in 1998 by Population 
Services International with the aim of reducing the negative health impacts of malaria 
across four specific areas of Tanzania. Called the Social Marketing of Insecticide Treated 
Mosquito Nets (SMITN), the initiative sought to establish commercial demand for 
mosquito nets among the Tanzanian population (Hanson and Jones, 2000). Specifically, 
it aimed to ‘reduc[e] infant and under-5 mortality rates by increasing commercial 
availability of ITNs and establishing a nationwide culture of ITN use’ (Donaldson and 
Thiede, 2011: 11). SMITN involved the promotion of a new brand of polyester nets with 
insecticide treatment, including a heavily subsidised net for pregnant women.  
According to one senior official within the National Insecticide-Treated Nets programme 
(NATNETS), prior to SMITN one could not really talk of a commercial market for 
mosquito nets in Tanzania.39 However, based on changes in coverage levels from the 
commercial sector in the different areas being targeted, it appears that there were concerns 
that SMITN may have had some crowding-out effect on unsubsidised purchases in two 
of the four areas (Hanson and Jones, 2000, Hanson and Worrall, 2002). 
In order to meet the original target of protecting 60% of the population at high risk of 
Malaria by 2005 as set out in the Abuja Summit of April 2000, a national ITN strategy 
was endorsed in November 2000 (NATNETS).40 The programme was led by the National 
Malaria Control Programme within the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. It 
comprised of three main components (Magesa et al., 2005: 3): 
x Increasing demand creation for ITNs; 
x Developing a national public-private partnership to build a sustainable domestic 
commercial ITN market; and 
x Targeting subsidies at high-risk groups. 
 
As part of this effort, in 2002 SMITN was renamed SMARTNET and moved away from 
support for its own subsidised ITN brand - Njozi Njema – towards supporting brands from 
the Tanzanian net industry, allowing domestic net manufacturers to develop their own 
brands. This was not so feasible before as manufacturers could not compete with the 
subsidised nets. Agreements were reached so that they would be provided with heavily 
subsidised insecticide kits if they sold them in a bundle with the nets. Other incentives 
were also provided to ensure that the private sector reached remote areas, such as transport 
                                                 
39 Interview with senior official in NATNETS. 
40 The RBM target increased to 80% in 2010. 
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and storage subsidies to manufacturers and wholesalers (Koot et al., 2006). Retailers were 
also brought on board by being encouraged to sell nets.  
By 2005 the country had no less than four domestic mosquito net manufacturers with a 
combined total annual net production of over five million nets (Magesa et al., 2005: 9). 
Aside from the social marketing activities, which have been argued to have   ‘encouraged 
the expansion of the commercial manufacturing and distribution system’ (Hanson, 2004), 
over time the industry has benefited from a progressively improved tax environment, 
starting with the removal of a 125% sales tax in 1994 and then Value Added Tax and 
related import duties by 2004 (Magesa et al., 2005: 6-7). All of this has contributed to a 
fairly healthy domestic ITN industry which saw the average retail price of Tanzanian nets 
go down from US$ 5 in 1995 to less than US$ 3.50 by 2004 (Magesa et al., 2005: 7). 
Another key aspect of the Tanzanian experience has been the on-going communication 
and marketing throughout society, including the role played by politicians advertising the 
importance of nets in the media, without which one official within the NATNETS 
programme believes that uptake would not have been nearly as much as it was, as it has 
helped to promote a culture of mosquito net use.41  
SMARTNET continued until 2007, overlapping with the TNVS, which launched in 
October 2004 and is described below. An overview of the various programmes and 
initiatives, including the key stages of the TNVS is provided in Figure 16. 
It is crucial to bear in mind the above context when interpreting the results of this study, 
as other countries will have quite different experiences of commercial market 
development for mosquito nets, with important implications for studying crowding-out. 
For example, where the commercial demand is not so developed, crowding-out of existing 
private sector sales is likely to be much less of a concern and subsidies may even help 
crowd-in future unsubsidised sales (Xu et al., 2009). 
 
6.4.2 The TNVS (October 2004 to mid-2008) 
As pointed out above, at the turn of the century insufficient demand for ITNs was 
recognised to be a key problem holding back achievement of the Abuja target. The drive 
to achieve and exceed this led to what became one of the core initiatives in Tanzania for 
tackling malaria – the TNVS. This study focuses specifically at the period from the start 
                                                 
41 Interview with senior official in NATNETS. 
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of the programme in October 2004 until up to September 2008. This is largely due to data 
availability but also the switch to subsidising LLINs from 2009 through a one-supplier 
system led to the effective collapse of the commercial market.42 
The TNVS has involved distributing discount vouchers (Hati Punguzo in Swahili) to 
pregnant women on attending antenatal care (ANC) and, from November 2006, children 
under five attending their first measles vaccination.43 Until late 2009, the voucher entitled 
the holder to a fixed discount on the commercial price of a conventional mosquito net of 
their choice at participating retailers, along with a package of insecticide treatment.44 
Vouchers could be redeemed at participating retailers, entitling the holder to a discount 
of 2750 Tanzanian Shillings (TZS) (around $US 2.50), raised to TZS 3250 in January 
2007, with any remaining cost paid by the voucher holder as a top-up.45 Given average 
retail prices for ITNs between 2005 and 2006, TZS 2750 represented a subsidy of around 
70-90% (Hanson et al., 2008). While Olyset branded LLINs were available for 
commercial purchase from around 2005, LLINs were not available through the TNVS 
until 2009. 
 
                                                 
42 Interview with senior official from NATNETS. 
43 In an attempt to improve targeting towards poorer households who could not afford the top-up payment, 
an Equity Voucher was piloted in six districts in April 2007 entitling the holder to a free net, though very 
few vouchers were distributed and evaluations indicated it had a limited effect and so it was not brought to 
scale (Marchant et al., 2008). 
44 From October 2009 it changed to a fixed top-up of TZS 500 for long-lasting ITNs. 
45 Based on an average exchange rate of TZS 1105 to US$1. October 2004 to May 2006 (Oanda.com). 
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Figure 18 shows how voucher books were first distributed by the local logistics partner, 
MEDA, to District Medical Officers and reproductive and health clinics, where individual 
vouchers were then given to pregnant women and mothers of infants. Vouchers were then 
redeemed at participating retailers who in turn exchanged the vouchers for ITNs from 
wholesalers who could claim ITNs from manufacturers. Manufacturers eventually 
returned vouchers to MEDA who reimbursed them for the number of vouchers submitted.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Voucher flow in the TNVS 
  
Source: MEDA  
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Pregnant Women Vouchers were phased in by district, starting in October 2004, with all 
districts in the country routinely delivering vouchers by May 2006. By June 2008, 2.47 
million Pregnant Woman Vouchers and 369,000 infant vouchers had been redeemed 
(Hanson et al., 2009: 3). It is important to note, however, that in one study from 2007, 
just 60% of pregnant women who attended ANC reported receiving a voucher (Hanson 
et al., 2009). In another study in 2008, just 33% of currently pregnant women interviewed 
reported receiving a Pregnant Woman Voucher on their first visit, with a further 9% and 
2% saying they got it in their second and third visit (Marchant et al., 2008). These figures 
suggest that targeting has been far from universal or consistent among pregnant women 
and suggest that other factors beyond being pregnant may have determined voucher 
receipt. The reasons remain somewhat unclear, though one explanation is that some staff 
appear to have asked women to show they had money to pay the top-up (Nathan et al., 
2007, Nathan et al., 2008).  
In addition, of those who received vouchers, a growing number did not go on to redeem 
them. Table 19 shows the number of vouchers distributed and redeemed between July 
2005 and March 2009 along with associated redemption rates. The main reason given for 
non-redemption in the national household surveys implemented to monitor the TNVS 
was that the voucher recipient had no money to pay the top-up (Hanson et al., 2006, 
Marchant et al., 2007, Marchant et al., 2008). Given the growing wedge between receipt 
of a voucher and purchase of a subsidised net, net ownership rather than voucher receipt 
is used in the empirical analysis as the key variable of interest. 
 
Table 19: Distribution and redemption rate of TNVS vouchers (July 2005 to March 
2009) 
 
 Pregnant women vouchers Infant vouchers 
Period Distributed Redeemed Rate Distributed Redeemed Rate 
July 2005 to 
March 2006 
339,750 
 
275,473 
 
81% 
 
   
April 2006 to 
March 2007 
1,203,900 
 
996,436 
 
83% 
 
   
April 2007 to 
March 2008 
1,358,075 
 
972,921 
 
72% 
 
472,025 
 
309,166 
 
65% 
 
April 2008 to 
March 2009 
916,334 
 
547,860 
 
60% 
 
525,525 
 
295,807 
 
56% 
 
Source: NATNETS data sheets. Note: Infant vouchers were available from November 
2006, though it took some time for stubs and vouchers to be returned (by clinics and 
retailers respectively) and then counted. 
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Tracking studies from 2006/07 and 2007/08 found that around 10% of the distributed 
vouchers sampled were also likely acquired by ineligible recipients (Nathan et al., 2007, 
Nathan et al., 2008). However, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the capture 
of these vouchers and associated subsidised nets was channelled back into the commercial 
market. Analysis of ITNs reported as commercially purchased in the 2008 NATNETS 
Household Survey show that around 5% were below the lowest retail price reported in 
TNVS retail surveys, which could indicate the presence of secondary markets for nets 
resold below the market rate. If these were subsidised nets being re-sold then their impact 
on incremental ownership is difficult to determine as they could still have represented 
new sales that would not have gone ahead otherwise. 
Alongside the TNVS, in August and December 2005 around 255,000 free nets were 
distributed in the Lindi and Mtwara regions among children under five years, linked with 
a measles vaccination campaign, in the Lindi and Mtwara regions respectively. At the 
same time free nets were also distributed in Rufiji district and smaller scale free net 
campaigns have been in place in various locations through different projects. 
Together with other interventions as part of the National Malaria Control Programme, the 
TNVS helped contribute to a dramatic increase in households owning at least one 
mosquito net from 23% in 2004-2005 to 63% by 2010 and a reduction in the prevalence 
of parasitaemia in children under five years old within the Ifakara surveillance area from 
25% in 2004–2005 to less than 5% in 2010 (Roll Back Malaria Partnership, 2012). 
However, as Figure 19 shows, after a general upward trend of increasing unsubsidised 
net sales, the start of the TNVS marked a period of declining commercial sales of 
unsubsidised nets, despite overall sales and coverage continuing to increase, raising the 
question of why the earlier growth in unsubsidised sales came to an end and then declined. 
In terms of overall net coverage, data from the TNVS household surveys show a clear 
increase in the proportion of households owning at least one net between 2005 and 2008 
(Figure 19). This included an increase in the proportion owning a net that had been treated 
within the past 12 months. Given the scale of the TNVS, it is likely to have contributed 
significantly to this increasing coverage. However, it is not possible to attribute the 
increases solely to the TNVS. For example, the free net campaigns will also have 
contributed and there may also be other underlying trends or temporal fluctuations that 
explain the changes in coverage. 
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While there may be a tendency to assume that each net purchased with a TNVS voucher 
represented an incremental increase in the number of nets owned, as suggested by the 
trends in unsubsidised sales in Figure 19, there are reasons to assume that this may not be 
the case due to possible crowding-out effects.  
 
 
Figure 19: Sales of unsubsidised and subsidised mosquito nets in Tanzania (2001-
2008) 
Source: NATNETS data sheets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Trends in ownership of mosquito nets in Tanzania (2005-2008) 
Source: (Marchant et al., 2008). 
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6.4.3 The TNVS after 2008 
While this study focuses on the period from the start of the TNVS until 2008, it is 
important to note that a number of key policy changes have taken place since. This 
includes the introduction of a voucher for LLINs instead of conventional ITNs bundled 
with insecticide treatment. This was introduced in October 2009, with the top-up required 
moving to a fixed TZS 500 as part of a drive to address inequality in access to and use of 
nets. At the same time, one manufacturer – A to Z Textile Mills – was given the right to 
be the sole manufacturer of all LLINs distributed through the TNVS and mass free net 
campaigns, effectively removing the earlier private sector competition that had existed 
(Donaldson and Thiede, 2011). As a result, by 2012 it meant that LLINs were effectively 
no longer commercially available for anyone except through a TNVS voucher.46 The 
configuration effectively completely displaced unsubsidised sales and also meant that, for 
a time, the voucher was redeemable for just a single type and size of net, removing the 
consumer choice that is supposed to be one of the key advantages of a voucher system.47 
From 2012 a second brand of LLIN was allowed to operate (NetProtect), which expanded 
the range of size, shapes and colours of nets including to those without a subsidy voucher. 
However, this re-opening of the market did not reach its potential and unsubsidised sales 
remained very limited. 
A further change after the period of study was the introduction of e-vouchers, piloted in 
early 2011 and rolled out from 2012 with 60% of clinics providing them as of July 2014.48 
Other interventions since 2008 include a mass distribution campaign between 2008 and 
2010 delivering nine million LLINs free of charge to children under five years old, 
followed in 2010 and 2011 by a Universal Coverage Campaign to cover all sleeping 
spaces not yet protected (Renggli et al., 2013). By the middle of 2012 it was then decided 
that the best approach would be to continue with the TNVS but to also introduce a 
programme distributing nets for free through schools (NATNETS, 2012). Most recently, 
the TNVS has been suspended following evidence of systematic fraud in the e-voucher 
system. 
 
 
                                                 
46 Interview with senior official in NATNETS. 
47 Interview with senior official in NATNETS. 
48 Personal communication with official from NATNETS, November 2014. 
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6.5 Methods 
6.5.1 Conceptual framework 
Adapting the approach by Xu et al. (2009), one can think of the impact that a subsidy 
programme has on total ownership of the product being subsidised (total) as a partial 
derivative, where the incremental increase from a subsidy ( 𝜕𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝜕𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑
) depends on both 
the increase in ownership arising directly from the subsidy itself (𝜕𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑
) and any 
increase or decrease arising from changes in unsubsidised purchases (unsubsidised) 
caused by the subsidy programme (𝜕𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑
) as a result of crowding-in or crowding-
out respectively. This is shown in Equation 4 based on the identity in Equation 3. 
 
 
𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 = 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 + 𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 
 
 
𝝏𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍
𝝏𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅
=  
𝝏𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅
𝝏𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅
+  
𝝏𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅
𝝏𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅
 
 
 
If all of the subsidised products paid for by the government end up being sold as 
subsidised products then (𝜕𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑
) from Equation 4 becomes one, meaning that the 
effect of the subsidy programme on incremental ownership can be estimated simply by 
calculating (𝜕𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑
). However, if there is leakage of the subsidised products at any 
point in the distribution chain then (𝜕𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑
) is no longer one and (𝜕𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑
) will 
give a biased estimate of the impact of a subsidy on incremental ownership. If a portion 
of the subsidised products end up being diverted and resold as unsubsidised products then 
this will mean that subsidised from Equation 4 must be decomposed into leaked and non-
leaked products. Similarly, unsubsidised must be considered as all unsubsidised products 
minus those which were actually leaked subsidised products (Equation 5 and Equation 
6). 
Equation 4: Impact of a 
subsidy on total ownership 
Equation 3: Identity for 
total ownership in 
presence of a subsidy 
   168 
𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 = 𝒏𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒅 + 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒅 
 
 
𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 = (𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 − 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒅) 
 
 
 
This leakage may occur in different ways depending on the design of the programme. For 
example, in the case of some fertiliser subsidy programmes in sub-Saharan Africa where 
the government takes on the responsibility of purchasing from importers then distributes 
and sells fertiliser at subsidised rates to those with a voucher, fertiliser may be diverted at 
one of a number of stages right through to the point of sale. Based on evidence of 
diversion in a Zambian fertiliser subsidy programme, Mason and Jayne (2013) 
accordingly adjust Equation 4 to take this into account, using estimates of the proportion 
of fertiliser that was diverted into the commercial system.  
However, in the case of the TNVS where the government left it to the private sector to 
purchase and sell mosquito nets at a subsidised rate to those with a voucher, the scope for 
diversion is considerably reduced. Nevertheless, it may still occur from the point at which 
redeemed vouchers are returned first by retailers back up through the distribution chain 
for compensation (Figure 17). Here, leakage may occur both through re-sale by those who 
redeemed a voucher for a subsidised net or through voucher fraud. 
There is some evidence to suggest local level leakage has taken place in the TNVS. For 
example, tracking studies from 2006/07 and 2007/08 found that around 10% of the 
distributed vouchers sampled were likely acquired by ineligible recipients who could not 
be tracked (Nathan et al., 2007, Nathan et al., 2008). However, it is difficult to determine 
the extent to which these vouchers and subsidised nets were re-sold commercially. 
Secondly, it is also possible that eligible recipients may have resold their nets at 
commercial or near commercial prices, leading to this not showing up on household 
survey data. There is some evidence for the presence of secondary markets in that around 
5% of all nets reported as commercially purchased in the 2008 NATNETS Household 
Survey were bought at below the very lowest retail price reported in TNVS retail surveys, 
though this could also be due to reporting errors. More recently, further evidence has 
Equation 5: Adjusted identity for 
subsidised products in presence of 
leakage 
Equation 6: Adjusted identity 
for unsubsidised products in 
presence of leakage 
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emerged of vouchers being stolen and fraud taking place since 2008 (MEDA, 2010, 
NMCP, 2014). Despite the evidence, however, it is not possible calculate a reliable 
estimate of what proportion of subsidised nets were re-sold. 
A final point to bear in mind is that, as indicated earlier, a subsidised product may crowd-
in (or crowd-out) unsubsidised sales through social learning effects if non-beneficiaries 
come to view the use of the subsidised products favourably (unfavourably) and then go 
on to buy (avoid buying) an unsubsidised product themselves. This is not captured in the 
demand model framework described below due to a lack of the available data required. 
The study estimates the effect that the TNVS had on demand for unsubsidised ITNs by 
modelling a household demand equation for unsubsidised ITN sales. A theoretical model 
of the factors determining demand is presented in Equation 7, drawing on a number of 
studies focused on sub-Saharan Africa (Carneiro et al., 2012, Chase et al., 2009, Dupas, 
2010, Gingrich et al., 2011b, Hanson et al., 2005, Poulos et al., 2006, Rashed et al., 1999, 
Wiseman et al., 2007). 
 
 
 
 
In Equation 7, Y represents household demand for mosquito nets, which can be seen as a 
function of the following factors: 
P = Market price of unsubsidised mosquito nets 
M = Market factors affecting cost and availability (e.g. distance and market 
concentration) 
I = Household income 
C = Credit availability 
S = Presence of any subsidies  
H = Household socio-economic and demographic characteristics 
He = Factors affecting potential health status of the household  
A = Use of alternative methods of malaria prevention 
 
Equation 7: Theoretical demand 
equation for mosquito nets 
𝒀 =  𝒇 (𝑷, 𝑴, 𝑰, 𝑪, 𝑺, 𝑯, 𝑯𝒆, 𝑨) 
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The estimable Equation 8 was then constructed using what data were available. 
 
 
 
 
In Equation 8, Yi is the number of unsubsidised nets purchased by household i in the past 
12 months prior to interview. Si – the key variable of interest – is the number of TNVS 
subsidised nets purchased by the household 13 months ago or longer. Xi is a vector of 
covariates, which are presented in Table 20, ei represents the residual error term and α, β, 
and γ are parameters to be estimated. 
The time difference between the dependent variable and the main explanatory variable 
was chosen in order to permit a causal interpretation to be made between the receipt of 
subsidised nets and the future purchase of unsubsidised nets. However, given that ITNs 
are a durable good that are sometimes only purchased every few years, it should be noted 
that if any negative relationship were found between Si and the dependent variable it may 
likely represent a displacement effect rather than a crowding-out effect operating through 
changes to individual preferences. Referring back to the earlier discussion on 
displacement, it is also the case that in the TNVS the private sector was used to sell 
subsidised ITNs and so, once again, the term displacement may be a more appropriate 
term for any negative relationship found. Even if any reduction in commercial sales 
affected private retailers that were not part of the subsidy distribution network, it is not 
clear this would represent crowding-out of the private sector overall. In any case, this 
level of analysis was not possible to conduct given the available data. 
Estimation of Equation 8 effectively allows for the calculation of a counterfactual of what 
unsubsidised net purchases would have been for subsidy recipients in the absence of the 
subsidy, based on the unsubsidised ITN purchase decisions of similar non-beneficiary 
households, controlling for observable characteristics. 
 
 
 
 
Equation 8: Basic empirical model to 
estimate crowding-in / crowding-out 𝒀𝒊 =  𝜶 +  𝜷𝑺𝒊 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊 + 𝒆𝒊 
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Table 20: Summary of variables used in estimation 
 
Variables Mean  
 
Standard 
error 
Description 
unsub_purch_12
m 
0.22 
 
[0.01] Dependent variable. Number of unsubsidised nets bought 
in 12 months prior to interview 
tnvs_13m_plus 
(referred to as Si) 
0.13 
 
[0.00] Number of nets bought with a TNVS subsidy voucher 13 
months ago or more 
tnvs_purch_12m 0.08 
 
[0.00] Number of nets bought with a TNVS subsidy voucher in 12 
months prior to interview 
free_net_12m 
free_net_24m  
free_net_36m 
free_net_48m 
0.03 
0.02 
0.01 
0.04 
[0.00] 
[0.00] 
[0.00] 
[0.00] 
Number of free nets reportedly received 12, 13-24, 25-36 
and more than 36 months prior to interview 
distmed_4x7 3175 
 
[3.74] Weighted district median market price of a 4x6x7 mosquito 
net based on prices reported in household survey (TZS) 
totalnets12m 0.69 
 
[0.01] Total number of nets in the household 12 months prior to 
interview (excluding unsubsidised nets purchased at 12 
months) 
quintile5 
quintile4 
quintile3 
quintile2 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0.19 
[0.01] 
[0.01] 
[0.01] 
[0.01] 
Wealth quintile of household (5= wealthiest). Quintile 1 is 
comparison group 
rural 
semiurban 
0.64 
0.27 
[0.01] 
[0.01] 
Household is rural or semi-urban. Urban households are 
comparison group 
hheduc17 
hheduc8plus 
0.65 
0.11 
[0.01] 
[0.00] 
Head has 1 to 7 years of education or 8 or more. No 
education is comparison group 
heardPWV 0.75 
 
[0.01] Respondent had heard of the TNVS pregnant women 
vouchers 
femalehead  0.23 [0.01] Head is female. 
headage2229 
headage3049 
headage50plus 
0.13 
0.47 
0.35 
[0.00] 
[0.01] 
[0.01] 
Head is 22 to 29 years old, 30 to 49 years old or 50 years 
or older. Under 22 is the comparison group 
profservbus 0.13 [0.00] Household head is employed in professional/clerical role, 
service or business 
hh_size  4.99 [0.03] Number of people in the household 
under5 1.12 [0.01] Number of children in the household aged 5 years or 
younger 
over50 0.55 [0.01] Number of people in the household aged 50 or over 
women1549 1.08 [0.01] Number of women in the household aged 15 to 49 
currpreg 0.11 [0.00] Number of currently pregnant women in the household. 
prevpreg12m 0.89 
 
[0.01] Number of pregnancies in the household in past 12 months 
retaildensity  1.49 
 
[0.01] Participating retailer to population ratio x 10000 based on 
retailer data from MEDA and population projections from 
2002 census 
mprev 17.34 
 
[0.17] Percentage of children (6-59 months) testing positive for 
malaria in the region in the Tanzania HIV/AIDS and 
Malaria Indicator Survey 2007-08 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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6.5.2 Potential endogeneity arising from unobservable factors associated with 
subsidy receipt 
Although there were clear guidelines and procedures to target vouchers to pregnant 
women and women with infants attending a measles vaccination, it is possible that the 
receipt and eventual use of vouchers may have been correlated with characteristics that 
are not observed (e.g. mothers who are intrinsically more interested in the health of their 
children). This means that Si may be correlated with the error term leading to endogneity 
and biased estimates. As such, an instrumental variable (IV) approach was taken using 
the ivreg2 command in Stata to investigate potential endogeneity.  
As is well known, IVs must satisfy two main requirements. First, the instrument must be 
correlated with the potentially endogenous explanatory variable (conditional on other 
exogenous variables). Second, the instrument must not be correlated with the error term 
in the main equation of interest (again, conditional on the other exogenous variables).  
Two instruments (z in Equation 9) were identified which, while correlated with the 
potentially endogenous variable Si, were not expected to lead to changes in the dependent 
variable independently, meaning that in Equation 9, β1 ≠ 0 and Cov (z, ei) = 0, where ei 
are the residuals from Equation 8. 
 
𝑺𝒊 =  𝜶 +  𝜷𝟎𝑿𝒊 +  𝜷𝟏𝒛𝒊 + 𝒗𝒊 
 
 
The two variables that lent themselves to being an IV were the receipt of a subsidy 
voucher (gotvouch) and whether the household had heard of the infant voucher scheme 
(heardIV). The receipt of a subsidy voucher is clearly expected to be strongly correlated 
with the potentially endogenous variable Si, despite the fact that not all vouchers were 
redeemed for subsidised nets as discussed above, as purchase of a subsidised net required 
ownership of a subsidy voucher. Similarly, it might reasonably be expected that 
awareness of the infant voucher programme would also be associated with Si, as those 
that had purchased a subsidised net would have already been exposed to the subsidy 
programme. However, the strength of the correlation might be expected to be smaller with 
this instrument. Indeed, when each variable was regressed in turn on Si, controlling for 
other exogenous variables, they were both strongly significant and gotvouch in particular 
shows a strong correlation (columns 1 and 2 in Table 21).  
Equation 9: Reduced form 
equation for purchase of TNVS 
subsidised mosquito nets 
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As highlighted, for the instruments to be valid, they should also not have any direct 
independent effect on the dependent variable (unsub_purch_12m) other than through the 
potentially endogenous Si. Theoretically, this assumption appears relatively sound for the 
case of gotvouch as, aside from through being able to purchase subsidised nets, which 
may displace (and therefore be correlated with) future unsubsidised purchases, the receipt 
of a voucher should not generally affect future unsubsidised net purchases. One way in 
which it may do independently is if the receipt of vouchers were to have some form of 
social learning effect on individuals regarding the importance of owning mosquito nets, 
thereby encouraging the purchase of commercial nets regardless beyond the subsidy 
programme itself. However, it is unclear how important this would be in Tanzania given 
that it is a country with a relatively long history of mosquito nets, as discussed above. The 
instrument heardIV is also relatively unlikely to affect the purchase of unsubsidised nets 
other than through the purchase of subsidised nets, for the same reason given above. 
Indeed, when both instruments were included as explanatory variables in a model 
explaining unsubsidised net purchases with other exogenous covariates included, both 
were highly statistically insignificant (columns 3 and 4). 
 
Table 21: Relationship between potentially endogenous explanatory variable Si 
and instruments and between instruments and dependent variable 
 
 OLS estimate in model explaining 
potentially endogenous 
explanatory variable 
OLS estimate in model 
explaining dependent 
variable 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
heardIV 0.08 
[0.01] 
P<0.01 
 0.003 
[0.02] 
P=0.91 
 
gotvouch  0.36 
[0.02] 
P<0.01 
 0.002 
[0.02] 
P=0.89 
R2 0.09 0.20 0.13 0.13 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. N=6918. Robust standard errors in square brackets. 
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The validity of both instruments was further tested by carrying out an overidentification 
test using the Hansen J statistic, which did not reject the joint null hypothesis that both 
instruments are valid (p=0.73). Both instruments were therefore used in an instrumental 
variables regression using the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) 
estimator. Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F Statistics were well above the ‘rule of thumb’ of 
10, rejecting the possibility of them being weak instruments, though the F-statistic for 
gotvouch (428) was substantially higher than that of heardIV (30) (Appendix 16 and 
Appendix 17). Along with the weaker correlation with Si identified above, this suggests 
that gotvouch may be a better instrument. 
As ivreg2 uses the same covariates from the second stage in the first stage auxiliary 
regression, an alternative control function approach was also adopted as a robustness 
check (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). This involved first estimating a reduced-form model 
explaining the potentially endogenous Si using relevant exogenous variables and the two 
instruments above. The estimated residuals were then saved. Second, the main equation 
based on Equation 8 was then estimated with the estimated residuals included as a 
covariate. The coefficient on the saved residuals allows for a Robust Wald test of the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity. 
 
6.5.3 Data 
The main data used to estimate Equation 8 come from the 2008 NATNETS Household 
Survey, implemented as part of the independent monitoring and evaluation effort for the 
TNVS. The full sample of 6,918 households was selected using a two-stage cluster 
random sample. At the first stage, 24 districts were randomly sampled, stratified by zone 
(see Appendix 14) and at the second stage 10 wards (clusters) of 30 households in each 
of the districts were selected based on probability proportionate to size. Within each ward, 
one sub-village was selected using simple random sampling, within which households 
were selected randomly. Sample summary statistics are presented in Table 22. Other data 
sources used include retailer data from MEDA and the 2002 census data. Malaria 
prevalence was obtained from the Tanzania HIV/AIDS and Malaria Indicator Survey 
2007-08. 
In the absence of income data, income was proxied by using a wealth index. Asset 
quintiles were constructed using Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), which is 
analogous to Principal Components Analysis but appropriate for discrete data (Howe et 
   175 
al., 2008).49 The index was constructed using information on housing conditions and asset 
ownership including livestock, with households then split into five quintiles based on 
their score (Appendix 15). 
 
Table 22: Summary of 2008 NATNETS Household survey sample 
 
Districts covered 24 
Total sampled households 7,200 
Number of refusals 46 
Total sample after cleaning 6,918 
Hhs by location 
Rural 
Semi-urban 
Urban 
 
4,416 (64%) 
1,855 (27%) 
647 (9%) 
Number of people per household 
1-2 
3-4 
5-6 
>7 
 
979 (14%) 
2288 (33%) 
2666 (38%) 
985 (14%) 
Average household size 
Mean 
Median 
Standard deviation 
 
5 
5 
2.5 
Gender of household head 
Male 
Female 
 
5,294 (77%) 
1,624 (23%) 
Years of formal education of head 
None 
1 to 7 
8 or more years 
 
1,671 (24%) 
4,498 (65%) 
749 (11%) 
Women aged 15-49 7485 
Children <5 years old 7728 
No. of women pregnant at time of survey 731 
Number of live births in 12 months prior to 
interview 
6129 
Source: 2008 NATNETS Household Survey. Statistics are un-weighted. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 Experimentation with quintiles using PCA suggests that there is no difference in this particular case. 
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6.5.4 Choice of estimator 
A cross tabulation of the dependent variable and the key explanatory variable is presented 
in Table 23, showing the number and frequency of unsubsidised purchases according to 
whether or not households also bought any subsidised nets 13 months ago or longer. It is 
clear that the large majority of households (85%) did not report purchasing any 
unsubsidised net within the previous 12 months, indicating that we are dealing with a 
corner solution outcome, where the dependent variable ‘takes on the value zero with 
positive probability but is a continuous random variable over strictly positive values’ 
(Wooldridge, 2002: 518).50 
There is considerable debate in the literature over which estimation methods are most 
appropriate for such models, depending on why the zeros are there (Angrist and Pischke, 
2009, Breen, 1996, Jones, 2000, Maddala, 1983, Madden, 2006). Two potential 
candidates appropriate for the present case are the Poisson and Negative Binomial (NB) 
models, which are specifically intended to fit the distributions of count data and have 
been used before in estimating demand for mosquito nets (Poulos et al., 2006). These are 
estimated along with a double hurdle (DH) model, which has been used in the agricultural 
literature (Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011, Xu et al., 2009), and has the advantage of 
accounting for the possibility that the decision to purchase any nets and the decision of 
how many to purchase may be determined by different processes. The DH approach 
involves first estimating a Probit model for the purchase of any unsubsidised net in the 
past 12 months, then a truncated normal regression for the determinants of the number of 
such nets purchased, conditional on any purchase. To implement this the study used the 
user-written Stata command craggit. 
Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) were estimated as opposed to Marginal Effects at the 
Average as they are averages of actual marginal effects and so better represent the actual 
population (Wooldridge, 2002). OLS estimates are also presented for the purposes of 
comparison. All models used cluster robust standard errors. 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 More accurately, the variable takes on a limited number of non-negative integers. 
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Table 23: Cross tabulation of frequency of unsubsidised nets bought in last 12 
months and subsidised nets bought 13 months ago or longer 
 
 Number of subsidised nets bought  
(over 12 months ago) 
 
Number of 
unsubsidised 
nets bought 
(last 12 months) 
0 1 2 3 Total 
0 5,092 673 82 4 5,851 
1 679 51 8 0 738 
2 206 7 0 0 213 
3 65 0 0 0 65 
4 29 2 0 0 31 
5 8 1 0 0 9 
6 7 0 0 0 7 
7 2 0 0 0 2 
9 1 0 0 0 1 
10 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 6,090 734 90 4 6,918 
 
Source: 2008 NATNETS Household survey. 
 
6.6 Results 
Tests for endogeneity using the ivreg2 command and Sargan-Hansen statistics do not 
reject the null hypothesis that Si is exogenous (p= 0.96 and p=0.68) (full results provided 
in Appendix 16 and Appendix 17). The estimated coefficients for Si are also almost 
identical to those using OLS (-0.06 and -0.01), which is another indication that 
endogeneity may not be a problem in this particular case. Results from the second stage 
of the Control Function approach find the coefficient on the saved residuals (lpuhat) to 
be highly insignificant (p=0.63) and so the null hypothesis of Si being exogenous is not 
rejected (full results available in Appendix 18). The remainder of the analysis therefore 
assumes that Si is exogenous. 
Poisson, NB and DH models were then estimated to assess the degree of displacement. 
Results from all models indicate a negative and highly significant overall effect ranging 
from -0.05 to -0.12. AMEs across wealth categories indicate a considerably larger 
negative effect on future unsubsidised sales among the very wealthiest household 
category compared to poorer households, with the difference statistically significant at 
the 95% confidence level (Table 24). It is interesting to note that, even among the poorest 
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households, there was on average no evidence of crowding-in, demonstrated by the 
statistically significant negative coefficients for all quintiles. 
Receipt of free nets over 12 months ago was not significantly associated with lower 
unsubsidised net purchases in any models. All of the other covariates are of the expected 
signs.   
While results from the Poisson, NB and DH models provide similar results, details of the 
models and specification tests suggest that the NB may be most efficient. Firstly, as the 
Poisson model assumes equality of mean and variance (the equidispersion property), 
following Cameron and Trivedi (2010) a test for equidispersion was carried out. Results 
suggest significant overdispersion, indicating that the NB model is a better fit. This is 
supported by the NB model having a less negative log pseudolikelihood value and the 
fact that the dispersion parameter (lnalpha) is not zero. The NB model also had a much 
lower log pseudolikelihood value than the DH model. The full output for the NB model 
is presented in Figure 21. Full results of the DH model and Poisson model are provided 
in the appendices. 
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Figure 21: Average marginal effects using NB model 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
 
 
 
 
Log pseudolikelihood = -3391.8338                 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
Dispersion           = mean                       Wald chi2(29)   =     943.15
Negative binomial regression                      Number of obs   =       6918
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
                                                                                    
             mprev     .0040622   .0005654     7.18   0.000      .002954    .0051704
     retaildensity     .0049505   .0127003     0.39   0.697    -.0199417    .0298427
       prevpreg12m    -.0293216    .012694    -2.31   0.021    -.0542014   -.0044418
          currpreg     .0476227   .0231276     2.06   0.039     .0022934    .0929519
         women1549     .0111347   .0108852     1.02   0.306    -.0101999    .0324694
            over50    -.0066186   .0186016    -0.36   0.722     -.043077    .0298398
            under5    -.0052443   .0119059    -0.44   0.660    -.0285795    .0180909
           hh_size     .0363042   .0045254     8.02   0.000     .0274346    .0451738
     1.profservbus      .065003   .0198082     3.28   0.001     .0261797    .1038263
   1.headage50plus     .0307052   .0487366     0.63   0.529    -.0648167    .1262272
     1.headage3049     .0472447    .037663     1.25   0.210    -.0265733    .1210628
     1.headage2229     .0489634   .0480557     1.02   0.308    -.0452241    .1431508
      1.femalehead    -.0134108   .0180815    -0.74   0.458      -.04885    .0220284
        1.heardPWV     .0986079   .0168068     5.87   0.000     .0656672    .1315487
     1.hheduc8plus     .0788672   .0336145     2.35   0.019      .012984    .1447504
        1.hheduc17     .0185484   .0216976     0.85   0.393    -.0239781    .0610748
       distmed_4x7     .0001176   .0000308     3.82   0.000     .0000572     .000178
      totalnets12m    -.0715724    .013352    -5.36   0.000    -.0977418    -.045403
  freenet_13m_plus    -.0162937   .0320764    -0.51   0.611    -.0791622    .0465749
      free_net_12m    -.0221901   .0360469    -0.62   0.538    -.0928408    .0484605
unsub_purch_13to36     .0340139   .0163235     2.08   0.037     .0020205    .0660073
                    
            urban      .1253635   .0303488     4.13   0.000     .0658809    .1848461
       semi-urban      .0565603   .0162934     3.47   0.001     .0246258    .0884949
       urban_rural  
                    
                5      .2412354    .031303     7.71   0.000     .1798826    .3025882
                4      .0434774   .0201693     2.16   0.031     .0039464    .0830085
                3     -.0043306   .0181804    -0.24   0.812    -.0399637    .0313024
                2     -.0183797   .0175217    -1.05   0.294    -.0527216    .0159622
      quintile_mca  
                    
tnvs_purch_bin_12m    -.0220824   .0257577    -0.86   0.391    -.0725667    .0284018
     tnvs_13m_plus    -.1136093   .0277121    -4.10   0.000     -.167924   -.0592946
                                                                                    
                          dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                Delta-method
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One can use the estimates from Table 24 to calculate the impact that the sale of partially 
subsidised nets had on incremental coverage of mosquito nets in Tanzania. For the 
purpose of illustration, if we take the overall NB AME of -0.11, this suggests that the 
3,959,192 subsidised nets distributed through the TNVS between October 2004 and 
September 2008 may have actually increased coverage by just 3,523,681 nets (i.e. 89% 
of the total subsidised nets), after accounting for the effect of the subsidy on unsubsidised 
sales. 
 
6.7 Discussion 
6.7.1 Limitations 
Before discussing the study’s main findings it is important to highlight its limitations. 
Firstly, due to the availability of relevant data, the analysis only covers the period from 
the beginning of the TNVS up until 2008. This study therefore helps us to understand the 
impact of TNVS on incremental coverage in its early years. 
Secondly, the estimates are based on household survey responses regarding net 
ownership, including recall over when nets were purchased and whether they were 
purchased using a subsidy voucher. Given this, there is some scope for recall error. 
However, there are no reasons to expect a systematic bias in a particular direction and it 
is likely that many households would remember whether the net was subsidised given 
that it required a recently pregnant woman in the households to have been given a 
voucher. Measurement error may also have occurred if voucher recipients bought a 
subsidised net and then sold it at a market or near market price. While they would be 
unlikely to report owning the subsidised net, any households surveyed that purchased one 
in this way would likely report it as unsubsidised. However, the impact any such resale 
and reporting would have on the estimates in the analysis would depend on whether the 
household that bought it had also previously purchased a subsidised net or not, making it 
impossible to accurately infer from the available data. 
Finally, as noted in the conceptual framework, any potential increase (decrease) in 
unsubsidised purchases due to impacts on market prices remained outside the scope of 
this study and any social learning effects would not be captured with the approach used, 
as any such change in purchases would not be attributable to the subsidy programme. 
Investigating social learning effects would require further analysis, for example, looking 
at purchases among those in close geographical proximity to those who received a 
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subsidised net. There may also be a social learning effect that operated at a more 
aggregate level through the programme as a whole arising through messages disseminated 
that raised awareness of the importance of the public health concerns in question and the 
products being subsidised. In so far as these encouraged further purchases among non-
beneficiaries, the models used in this study may underestimate the level of crowding-in 
taking place. 
 
6.7.2 What the results say and some explanations 
The results indicate that, although the TNVS increased overall coverage of ITNs up until 
2008, it led to a less than one-for-one increase in net ownership. For every 100 subsidised 
nets the TNVS appears to have led to an incremental increase of between 88 and 90 new 
nets on average across all wealth groups. Incremental increases were considerably lower 
among the wealthiest households, where 100 subsidised nets contributed between just 71 
and 76 new nets, providing support for the hypothesis that subsidies reaching those who 
would have already purchased unsubsidised nets are likely to lead to a displacement 
effect. Looking at the relationship between household wealth and demand for 
unsubsidised ITNs from the regression output in Figure 21, it can indeed be seen that 
there is a large positive and highly significant relationship between being in the highest 
wealth category (quintile 5) and having purchased an unsubsidised net in the 12 months 
prior to interview. The fact that a negative relationship between purchasing a subsidised 
net and future unsubsidised purchases was also found in each of the poorer wealth 
quintiles is discussed further below. The results are consistent regardless of the 
econometric model used, though OLS estimates are consistently lower. 
In light of the distinction made in the literature review, it is likely that the effects observed 
are displacement effects rather than crowding-out effects for two reasons. Firstly, the 
TNVS used the private sector to sell subsidised nets. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, ITNs 
are a durable good that are not purchased with great frequency, and so the purchase of a 
subsidised net may have simply reduced the need for households to purchase 
unsubsidised nets in the year ahead. Further research would be welcome to investigate 
potential longer-term effects on individual preferences and the private sector as a whole. 
There is some reason to believe that the estimates presented in Table 24 should be 
considered conservative given evidence of leakage and potential secondary markets for 
subsidised nets. While it is difficult to quantify the effect that leakage has had, if 5% of 
all subsidised nets were resold at market prices then (using the NB estimates) 100 
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subsidised nets would have led to 84 new nets rather than 89, or 80 if 10% of nets were 
re-sold. However, in so far as any positive social learning effects took place, as indicated 
above it would mean the estimates in this study underestimate the level of crowding-in 
effects, making it more difficult to judge the absolute impact of the TNVS on 
unsubsidised sales. 
While not the main focus of the paper, the study does not find any evidence that the past 
receipt of free nets had any statistically significant effect on future unsubsidised 
purchases. This contrasts with some earlier studies that found a negative impact of fully 
subsidised nets on unsubsidised purchases (Chase et al., 2009, Gingrich et al., 2011a). 
One of the reasons the findings of the present study differ from the other studies may be 
the longer time period over which this study has estimated crowding-in /-out effects as 
the durable nature of bed nets means households may not be so likely to purchase many 
in a short period of time. The difference in findings between free and partially subsidised 
nets could be down to the fact that whereas free nets do not involve any expenditure, 
partially subsidised nets clearly do more to reduce a household’s ability to purchase 
further unsubsidised nets in the near future. 
The results fit the aggregate trend of declining sales of unsubsidised nets presented in 
Figure 19. Using a three-year moving average (to smooth short-term fluctuations) shows 
an average growth in unsubsidised sales of 18.5% in the three years leading up to the start 
of the TNVS (2002 to 2004) followed by a decline of 1% in the three years following it 
(2005 to 2007), though it is difficult to directly match up absolute levels of estimated 
displacement with actual declines due to the short-term volatility (particularly in 2008) 
and associated uncertainty over what sales would have been in the absence of the subsidy. 
It seems that while displacement may partially explain the trend of declining unsubsidised 
sales, there are other crucially important determinants of unsubsidised sales that should 
be investigated, not least the growth in commercial prices. The average nominal retail 
price of a standard 3x6 round net grew from TZS 3079 in 2005 to TZS 3300 in 2006/07 
and TZS 4144 by 2007/08, with similar proportionate changes seen in reported wholesale 
prices (Mponda et al., 2008). Part of the reason for this may be general inflation and the 
global fuel crisis, which saw oil prices rising considerably from 2007 to mid-2008. 
The results also fit with the study by Gingrich et al. (2011a) that investigated the effect 
of partially subsidised nets on unsubsidised sales, though that study suggested 'crowding-
out’ arose instead through increased demand raising the overall price of unsubsidised 
nets, causing lower purchases among non-beneficiaries. The present study identifies an 
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alternative (and potentially complementary) pathway to displacement or crowding-out: 
the subsidies reaching households that would have purchased unsubsidised nets anyway.  
Increasing retail prices could well still be one reason behind declining unsubsidised sales 
though it would only explain the observed displacement in the present study in so far as 
higher commercial prices put off subsidy beneficiaries from buying further unsubsidised 
nets in the future (effectively limiting a crowding-in effect). However, high prices should 
have the same effect on those receiving and not receiving the subsidy, unless by virtue of 
having received the subsidy, beneficiaries in particular are more likely to hold off 
purchasing unsubsidised nets (e.g. if they expect to be able to get another subsidised net). 
More broadly, impacts of the TNVS on commercial prices require further investigation 
before a causal interpretation can be made linking the TNVS to higher wholesale prices. 
The finding of displacement at first appears at odds with the findings by Dupas (2010) 
from a randomised experiment in Kenya. However, in that experiment ‘future net 
purchases’ were of subsidised nets and so it is not fair to suggest that study provides 
evidence of crowding-in outside a controlled experimental setting. That study does 
suggest, however, that in order for crowding-in to occur nets must be commercially 
affordable. 
Overall, the findings do not appear to support the theory of subsidies crowding-in demand 
for unsubsidised nets and it is important to ask why no evidence for this was found. As 
noted earlier, there are two main mechanisms through which crowding-in has been 
thought to operate. First, through allowing people to experiment with products they would 
not have otherwise purchased, a subsidy may encourage them to make future 
unsubsidised purchases. Second, a predictable large-scale subsidy that translates into a 
consistent and substantial growth in aggregate demand for a product through the private 
sector (i.e. where the private sector is involved in selling the subsidised product) may 
allow retailers to expand their operations and potentially even bring down the market 
price of the product, e.g. through economies of scale.  
In the case of Tanzania, awareness of the benefits of nets was already relatively strong as 
a result of the extensive social marketing activities that had taken place before the TNVS. 
The main constraint on the purchase of unsubsidised ITNs is likely to have been the high 
price of unsubsidised ITNs which, rather than going down, in fact increased over the 
period of study. While this study does not investigate the extent of growth in private sector 
activity, which may indeed have increased as a result of the TNVS, bringing down the 
market price of the product being subsidised is clearly crucial in order to achieve truly 
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sustainable coverage over the longer-term. It is also true that crowding-in may be difficult 
to observe for a product which is not purchased with great frequency, or in a situation 
where extensive subsidy initiatives continue to operate as individuals may choose to put 
off unsubsidised purchases if they feel they may be able to acquire subsidised products. 
 
6.7.3 Policy implications 
Given the considerably higher levels of displacement among the wealthiest households 
and the fact that subsidised purchases in that category did represent a significant share of 
overall TNVS sales,51 the most obvious policy implication is that in order to achieve a 
higher level of incremental sales with the same or fewer resources, programmes such as 
the TNVS could try to avoid subsidies reaching the very wealthiest households. However, 
one must be sure that there is evidence to show they are already purchasing the 
unsubsidised products. If not, a temporary subsidy may still be warranted. Indeed, despite 
100 nets displacing between 24 and 29 unsubsidised nets among the wealthiest 
households, the TNVS still led to an overall incremental increase among these 
households. Means-based targeting is also likely to prove particularly difficult in many 
low- or middle-income countries and there is also a need to judge whether the additional 
costs of targeting would outweigh the costs of inefficiencies arising from subsidising 
products for households who are more likely to purchase them anyway. 
The fact that displacement was still statistically significant on average among all 
categories of less wealthy households might suggest that even with more highly 
sophisticated targeting, some level of displacement could well be inevitable as wealth 
status will never perfectly correlate with purchase decisions. However, as suggested, it is 
likely that high commercial prices are a key factor undermining crowding-in and so it is 
imperative that any subsidy programme for public health products does not lose sight of 
the need for complementary actions to bring down commercial prices, which will help 
secure longer-term sustainability of coverage. 
In terms of the debate raised by Dupas (2014) over whether it is better to provide products 
for free or to require partial payment, the finding of no longer-term crowding-out from 
fully subsidised nets (compared to the displacement from partially subsidised nets) 
                                                 
51 TNVS household surveys show a higher proportion of households in the wealthiest asset quintile received 
a pregnant woman voucher (PWV) voucher in 2008 than those in poorer quintiles (p=0.01) and a higher 
proportion of those redeemed PWVs (p<0.01). Redemption of PWVs was also higher in earlier years though 
not statistically significant. In 2008, coverage of infant vouchers was lower among the wealthiest 
households though redemption was higher than other quintiles (p=0.10). 
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suggests free nets may well be more effective in raising incremental coverage, providing 
the nets are indeed used appropriately. However, there is clearly a trade-off against the 
significant additional costs of distributing fully subsidised nets compared to nets where a 
portion of the cost may be recouped through the charging of a top-up fee. As such, a 
combination of the two may be preferable as has been the case in Tanzania. 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
Using a household demand model with nationally representative data, this study finds 
evidence that the purchase of partially subsidised nets was associated with fewer 
unsubsidised net purchases in the future. Future unsubsidised purchases were 
significantly lower among the wealthiest households, providing evidence of a targeting-
based displacement effect. As such, it cannot be said that TNVS subsidised nets led to a 
one-for-one increase in overall incremental coverage. Care should therefore be taken in 
any future claims regarding the impact of subsidies on coverage. The study found no 
evidence of crowding-in, even among the very poorest, indicating that subsidies alone are 
likely to be insufficient for sustaining longer-term coverage of public health products and 
that more needs to be done to also bring down the commercial price of products. The 
findings constitute an important contribution to the debate over how to design subsidy 
programmes to improve and maintain overall coverage of important PHPs. 
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7 Discussion and conclusion 
This final chapter takes a step back in order to look at the bigger picture and the broader 
implications of the findings of the thesis. Returning to the original aim and research 
objectives, the chapter first of all briefly reviews the rationale and approach of the thesis 
before summarising its key findings. The following section then considers the 
contribution of the findings, discussing their significance in terms of contributing to our 
knowledge around targeting and crowding-in and crowding-out, and to the improvement 
of future programme design. Finally, consideration is given to the general limitations of 
the thesis followed by some areas for future research. 
 
7.1 Summary of rationale and approach of the thesis 
Since the turn of the century there has been a surge in the number of AIS and PHPS 
programmes and policies across the globe, which has inspired a growing body of 
empirical research. However, despite the subsidies in both sectors sharing a number of 
similarities in their broad conceptual justifications, design features and challenges, 
research to date has been carried out within sectoral silos. While single sector research is 
essential for driving forward our knowledge and understanding of these initiatives, 
chapter 1 suggested various potential advantages to moving beyond the research 
boundaries of single sectors by considering the theory, methods and practice from two or 
more sectors together. This thesis therefore set out to investigate what theoretical, 
methodological, empirical or policy insights could be gained in relation to AISs and 
PHPSs by looking both within and across the agricultural and health literatures. A review 
of the theory, practice and challenges facing both types of subsidy revealed the interlinked 
topics of targeting and crowding-in / crowding-out to have gaps in the empirical literature, 
with scope for benefitting from the approaches and thinking of a different sector. That 
review led to the three empirical papers presented in chapters 4 to 6. 
 
7.2 Empirical findings by research objective 
As the main empirical findings have been discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6, this section 
provides a brief summary of the overall findings with respect to the original research 
objectives from chapter 3. The first two objectives were concerned with targeting 
outcomes and their determinants in Malawi’s FISP, covered in chapters 4 and 5. The third 
research objective, explored in chapter 6, concerned the question of crowding-in, 
  188 
crowding-out and incremental coverage of ITNs in Tanzania’s National Voucher Scheme. 
Research objective four is discussed in section 7.4. 
 
Research objective 1: To explore socioeconomic-related inequalities relating to coupon 
allocation, coupon redemption, and use of subsidised inputs in the Malawi FISP between 
2006/07 and 2012/13.52 
a. Still no overall pro-poor targeting of fertiliser coupons by 2012/13. As of 
2012/13, receipt of any fertiliser coupon was still on average disproportionately 
distributed among the less poor households despite a statistically significant 
reduction in inequality between 2006/07 and 2008/09. Households with greater 
asset wealth (particularly those around the middle of the distribution) also 
benefitted disproportionately in terms of the number of fertiliser coupons 
received, despite a statistically significant reduction in this inequality over time. 
Similar findings emerged when households were ranked by income measures. 
b. Some limited evidence of wealthier households being more likely to redeem 
all fertiliser coupons in earlier years. While the data do not reveal major 
differences between the wealth categories in terms of ability to redeem coupons 
for subsidised fertiliser, redemption of all fertiliser coupons was distributed 
slightly disproportionately among wealthier households in 2006/07 and 2008/09. 
By 2012/13 there was statistically no difference between wealth groups, 
suggesting that ability to redeem was not systematically determined by SES so 
much as other factors. However, the limited cases of reported non-redemption do 
make it difficult to draw firm conclusions. A less pronounced pro-wealth bias was 
found when using income measures. 
c. Notable inequalities in access to subsidised fertiliser. Consistent with the 
inequalities observed for the number of fertiliser coupons received, the findings 
showed fairly high levels of inequality over the years in terms of the volume of 
subsidised fertiliser acquired. The shapes of the CCs suggest households in the 
middle and upper-middle of the wealth distribution gaining particularly 
disproportionately. There was some statistically significant reduction in 
inequality over time though not enough to become overall pro-poor as of 2012/13. 
                                                 
52 The research in chapter 3 focused specifically on fertiliser, being by far the most valuable of all inputs 
distributed in the FISP. 
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d. Limited evidence of wealth-based differences relating to input use (among 
fertiliser obtained through coupons). Of the fertiliser obtained through subsidy 
coupons there was limited evidence of socioeconomic-related inequality in how 
that subsidised fertiliser was used, with the value for the CI only being statistically 
significant (and positive) in 2008/09, when the estimate showed poorer 
households were more likely to report some other use of inputs. There was no 
difference using income measures. However, in general it was difficult to identify 
any inequalities due to the very low number of households reporting to have used 
fertiliser other than on their own land. 
 
Research objective 2: To identify and assess the importance of different factors that 
determined the allocation and redemption of subsidy coupons in the FISP and use of 
subsidised inputs among smallholder households. 
a. Power and informational asymmetries are crucial in CBT and coupon 
redemption. One of the main findings that emerged from the interviews, and 
appeared important in beneficiary selection through to coupon redemption and 
use of subsidised inputs, was the role of power and informational asymmetries. In 
beneficiary selection and the allocation of coupons, the asymmetries between 
local leaders and the wider village population meant that leaders were able to 
exercise considerable control over the allocation of coupons with limited 
accountability. The current approach of the FISP’s beneficiary selection and 
coupon allocation mechanisms being left to communities was found to end up by 
default granting overwhelming power to traditional authority systems and to 
permit village leaders to divert some benefits for themselves and those with whom 
they had good relations. Responses from many of the farmers revealed how 
leaders can also deprive villagers of their right to being fully informed of the 
official guidelines, strengthening the position of leaders to act according to their 
own will. In all areas visited, the approach also resulted in the ultimate use of 
subsidised inputs being partly dictated by local leaders who requested them to be 
shared with others. While this may represent an attempt to deal with the low 
coupon to eligible beneficiary ratios and an attempt at achieving a sense of 
fairness, it can also be used to effectively compensate for leakages taking place 
from the village head upwards. Finally, power asymmetries were also crucial in 
mediating the outcomes of fertiliser coupon use, with a privileged position being 
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granted to fertiliser depot staff who in some localities appear able to capture 
substantial rents alongside local vendors, both through the hiking of official top-
up prices as well as diversion of subsidised inputs. 
b. The importance of village politics. With regard to beneficiary identification and 
coupon allocation, the current system also effectively supports the playing out of 
local village politics in cases where the position of village leaders requires them 
to respond to demands from their villagers. Ultimately, however, depending on 
the local context, this can allow more empowered households that are better able 
to petition , leaving some of the more marginalised households without a voice 
and without access. 
c. The role of poverty. Poverty was also identified to be a crucial factor mediating 
the choices households made or were forced to make regarding the use of coupons 
and of any subsidised inputs they received. One of the main drivers in this respect 
was the pressing need facing some poorer households for cash to meet various 
expenditures, such as food, medical costs and costs of education, leaving some 
households prone to selling coupons and / or a portion of their subsidised inputs. 
Various other challenges also arose relating to household poverty, including the 
additional obstacles that it creates at depots where prices are inflated through the 
involvement of unscrupulous depot staff and vendors. This is broadly consistent 
with the quantitative analysis from chapter 4 (during earlier years of the FISP), 
though the relatively small sample of respondents reporting non-redemption of 
coupons and alternative uses of subsidised inputs in household surveys makes it 
difficult to say how widespread the problem really is. 
 
Research objective 3: To estimate the impact that the TNVS had on commercial ITN 
sales and overall ITN coverage between 2005 and 2008. 
a. Mild overall displacement of unsubsidised commercial sales. Results from the 
household demand model in chapter 6 showed that the purchase of subsidised nets 
through the TNVS was associated negatively and highly significantly with the 
future purchase of unsubsidised commercial nets after controlling for a range of 
other explanatory factors. On average, every 100 subsidised nets purchased was 
associated with a reduction in the purchase of between 10 and 12 unsubsidised 
nets. This suggests that the TNVS had a slightly negative impact on the purchase 
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of unsubsidised equivalent nets by displacing unsubsidised sales that would have 
gone ahead in the subsidy’s absence. 
b. Transmission of subsidies to the very wealthiest households had the strongest 
displacement effect. The average level of displacement was significantly greater 
among households in the very wealthiest category that purchased a subsidised net, 
where every 100 subsidised nets was associated with a reduction of between 24 
and 29 nets. This finding supports the hypothesis that one of the pathways for 
displacement is through substituting for sales that would have gone ahead 
anyway. However, displacement still appeared to take place among all wealth 
groups.  
c. Overall the TNVS made a positive contribution to incremental coverage of 
ITNs. Despite evidence of displacement, overall the TNVS still made a positive 
contribution to the level of ITN coverage in Tanzania. Based on the estimates of 
displacement, the 3,959,192 subsidised nets distributed through the TNVS 
between October 2004 and September 2008 appear to have led to an approximate 
increase of between 3,484,089 and 3,563,273 (i.e. between 88% and 90% of the 
total subsidised nets). However, these estimates come with the caveat that the 
demand model did not capture impacts that the TNVS may have had in increasing 
unsubsidised purchases through localised and population-wide social learning 
effects. It also does not capture any effect that the subsidy programme may have 
had in altering the market price of nets. 
d. No evidence of fully subsidised nets crowding-out unsubsidised purchases. 
Finally, the results from chapter 6 indicate that, in contrast to the partially 
subsidised nets from the TNVS, the past receipt of fully subsidised (free) nets did 
not have the same negative impact in displacing unsubsidised purchases. 
 
7.3 Contribution to knowledge 
The findings from this thesis make a number of contributions both to the programme 
specific empirical literatures on targeting outcomes and crowding-in and crowding-out, 
as well as to the broader theoretical frameworks applicable to both sectors. This section 
now considers contributions to the literatures on targeting, crowding-in and crowding-
out, before concluding with a reflection on the contribution to our understanding of the 
utility of a cross-sector approach to research. The contributions are discussed in relation 
to existing literature. 
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7.3.1 Targeting and vouchers 
As far as the author is aware, this was the first study to have used CCs and CIs to measure 
the targeting outcomes of an AISP. Their use in the agricultural literature in general also 
appears to be largely absent. The study has demonstrated the utility of using these 
methods not only as a means of gaining richer insights into the full distribution of 
targeting outcomes across a population over time and space, but also in terms of them 
being a useful visual tool for communicating programme outcomes to a policy and 
research audience. It is hoped that dissemination of chapter 4 will contribute to greater 
awareness of these methods within the agricultural literature in order that they may be 
used more widely. 
The findings from chapter 4 also update our understanding of targeting outcomes in 
Malawi’s FISP through the use of more recent data than has been used in previous studies. 
The application of CCs and CIs to three datasets has also demonstrated how outcomes 
have changed (or not) over time. The findings are in line with earlier studies cited in 
chapter 4, which found the receipt of coupons and volume of subsidised fertiliser to be 
associated with measures of wealth. They are also in line with the more recent study by 
Kilic et al. (2013), which used data covering the 2009/10 agricultural season and argued 
it was those in the middle of the distribution disproportionately benefitting. The present 
study demonstrates this finding more clearly using CCs and also explores a wider range 
of stages in the subsidy allocation process and demonstrates the continued failure over 
multiple years of the targeting mechanisms within the FISP to achieve their intended 
objectives. 
The findings from the primary research carried out by the author and reported in chapter 
5 offer the first known attempt at explicitly assessing the key factors driving targeting 
outcomes at the community level at the various stages of subsidy transmission to 
beneficiaries in the FISP. They add to and update the very limited body of empirical 
evidence looking at local targeting processes and obstacles facing improved targeting 
outcomes and help us to understand a number of key factors and informal processes which 
explain why the observed targeting outcomes are as they are. This is crucially important 
for policy makers with an interest in improving targeting outcomes. For example, 
interviews across the four separate locations highlighted that the bottlenecks at fertiliser 
depots that create opportunities for rent seeking may be a crucial factor undermining stock 
availability, which in turn underpins not only non-redemption (which was a number one 
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concern of two district level officials) but also appears to stimulate a secondary market 
for subsidy coupons. 
A number of findings from the primary research are broadly in line with earlier evidence 
from programme evaluations, for example, the important role played by village leaders 
in determining subsidy coupon allocation (Dorward et al., 2013). However, the findings 
go into greater depth in explaining the underlying processes and village politics that can 
occur and determine outcomes. The findings confirm the hypothesis by Dorward et al. 
(2013) that the open forums, which have been promoted since 2008/09, are not truly 
‘open’ in terms of allowing for genuine participation and accountability. The study also 
explained what the high reporting of ‘redistribution’ in the 2012/13 FISS actually means 
in the village context by revealing how village leaders in all four villages enforced sharing 
with other households. 
Some findings did seem to contradict certain conclusions from previous studies. First, the 
use of semi-structured interviews in this thesis appears to have identified a greater lack 
of awareness of official FISP guidelines than a previous study by Mvula et al. (2011), 
which concluded that people were generally aware of official targeting criteria. Part of 
the reason for this may be that the conclusion by Mvula et al. appears to have depended 
particularly upon reports from FGDs and village leaders, which may have reflected the 
opinions of more empowered individuals and not provided such a voice to more 
marginalised individuals. This is an important point, as the lack of awareness found 
through the semi-structured interviews highlighted a further means through which local 
leaders can seek to dominate and control the distribution of subsidies. 
The findings also contribute to the broader empirical literature on CBT, where it has been 
mentioned a number of times that evidence and documentation on the performance of 
CBT has been lacking (Coady et al., 2004, Ravallion, 2003, Ridde et al., 2010). This in 
turn feeds into the broader theoretical CBT literature. On the one hand, findings are 
broadly in line with a number of empirical studies that highlight the limitations of using 
CBT to transfer central government benefits. For example, a study by Scheffel (1999) 
also highlights the importance of power asymmetries in the case of a programme in 
Slovakia, where local councils representing the dominant Gadjo majority denied Roma 
access to government benefits. A study on Bangladesh’s Food for Education programme 
also appears to highlight the importance of power asymmetries and the local political 
economy, finding that more unequal villages in terms of land ownership were worse at 
targeting poor households (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005). There are also parallels with a 
  194 
study reported by Coady et al. (2004) of a rice subsidy in Indonesia in which village elders 
in some villages disagreed with the central policy goals of selecting beneficiaries and 
instead divided the village’s quota of rice among all members. 
On the other hand, the findings contrast with some evidence of CBT having performed 
relatively well in achieving targeting aims (Alderman, 2002, Coady et al., 2004). The 
reasons for these differences appear to lie in a number of factors, including programme 
design and local context. Concerning programme design, in their large-scale review of 
different targeting approaches, Coady et al. (2004) note that the studies they found on 
CBT may have performed unusually well as ‘several of the programs that use community 
targeting use other methods as well that may be responsible for a good deal of their 
power’. They cite the example of Mexico’s PROGRESA social transfer programme, 
which first of all used a poverty map to select poor areas, then a PMT to screen out non-
poor residents, before using CBT as a final stage. As part of their overall findings, 
targeting performance also improved with country income levels and indicators of 
government accountability, suggesting that CBT may face greater challenges in low-
income contexts such as Malawi. 
Overall, the findings from this thesis lend support to the hypotheses put forward by a 
number of authors that the theoretical advantages of CBT (e.g. better information, greater 
accountability and building social capital) may in some cases be tempered or outweighed 
by rent-seeking, capture by local elites, reinforcement of existing power structures and 
use of criteria at odds with the programme’s targeting criteria (Conning and Kevane, 
2002, Mansuri and Rao, 2012, Ravaillon, 2003). They also suggest that social capital may 
be actively undermined due to the targeting process raising social tensions.  
The findings also contribute to our theoretical understanding of the conditions under 
which CBT may be less appropriate as a mechanism for targeting. These include: contexts 
in which local traditional leadership structures are culturally revered and offer a 
privileged position through which they may abuse their authority; where there is limited 
scope for government oversight or monitoring (e.g. stretched extension services); where 
the decisions concern distribution of resources that represent significant value and 
therefore raise the returns from elite capture, patronage and rent seeking; when the 
targeting criteria of the programme concerned are very broadly defined; and in contexts 
where it may in practice be difficult to distinguish between eligible households. 
The findings from the empirical chapters on targeting in the FISP combine with those 
from Chapter 6 to highlight the broader challenges and limitations of targeting across 
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both agriculture and health sectors. On the one hand, findings from Chapter 6 show how 
categorical targeting has its limitations through not being able to distinguish between 
those that were more or less likely to have purchased an unsubsidised ITN. If targeting 
were based on socioeconomic status, it could have substantially reduced levels of 
displacement, allowing the government to use the financial savings to expand coverage 
among other households that were less likely to have purchased an unsubsidised net 
(though subsidised nets reaching even the wealthiest households did still have an overall 
positive effect on increasing incremental ownership of ITNs). On the other hand, the 
findings reveal how, even if the TNVS were targeted using some form of means-test 
(which would have likely involved greater financial costs), some level of displacement 
would have still been likely as small levels of displacement were found even among the 
poorest households, suggesting that factors other than wealth were influencing the choice 
of whether or not households purchased ITNs. 
The findings also contribute to the wider literature on vouchers. Overall, the evidence on 
vouchers generally suggests voucher programmes have been successful at raising the 
consumption of key goods and services and have largely facilitated the effective targeting 
of specific groups of individuals (Ensor, 2003, Meyer et al., 2011). However, there has 
been far less investigation into the processes underlying voucher programmes. Where it 
exists, evidence has highlighted the scope for malpractices in the targeting and 
transmission of benefits from voucher subsidy programmes. For example, an in-depth 
programme evaluation of a voucher programme for maternal health services in 
Bangladesh found reports of nepotism in the distribution of vouchers where relatives were 
more likely to receive vouchers, as well as evidence of pressure on voucher distributors 
to provide vouchers to those who were ineligible (Hatt et al., 2010). 
A further reason for the relatively limited amount of evidence on processes may be due 
to the sensitive nature of corruption and the fact that there are incentives that keep such 
discussions from being published. For example, since the analysis of the TNVS in this 
thesis, the programme has been closed due to an internal audit revealing evidence of 
systematic misuse of e-vouchers among health workers and local retailers. Specifically, 
health staff were found to be using fake health card numbers and colluding with retailers 
and ITN sales representatives to redeem vouchers without the exchange of a net to a 
beneficiary. Crucially, this was made possible through collusion between local actors and 
the absence of unique identifiers for the health cards against which vouchers were 
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assigned. This case reveals that the mere use of e-vouchers in itself is not a solution to 
overcoming problems relating to corruption.53 
The findings here therefore contribute to a relatively limited qualitative evidence base on 
the operation of vouchers but seem to be consistent with concerns raised elsewhere. From 
a theoretical perspective there are three key lessons. The first concerns the theoretical 
benefit of vouchers being a tool that allows for the effective targeting of intended 
beneficiaries. Clearly, whether or not this is the case hinges upon having in place an 
adequate beneficiary selection mechanism; the use of vouchers in and of themselves 
cannot be assumed to improve the targeting of goods or services.  
The second lesson is that the theoretical argument that vouchers may help overcome some 
of the potential corruption associated with pure cash transfers due to the virtue of 
vouchers only being redeemable for certain goods and services and for certain 
individuals, ignores the fact that controls on who can redeem coupons for what are 
themselves operated by individuals, who may be corruptible. Also, the extent of scope 
for corruption may partly depend upon the good or service being subsidised. So whereas 
access to specific services may be less readily transferable, certain goods such as fertiliser 
in Malawi, for example, are easily tradable and in high demand and therefore relatively 
open to corruption. Though this does not mean that other forms of corruption may not 
also take place, however, such as requests for bribes and, as the TNVS case highlights, 
the use of ghost beneficiaries without even the need for any exchange of goods.  
Thirdly, it must be emphasised strongly in the theory around vouchers that the pathway 
from voucher allocation to voucher redemption and access to the intended subsidised 
products or services is dependent upon a wide range of conditions, not just including 
availability of the products or services, but upon the absence of rent-seeking and corrupt 
practices, which in practice may be extremely difficult to monitor and combat in many 
low-income country settings. 
 
7.3.2 Crowding-in, crowding-out and displacement 
As the review of literature in chapter 6 explained, very few studies have looked at the 
effect of partially subsidised ITNs on the sale of unsubsidised ITNs, yet the investigation 
of such effects is essential for understanding the impacts that PHPS programmes have on 
incremental coverage of the PHPs being subsidised. It is also important for informing the 
                                                 
53 Communication with senior NATNETS official. 
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theory around whether and when PHPSs help pump-prime demand for unsubsidised 
equivalent products. The analysis in chapter 6 was the first attempt the author is aware of 
to use a household demand model approach to estimate the effect that purchasing partially 
subsidised ITNs has on the purchase of unsubsidised ITNs at the level of the household 
and wider economy. 
The finding of partially subsidised ITNs displacing sales of unsubsidised ITNs is 
consistent with the findings in the one other study that has looked at the impact of partially 
subsidised nets on unsubsidised nets using a partial equilibrium framework (Gingrich et 
al., 2011a). However, this thesis contributes to the evidence and theory by suggesting a 
different pathway; one that operates as a result of subsidies reaching those who would 
have already purchased an unsubsidised net, rather than through the subsidy programme 
as a whole raising prices. This is further supported by the displacement estimates in this 
thesis being greatest among the wealthiest households. The price pathway may well also 
exist, though further research is required to prove any causal effect that the TNVS may 
have had on increasing prices given other key factors that may have explained the price 
increases in Tanzania at the time. 
The fact that there was displacement in all wealth categories also means that there was, 
on average, no crowding-in. This is an interesting finding because it appears to run 
counter to the theory that subsidising PHPs may help pump-prime private sector markets 
through increasing future demand. However, it must be noted that this does not mean 
private sector markets have not expanded overall due to the increased aggregate demand 
from subsidised sales as the private sector was involved in selling subsidised nets (see 
conceptual framework below). It does raise the question though of why the purchase of 
partially subsidised ITNs did not on average stimulate further unsubsidised ITN sales.  
One explanation could be that crowding-in effects are less likely to be observed while a 
subsidy programme is still in place if those who received a subsidised product hold off 
from purchasing further unsubsidised equivalents due to expectations that they may be 
able to acquire subsidised versions again (i.e. an ‘expectation effect’). However, this 
effect should also apply to those who did not receive a subsidy (unless they know they 
will be ineligible), which should therefore also dampen demand for unsubsidised products 
among non-recipients, which would result in lower estimates of crowding-out. Instead, it 
may be that, given the durable nature of ITNs, it may require a longer time period over 
which to observe any potential crowding-in effects. Crowding-in would of course 
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necessitate though that market prices were low enough for people to be able to purchase 
unsubsidised equivalent products. 
Another possibility could be a potential ‘anchoring effect’, where those receiving 
partially subsidised products come to value the products at the price they have paid, 
making them more reluctant to pay a higher price in the future. The one previous study 
known to have tested for such effects in the past found no evidence for it, though only 
when ITNs were free or of a very low price (Dupas, 2010). It may be, therefore, that there 
are anchoring effects at higher prices. Also, discussing her study, Dupas acknowledged 
that ‘as the subsidy was provided by a local research organization, households in the study 
might have been less likely to exhibit anchoring effects than they would have if the 
subsidy had been implemented nation-wide by the government’ (Dupas, 2010: 24). 
It is also interesting to contrast the finding of displacement from partially subsidised ITNs 
with that of no displacement arising from free nets. The latter finding does conflict with 
two other studies that have looked at impacts of free nets on unsubsidised purchases 
(Chase et al., 2009, Gingrich et al., 2011a). However, the study by Chase et al. was only 
based on reported WTP rather than actual unsubsidised sales and the study by Gingrich 
et al. was based on data from one year, which does not therefore offer the insight into 
longer term effects that this thesis does.  
Looking at studies which have looked at the impact of free nets on subsidised purchases, 
the findings in this thesis run counter to those by Gingrich et al. (2014), who found a 
substantial immediate reduction in the number of subsidised nets being sold during a mass 
free net campaign and Gingrich et al. (2011b) who found a short-term negative 
association between receipt of free nets and purchase of partially subsidised nets. 
However, the campaign covered by the former was unique in that it involved the 
distribution of a substantial 8.5 million nets while the latter study only considered short-
term impacts, which did not allow for impacts on future purchases. The findings from this 
thesis are, however, consistent with findings by Eze et al. (2014) and Dupas (2010), both 
of which suggested no evidence of free ITNs undermining subsidised ITN purchases, and 
Dupas even finding some crowding-in effects. However, it must be remembered these 
studies look at impacts on subsidised nets. 
How might the difference in displacement through partially subsidised nets and free nets 
be explained? One explanation could be that while receiving a free product may affect 
the marginal utility a household gains from further such products, it does not affect a 
household’s budget constraint in the way that a partially subsidised product would. Fully 
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subsidised products will therefore not have the same limiting effect on future subsidised 
purchases in terms of the household’s budgetary resources. This is a crucially important 
distinction that does not appear to have been made in the literature so far. 
In brief, the empirical findings on displacement make an important contribution to our 
knowledge of the extent to which targeting partially subsidised ITNs using categorical 
targeting (that does not take into account ability to pay) may displace unsubsidised sales 
and potential differential impacts of full versus partial subsidies. They also highlight a 
number of potential reasons why we do not observe crowding-in effects. 
Drawing on these findings and the review of both the AIS and PHPS crowding-in/ -out 
literatures also allows for the development of a more all-encompassing theoretical 
framework through which to consider the various aspects and types of crowding-in and 
crowding-out that can arise from subsidy programmes. This is presented in two parts. 
Figure 22 concerns the demand side of voucher subsidy programmes, which relates 
particularly to the issues of targeting that this thesis has focused on. Figure 23 then 
illustrates how there can also be crowding-in/ -out on the supply side depending on the 
design and implementation of distribution and retail of subsidised products, and impacts 
on market prices. Note that the distinction between crowding-out and displacement is not 
made explicit in the diagrams, which assume government provision of subsidised 
products, though they may of course be adapted. 
These figures represent a first attempt at what is intended to be a useful set of frameworks 
for researchers and policy makers in both sectors, highlighting some key points of 
consideration that underpin issues of raising the incremental benefit of a subsidy 
programme over the longer-term. A number of key features that are important to note, 
particularly those arising from the work in this thesis, are summarised below for each 
framework. 
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Impacts of subsidised products on the demand-side 
x Firstly, Figure 22 helps highlight how diversion of vouchers at various levels may 
have different impacts on crowding-in/ -out and incremental coverage or use of 
the product being subsidised depending on how vouchers are used. For example, 
if redeemed for products that are then sold at market or near market rates (centre 
left of diagram), it is likely to displace unsubsidised sales. Drawing on chapter 5, 
Figure 22 shows how after vouchers reach households, various mediating factors 
such as perceived ability to redeem the voucher and gender or cash constraints 
may mediate how they are used. 
x Secondly, at the centre of the framework it can be seen how subsidised products 
reaching households that would have purchased unsubsidised products anyway 
reflects crowding-out (or displacement), while those reaching households that 
would not have represent a short-term increase in incremental coverage or use of 
the product arising directly from the programme. In chapter 6, it was shown that 
in the case of the TNVS, subsidies reaching the wealthiest households had a larger 
crowding-out (displacement) effect. There is an important distinction to make 
here however between the direct effect arising from the subsidy programme itself 
and longer-term crowding-in or crowding-out effects that arise after some delay 
or even beyond the life of the programme. It is the combination of both that gives 
the overall incremental impact on ownership. This distinction has important 
methodological implications for past and future attempts at measuring crowding-
in/ -out using household demand models as, if insufficient time is allowed for 
crowding-in to be observed then findings may be biased towards finding 
crowding-out. This depends on factors such as the frequency of purchase of the 
specific product and also the continuation of the subsidy programme itself. 
x Keeping the short-term versus long-term distinction in mind is also crucial for 
focussing attention on those conditions (including those in italics in the boxes) 
that must be in place in order for a subsidy programme to achieve one of its 
theoretical advantages of raising use of the product being subsidised beyond the 
life of the subsidy. It was suggested earlier that some of those factors in the centre 
bottom box in italics (e.g. affordability, expectation of receiving future subsidy 
and impact on the budget constraint) could have held back crowding-in from being 
observed in the TNVS. The impact on the budget constraint in particular may help 
account for the observation in chapter 6 that crowding-out was observed for 
partially subsidised nets yet not for free nets. 
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x Thirdly, drawing from the reference to social learning effects found in the PHPS 
literature (Dupas, 2010), another important point that Figure 22 raises is how a 
subsidy programme may still affect the purchase decisions of non-recipients, e.g. 
through social learning effects. This may be mediated by a range of factors in the 
box to the centre right of the diagram, such as their perceptions or experience of 
the benefits of the products. It is an area that has so far been somewhat overlooked 
in the agricultural literature but may have implications for measuring crowding-
in and crowding-out using demand model approaches. Further research in this 
area would be helpful. 
x A final important point to note, drawing on chapter 5 on Malawi’s FISP, is that 
ownership and use can be quite separate things and that there is an important need 
for appropriate monitoring and evaluation to uncover how subsidised products are 
genuinely used. 
 
Impacts of subsidised products on the supply side 
x The main function of Figure 23 is to highlight how, in addition to crowding-in or 
crowding-out / displacement taking place through the targeting and use of 
vouchers, a subsidy programme may also have the effect of crowding-in or 
crowding-out the private sector more generally through its distribution 
arrangements. This may occur at a number of levels, from importers to 
manufacturers and retailers, depending on the specific design of the programme. 
For example, a programme would be particularly vulnerable to crowding-out 
where the government takes it upon itself to sell all subsidised products itself as 
this effectively removes the market from private sector actors. It is still possible 
that crowding-in could arise, though the conditions under which this would take 
place are considerably narrowed (e.g. providing subsidised products did not reach 
those who would otherwise purchase unsubsidised equivalents from private 
retailers). As shown in the case of the TNVS and FISP, this may often be a 
difficult condition to achieve. This highlights how the demand side and supply 
side frameworks come together. For example, if due to weak targeting there is 
crowding-out under a system where the government is fully responsible for selling 
the subsidised products, this will more likely have negative impacts on the private 
sector compared to a system where it is the private sector selling subsidised inputs. 
The reason being that in the latter case, even if unsubsidised sales are displaced, 
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the subsidised sales will still benefit the private sector (or at least those retailers 
who sell subsidised products). 
x Figure 23 also highlights the point raised in chapter 5 regarding the danger of the 
public sector procuring the subsidised goods directly rather than allowing the 
private sector to do it on the government’s behalf. As shown, this can create a 
liability for the government, with any diversion of products for subsequent sale 
within the country then potentially leading to crowding-out and limiting the 
impact of the subsidy programme on incremental coverage. If diversion is 
sufficiently large, the downward arrow shows how it may also lead to downward 
pressure on the market price of equivalent products, as suggested by Takeshima 
et al. (2012). 
x As in Figure 22, the market price of unsubsidised products is shown to be a key 
factor for maintaining future sales and therefore longer-term crowding-in. The 
market price will be impacted upon by a wide range of factors, including the effect 
the subsidy programme has on lowering costs at the level of import/domestic 
manufacture (in so far as they are passed on) as well as any changes to the retail 
market for the product in question. The possibility of increased aggregate demand 
affecting market prices is also left open in the diagram, as suggested by Gingrich 
et al. (2011a), though further research is required in this area to demonstrate 
concrete causal linkages. 
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7.3.3 Utility of a cross-sector approach to research 
Finally, the thesis as a whole makes a contribution towards understanding the utility of a 
cross-sector approach to research. Three benefits in particular have been demonstrated. 
Firstly, exposing oneself to the literature from a different sector covering a conceptually 
similar programme or policy can provide an impetus for exploring research questions that 
may otherwise have received limited attention due to existing research or policy priorities. 
For example, while the question of whether partially subsidised products crowd-out 
unsubsidised products has received significant empirical attention in the agricultural 
literature due to sector-specific interests, it has received relatively little in the health 
sector, partly due to the overriding concern with achieving rapid short-term improvements 
in public health indicators. Secondly, it has been shown how drawing on the literature of 
more than one sector can lead to the identification of alternative or complementary 
methods for carrying out empirical research. These methods may help address questions 
from a new perspective, offer superior or different functionalities and provide new 
insights. Thirdly, a cross-sector approach can be useful in helping to broaden our 
theoretical understanding and conceptual frameworks around research issues of common 
interest. For example, the emphasis on the issue of social learning effects in the health 
literature as a potential pathway to crowding-in is something that has so far not really 
featured in discussions in the agricultural input subsidy literature. In addition, the thesis 
has clearly demonstrated the challenges and limitations of targeting in both agriculture 
and health sectors, raising questions over what policy options may be available in order 
to help address these common challenges. 
 
7.4 Implications for policy 
The fourth and final research objective of the thesis was ‘to assess policy implications 
arising from the empirical findings for the design and implementation of AIS and PHPS 
programmes’. This has partly already been addressed in the discussion sections of the 
empirical chapters. This section therefore now first briefly summarises those policy 
implications before drawing upon them to propose three core principles for effective 
design and implementation of AIS and PHPS programmes. 
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7.4.1 Summary of policy recommendations from empirical chapters 
7.4.1.1 Targeting in the FISP 
Beneficiary selection 
Given the considerable challenges identified in using CBT in the FISP as a means of 
selecting beneficiaries and the limitations of encouraging open forums as a means to 
check the power of local leaders, it was argued that an alternative approach should be 
used for beneficiary selection in the FISP. A number of alternatives were discussed, 
including using a PMT approach, a combination of CBT with a PMT, or a rationed 
universal subsidy. Further detailed analysis should be carried out to investigate the 
relative benefits and costs of these alternatives in the context of the FISP, based on careful 
calculation of financial and other costs, including the challenges of accurate data 
collection. Regardless of the approach used, effective outcomes will hinge on the 
development and use of an appropriate national identification scheme. 
 
Removing opportunities for rent seeking at depots 
Findings of parastatal fertiliser outlets becoming key bottlenecks in the transmission of 
fertiliser subsidies to end users and creating opportunities for rent seeking led to the 
argument for making greater use of private sector delivery of subsidised inputs in the 
FISP, combined with appropriate government monitoring and regulation. 
 
Ensuring effective use of subsidised inputs 
From the findings in chapter 5 that some of the poorest households may struggle to make 
most effective use of subsidy coupons or subsidised inputs, the chapter suggested a need 
for greater integration with social protection measures, potentially providing the very 
poorest with cash transfers rather than, or in addition to, input subsidy coupons. 
 
7.4.1.2 Crowding-in /-out and incremental coverage 
The findings from chapter 6 highlighted the danger of subsidised goods reaching the very 
wealthiest (or more specifically those who would already purchase unsubsidised 
equivalents) in terms of the effects on crowding-out (or displacement) and undermining 
the cost-effectiveness of the programme. It was suggested that further attention could 
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therefore be given to targeting on the basis of which types of household do not currently 
purchase the products to be subsidised. However, even though up to one third of 
subsidised nets given to the wealthiest households crowded-out unsubsidised sales that 
would have gone ahead anyway, the remainder did still represent an incremental increase 
in ITN ownership. This point appears to have been lost in the AIS literature, where similar 
levels of crowding-out are viewed with great concern. This highlights the need to be very 
careful about excluding households on the basis of wealth indicators. 
 
7.4.2 Three design and implementation principles for effective input subsidy and 
public health product subsidy programmes  
Drawing on the above policy recommendations and the proposed conceptual framework 
on crowding-in / -out, three overarching policy recommendations emerge, cutting across 
the two main topics explored in the thesis. 
 
1. Target subsidised goods to those who would not purchase unsubsidised 
equivalents and explore opportunities for cost-savings through shared 
targeting registries 
It was shown in chapter 6 how subsidies reaching the wealthiest households may typically 
lead to the highest levels of displacement if they are the households that are more likely 
to purchase the goods anyway, which in turn will lower the impact a subsidy programme 
has on incremental coverage or use of the products being subsidised. There are likely to 
be considerable benefits, therefore, from making greater use of information prior to the 
implementation of a subsidy programme about the types of household that already 
purchase the goods in question. As well as helping to understand what the potential 
constraints to use are, which can guide the design of an appropriate policy response, it 
will also assist in developing targeting criteria and mechanisms for beneficiary selection. 
The implication is that targeting criteria will then be based less upon a priori assumptions 
about who should be targeted and more on existing evidence of demand patterns so as to 
maximize the impact subsidies have on increasing use of the goods being subsidised.  
In order to implement this, greater focus may be needed on how to make the collection 
and maintenance of reliable household information financially and practically feasible. 
The rapid growth of a range of targeted social protection interventions in recent years, 
such as cash transfers and public works schemes (Garcia and Moore, 2012, IEG, 2011), 
  208 
presents a number of opportunities for improving the targeting and transmission of 
subsidies in AISPs and PHPS programmes by harnessing cost-savings through sharing 
the administration of targeting activities with targeted social protection programmes. 
Given the potentially different eligibility criteria involved in different programmes and 
policies, this need not necessarily manifest itself in the provision of a single card for 
accessing different entitlements, as in India’s Below the Poverty Line card (Ram et al., 
2009). However, it could simply mean making use of shared data collection, and single 
registries or databases, allowing for greater use of beneficiary selection methods such as 
PMT that, in theory, could offer the chance for more precise targeting. While this would 
not remove the various challenges associated with PMT, such as gathering accurate and 
reliable data and keeping it up to date, it could at least make it more financially affordable. 
 
2. Ensure that targeted beneficiaries can make effective use of subsidised 
products 
Findings from chapter 5 also showed how at various stages in the FISP cash constraints 
can lead to some of the poorest households not making the most effective use of subsidy 
coupons or subsidised inputs. As was noted in chapter 6, in the TNVS too, poverty has 
been recognised as a key factor associated with non-redemption of vouchers. There could 
therefore be scope for significant improvements in the equity of subsidy transfer if 
governments were able to address these constraints, either through providing alternative 
forms of support (e.g. cash transfers) or coordinating programmes to ensure that the same 
households were also targeted with existing social protection programmes at the right 
time in order to alleviate their credit constraints. 
 
3. Make use of the private sector for delivery and retail of subsidised goods 
A number of findings in this thesis suggest that, for the distribution of partially subsidised 
products, it is important to stick to the ‘market smart’ principle of using the private sector 
in the distribution and sale of subsidised products where possible. One of the reasons 
given above is that it may help to reduce (though not completely eradicate) rent seeking 
that occurs from the bottlenecks created through the public sector. This is more likely to 
happen in places where use of the private sector results in local private sector competition, 
providing a number of sources through which coupon holders are able to procure their 
subsidised products. In terms of ensuring that products are locally available, the profit 
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incentive should go some way to encourage retailers to stock enough products in the right 
place at the right time as people require it. However, experience from the health sector 
shows that careful monitoring and regulation will still be crucial, as use of the private 
sector alone will not itself eliminate all diversion or ensure subsidised goods are sold at 
recommended prices or to the right people (Bate and Tren, 2011, Marriott, 2009). It is 
also important to ensure that, where the private sector does not currently have a presence, 
the government steps in until private outlets emerge. 
A second reason for greater use of the private sector for delivery and retail is that it would 
substantially reduce the liabilities governments face for diversion between wholesale and 
retail levels, which was found to have occurred in the FISP. With public procurement 
from the wholesale level, any diverted inputs that are resold on the private market at 
market or near market rates will then likely limit the impact of a subsidy programme on 
incremental coverage and, in some cases, could even have a negative impact on the 
private sector if it pushes prices down so far as to become unprofitable for other private 
sector retailers (Takeshima et al., 2012). It will also limit the cost-effectiveness of the 
programme. 
Thirdly, in implementing subsidy programmes, policy makers must not lose sight of the 
fact that in order to ensure continued future access to products during and beyond the life 
of a subsidy programme, there is a crucial need to ultimately focus on bringing down the 
commercial price of the products. Indeed, the high price of products is often a major 
reason for implementing a subsidy in the first instance and in both sectors even subsidised 
prices are too much for some. It is unclear how far this would be achieved on a sustainable 
basis without involving the private sector. As the case of the TNVS demonstrates, 
however, while using the private sector may be a necessary condition, it cannot be relied 
on in itself to keep retail costs low and care will be needed to look at the full value chain 
in order to see what further policies can help to bring down the commercial price of inputs 
or PHPs (e.g. trade facilitation and tax policy).    
 
7.5 Limitations of the thesis 
Limitations specific to each of the empirical chapters have already been raised. This 
section discusses a number of overarching limitations. Firstly, while the approach used in 
chapter 4 was useful in estimating inequality associated with direct benefit from subsidy 
programmes, it did not look at the socioeconomic-related inequality in terms of all 
indirect benefits (e.g. from local economy or general equilibrium effects). Similarly, the 
  210 
analysis in chapter 6 estimated household-level crowding-in /-out effects of subsidised 
products on equivalent unsubsidised products and did not cover effects on other substitute 
or complementary products, or on the supply side. These all offer areas for future 
research. 
Secondly, the quantitative and qualitative empirical work on targeting outcomes in the 
FISP has focused exclusively on beneficiary level targeting outcomes. While this is an 
area in which there was a need for an updating and deepening of analysis, there was not 
scope to also cover the important issue of area level targeting, which is a key area for 
further research. One related issue in the FISP is that the current approach to area targeting 
appears to be far from desirable from a purely economic or technocratic perspective in 
that it allocates subsidised inputs to areas without much consideration for the fact that 
certain areas have higher proportions of wealthier households or households that farm 
land which is already relatively fertile. For example, while some poorer districts such as 
Chikwawa, Nsanje and Machinga all had a poverty incidence above 75% according to the 
2010/11 Integrated Household 3 survey, those of Nkhotakota and Kasungu were below 
35% (NSO, 2012). While this does not mean that there are no poor households in the 
latter districts, or that even those above the poverty line will be able to afford unsubsidised 
fertiliser, it does serve to highlight the potential scope for further refining targeting at an 
area level. Under the current system, villages from areas with equal sized populations 
should in theory benefit equally, even if one area has a higher number of households in 
need of subsidised inputs. The major constraint on any policy changes in this area, 
however, could be the political challenge that improved area targeting can present given 
vested interests. However, such bold initiatives are essential for more effective public 
policy. 
 
7.6 Recommendations for future research 
Finally, this chapter concludes by summarising a number of key recommendations for 
future research. Firstly, having demonstrated the utility of using concentration curves and 
concentration indices to measure targeting outcomes in AISPs, these methods could be 
usefully applied to other AISPs to explore any cross-country differences that may exist 
between programmes. Where data are available, further analysis could also decompose 
inequalities in order to identify potential drivers through a quantitative framework. 
Secondly, further research into the effect of partial ITN subsidies on unsubsidised 
purchases using household demand models would be very welcome as a means of 
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comparing against the findings in this study. In particular, the findings suggest that further 
research into the relative impact of free versus partially subsidised products could be 
useful focal point for our understanding of potentially differential impacts on future 
unsubsidised purchases. However, it was noted earlier how it may be difficult to capture 
potential social learning effects through household demand models and so these issues 
should also therefore receive further attention.  
Thirdly, it was shown how the use of qualitative approaches can be useful in getting 
behind findings from the quantitative data from large household surveys, revealing new 
insights into issues such as how subsidy coupons and subsidised products may be used. 
Larger-scale qualitative research into the use of subsidy coupons and subsidised products 
would be welcome to get a sense of how each are actually used. This in turn would help 
inform choices around potential future integration with social protection measures such 
as cash transfers. Then, building on the findings of the thesis, further analysis should be 
carried out into the full costs, benefits and implications for programme impacts from 
adopting a PMT approach or rationed universal subsidy in Malawi’s FISP, including the 
options for combining resources for a shared targeting approach, linked to social 
protection programmes. 
Finally, further qualitative research would be welcome to explain household choices 
around future unsubsidised purchases in the context of a partial subsidy programme. This 
would help us to better understand the limited evidence of crowding-in. There is also a 
need to research the effects of crowding-in and crowding-out from the supply side by 
looking at how subsidy programmes are associated with the development of the private 
sector, including research into any causal relationship between subsidy programmes and 
the price of unsubsidised equivalent goods. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Search strings used for literature search 
 Database: Medline (Abstract search) (Multi-field search tab) 
1 
(Public health product or PHP or commodity or Oral-rehydration or ORS or 
Insecticide-treated or ITN or contracept* or family planning or condom or water 
purification or Iron supplement or artemisinin-based or artemisinin-combination 
or Anti-malarial or STI or sexually-transmitted or vaccin*) 
2 
(subsidy or subsidies or subsidi#e or subsidi#ed or subsidi#ation or demand-side 
financ* or voucher or social marketing or co-payment or copayment or price 
control or price ceiling or social franchi#e or tax relief or reimbursement or fee 
exemption or tax exemption or tariff removal or tariff exemption) 
3 
(developing countr* or low-income countr* or third world countr* or LDC or 
LIC or middle-income countr* or LMIC or Africa* or Asia* or Latin America or 
Afghanistan or Bangladesh or Benin or Burkina Faso or Burundi or Cambodia or 
Central African Republic or Chad or Comoros or Congo or Zaire or Eritrea or 
Ethiopia or Gambia or Guinea or Guinea-Bisau or Haiti or Kenya or Kyrgyzstan 
or Liberia or Madagascar or Malawi or Mali or Mozambique or Myanmar or 
Burma or Nepal or Niger or Rwanda or Sierra Leone or Somalia or Tajikistan or 
Tanzania or Togo or Uganda or Zimbabwe or Rhodesia or Angola or India or Sao 
Tome or Armenia or Iraq or Senegal or Belize or Kiribati or Solomon Islands or 
Bhutan or Kosovo or Sri Lanka or Bolivia or Laos or Sudan or Cameroon or 
Lesotho or Swaziland or Cape Verde or Marshall Islands or Syria* or Mauritania 
or Timor-Leste or cote or Ivory Coast or Micronesia or Tonga or Djibouti or 
Moldova or Turkmenistan or Egypt or Mongolia or Tuvalu or El Salvador or 
Morocco or Ukraine or Fiji or Nicaragua or Uzbekistan or Georgia or Nigeria or 
Vanuatu or Ghana or Pakistan or Vietnam or Guatemala or Papua New Guinea 
or West Bank or Gaza or Palestine or Guyana or Paraguay or Yemen or Honduras 
or Philippines or Zambia or Indonesia or Samoa or Albania or Ecuador or 
Namibia or Algeria or Gabon or Palau or American Samoa or Grenada or Panama 
or Antigua or Iran or Peru or Argentina or Jamaica or Romania or Azerbaijan or 
Jordan or USSR or Russia* or Belarus or Kazakhstan or Serbia or Bosnia or 
Latvia or Seychelles or Botswana or Lebanon or South Africa or Brazil or Libya 
or St Kitts or Bulgaria or Lithuania or St Lucia or Chile or St Vincent or China 
or Malaysia or Suriname or Colombia or Maldives or Thailand or Costa Rica or 
Mauritius or Tunisia or Cuba or Mayotte or Turkey or Dominica or Mexico or 
Uruguay or Dominican Republic or Venezuela or South Korea or Taiwan or 
Singapore) 
4 1 and 2 and 3 
 Database: Medline  (Keyword search) (Advanced search tab) 
5 
(Public health product or PHP or commodity or Oral-rehydration or ORS or 
Insecticide-treated or ITNs or ITN or contracept* or family planning or condom 
or water purification or Iron supplement or artemisnin-based or artemisinin-
combination or anti-malarial or antimalarial or STI or sexually-transmitted or 
vaccin*) 
6 
(subsidy or subsidies or subsidi#ed or subsidi#ation or demand-side financ* or 
voucher or social marketing or co-payment or copayment or price control or price 
ceiling or social franchi#e or tax relief or reimbursement or fee exemption or tax 
exemption or tariff removal or tariff exemption) 
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7 
(developing countr* or low-income countr* or third world countr* or LDC or 
LIC or middle-income countr* or LMIC or Africa* or Asia* or Latin America or 
Afghanistan or Bangladesh or Benin or Burkina Faso or Burundi or Cambodia or 
Central African Republic or Chad or Comoros or Congo or Zaire or Eritrea or 
Ethiopia or Gambia or Guinea or Guinea-Bisau or Haiti or Kenya or Kyrgyzstan 
or Liberia or Madagascar or Malawi or Mali or Mozambique or Myanmar or 
Burma or Nepal or Niger or Rwanda or Sierra Leone or Somalia or Tajikistan or 
Tanzania or Togo or Uganda or Zimbabwe or Rhodesia or Angola or India or Sao 
Tome or Armenia or Iraq or Senegal or Belize or Kiribati or Solomon Islands or 
Bhutan or Kosovo or Sri Lanka or Bolivia or Laos or Sudan or Cameroon or 
Lesotho or Swaziland or Cape Verde or Marshall Islands or Syria* or Mauritania 
or Timor-Leste or cote or Ivory Coast or Micronesia or Tonga or Djibouti or 
Moldova or Turkmenistan or Egypt or Mongolia or Tuvalu or El Salvador or 
Morocco or Ukraine or Fiji or Nicaragua or Uzbekistan or Georgia or Nigeria or 
Vanuatu or Ghana or Pakistan or Vietnam or Guatemala or Papua New Guinea 
or West Bank or Gaza or Palestine or Guyana or Paraguay or Yemen or Honduras 
or Philippines or Zambia or Indonesia or Samoa or Albania or Ecuador or 
Namibia or Algeria or Gabon or Palau or American Samoa or Grenada or Panama 
or Antigua or Iran or Peru or Argentina or Jamaica or Romania or Azerbaijan or 
Jordan or USSR or Russia* or Belarus or Kazakhstan or Serbia or Bosnia or 
Latvia or Seychelles or Botswana or Lebanon or South Africa or Brazil or Libya 
or St Kitts or Bulgaria or Lithuania or St Lucia or Chile or St Vincent or China 
or Malaysia or Suriname or Colombia or Maldives or Thailand or Costa Rica or 
Mauritius or Tunisia or Cuba or Mayotte or Turkey or Dominica or Mexico or 
Uruguay or Dominican Republic or Venezuela or South Korea or Taiwan or 
Singapore) 
8 5 and 6 and 7 
 Database: CAB Abstracts (Keyword search) 
9 (Agricultur* or farm) 
10 
((input or fertili#er or seed or pesticide or insecticide or herbicide or fungicide or 
irrigat* or pump or crop* or livestock or vaccin*) adj5 (subsidy or subsidies or 
subsidi#ed or subsidi#ation or demand-side financ* or voucher or social 
marketing or co-payment or copayment or price control or price ceiling or social 
franchi#e or tax relief or reimbursement or tax exemption or tariff removal or 
tariff exemption)) 
11 
(developing countr* or low-income countr* or third world countr* or LDC or 
LIC or middle-income countr* or LMIC or Africa* or Asia* or Latin America or 
Afghanistan or Bangladesh or Benin or Burkina Faso or Burundi or Cambodia or 
Central African Republic or Chad or Comoros or Congo or Zaire or Eritrea or 
Ethiopia or Gambia or Guinea or Guinea-Bisau or Haiti or Kenya or Kyrgyzstan 
or Liberia or Madagascar or Malawi or Mali or Mozambique or Myanmar or 
Burma or Nepal or Niger or Rwanda or Sierra Leone or Somalia or Tajikistan or 
Tanzania or Togo or Uganda or Zimbabwe or Rhodesia or Angola or India or Sao 
Tome or Armenia or Iraq or Senegal or Belize or Kiribati or Solomon Islands or 
Bhutan or Kosovo or Sri Lanka or Bolivia or Laos or Sudan or Cameroon or 
Lesotho or Swaziland or Cape Verde or Marshall Islands or Syria* or Mauritania 
or Timor-Leste or Cote or Ivory Coast or Micronesia or Tonga or Djibouti or 
Moldova or Turkmenistan or Egypt or Mongolia or Tuvalu or El Salvador or 
Morocco or Ukraine or Fiji or Nicaragua or Uzbekistan or Georgia or Nigeria or 
Vanuatu or Ghana or Pakistan or Vietnam or Guatemala or Papua New Guinea 
or West Bank or Gaza or Palestine or Guyana or Paraguay or Yemen or Honduras 
or Philippines or Zambia or Indonesia or Samoa or Albania or Ecuador or 
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Source: Author. No date restrictions were imposed. 
 
 
  
Namibia or Algeria or Gabon or Palau or American Samoa or Grenada or Panama 
or Antigua or Iran or Peru or Argentina or Jamaica or Romania or Azerbaijan or 
Jordan or USSR or Russia* or Belarus or Kazakhstan or Serbia or Bosnia or 
Latvia or Seychelles or Botswana or Lebanon or South Africa or Brazil or Libya 
or St Kitts or Bulgaria or Lithuania or St Lucia or Chile or St Vincent or China 
or Malaysia or Suriname or Colombia or Maldives or Thailand or Costa Rica or 
Mauritius or Tunisia or Cuba or Mayotte or Turkey or Dominica or Mexico or 
Uruguay or Dominican Republic or Venezuela or South Korea or Taiwan or 
Singapore) 
12 9 and 10 and 11 
13 10 and 11 
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Source: (Morris et al., 2007) 
1. Promote fertiliser as part of a wider strategy - Increasing fertiliser use will 
be no magic bullet; there is a need to ensure access to complementary inputs 
and focus on output markets and appropriate sequencing. 
2. Favour market-based solutions - Long-term solutions have to be market-
based and interventions should be designed to support rather than undermine 
incentives for private sector investment and market development. Public-
private partnerships may be justified as a first step towards full privatisation. 
3. Promote competition - Competition in fertiliser (input) markets is needed to 
ensure the lowest cost and best quality service. Barriers to entry should be 
reduced. 
4. Pay attention to demand - Farmers’ effective demand (determined by current 
or potential profitability of fertiliser (input) use should be the ultimate driving 
force of input supply systems and the foundation of a sustainable fertiliser 
promotion strategy. 
5. Importance of economic efficiency - fertiliser promotion should be driven by 
economic considerations and interventions should be carried out only where 
fertiliser use is economically efficient. 
6. Empower farmers – Interventions should empower farmers to make their own 
decisions on the most appropriate way to manage soil fertility in their particular 
farming context. 
7. Devise an exit strategy - Governments should not be involved in distributing 
fertiliser in the long-term and any public interventions should be designed with 
a clear exit strategy (except for a few long-run public-good functions like market 
regulation, infrastructure development, and research on natural resources 
management). 
8. Reaping economies of scale and scope - Countries should seek regional 
integration and harmonisation of fertiliser policies to reap economies of size 
and scope (especially important in SSA). 
9. Ensure sustainability - Interventions should be economically, institutionally, 
and environmentally sustainable. 
10. Promote pro-poor growth – Providing that the previous nine principles are 
followed, interventions should also aim to promote pro-poor growth. In 
exceptional circumstances, poverty reduction or food security objectives may 
be given precedence over efficiency and sustainability goals, if CSs can be 
shown to be a cost-effective way of addressing these problems. 
Appendix 2: Ten guiding principles for market smart subsidies 
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Appendix 3: Key contemporary issues, debates and questions in the literature on 
AISs 
Topic Issues, debates and questions 
Justifications and 
objectives of AISs 
There is a range of different views on what the objectives of AISs should be. Historically, 
much more emphasis was placed on raising aggregate production for self-sufficiency 
and improving overall social welfare. More recent thinking is somewhat split between 
emphasising poverty reduction, kick starting input supply industries, overcoming market 
failures, addressing environmental externalities or even as part of a policy package for 
wider economic growth and structural transformation. 
Targeting (who 
should be targeted 
and how and what 
targeting outcomes 
have been) 
There is some debate over who should be targeted by AISs: whether it is the poorest 
households, food insecure households, the productive poor or those that use inputs most 
efficiently. Given the challenges of targeting, some have also put forward the case for 
rationed universal subsidies (SOAS et al., 2008). There are also problems in terms of 
conflicting targeting objectives, arising from conflicting programme aims. Malawi’s Farm 
Input Subsidy Programme, for example, aims to ‘improve resource-poor smallholder 
farmers’ access to improved agricultural inputs in order to achieve their and national 
food self-sufficiency’ (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013a). However, targeting required for 
maximising national food self-sufficiency may be different to that which intends to simply 
improve household food-security of the very resource poor and vulnerable. 
 
A number of studies suggest that less poor households have tended to benefit more 
than poorer households in recent AIS programmes (Chibwana et al., 2012, Kilic et al., 
2013, Osorio et al., 2011, Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011, Xu et al., 2009). Unequal 
distribution of benefits has long been a critique of AISs. What remains less clear is the 
distribution of benefits after taking into account the full range of wider indirect economy-
wide effects. Policy questions remain over what is the best way to select beneficiaries 
and distribute subsidies to them. Community-based targeting has been a common 
approach for beneficiary identification though recent evidence raises questions over its 
appropriateness (Pan and Christiaensen, 2012). There are those who argue there 
should be greater use of more objective proxy-based tests, though acknowledge the 
higher costs involved (Houssou and Zeller, 2011). Others have even argued that a 
rationed universal subsidy may in some cases be most beneficial (Dorward and Chirwa, 
2013b, Holden and Lunduka, 2012b). 
Leakage diversion 
and rent-seeking 
Related to the issue of targeting are major challenges in the transmission of subsidies 
to intended beneficiaries, including scope for diversion and bribery at various levels, 
which can prevent access or raise the subsidised price paid by beneficiaries (Jayne et 
al., 2013, Mvula et al., 2011, Osorio et al., 2011). Diversion and sale of subsidised inputs 
can also undermine the private sector if it reduces demand for unsubsidised inputs 
(Mason and Jayne, 2013). 
Impacts on 
production, 
household income, 
wellbeing and other 
more indirect or 
longer-term 
outcomes. 
There is little dispute that subsidies which increase the use of inputs lead to increased 
production, e.g. (Dorward and Chirwa, 2011c, Holden and Lunduka, 2010a, Ricker-
Gilbert and Jayne, 2011). How much increased (incremental) production there is, 
however, depends on a wide range of factors including targeting outcomes, agro-
ecological conditions, whether subsidies crowd-out unsubsidised purchases that would 
have gone ahead anyway (see below), research and extension services, and favourable 
soils and weather. 
 
There is evidence that some AISs have led to increased food security and household 
incomes of beneficiaries and some evidence of increasing rural wages (Dorward and 
Chirwa, 2011c, Holden and Lunduka, 2010a, Karamba, 2013). However, other studies 
failed to find evidence of longer-term increased household wealth (Holden and Lunduka, 
2010a, Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne, 2011). A key area of further research would therefore 
be to look at the obstacles preventing further building up of assets and wealth by 
beneficiary households and the conditions under which this is more likely to arise. There 
is very limited evidence on health-related impacts of AISs. That which exists suggests 
some positive effects (Karamba, 2013). 
 
In terms of wider economic impacts, there remain significant gaps in our knowledge. 
Some evidence using modelling approaches does highlight the potential for input 
subsidies to have large welfare multipliers (Arndt et al., 2013, Filipski and Taylor, 2012). 
Dorward and Chirwa (Dorward and Chirwa, 2013a) use a partial equilibrium model of 
the informal rural economy and estimate multipliers of 1.5  and 2.5 in two different 
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livelihood zones in Malawi. In terms of staple prices, the limited evidence finds that maize 
fertiliser subsidies have had minimal impact on reducing maize prices (Ricker-Gilbert et 
al., 2013b). Part of the reason for this is likely to be due to non-complementary grain 
trade policy. However, there is some evidence of Malawi’s FISP having small but 
significant impacts on local wages (Ricker-Gilbert, 2011) and even on real wages 
(Dorward and Chirwa, 2011b, Dorward et al., 2013). 
Impacts on the 
private sector, 
including sales of 
unsubsidised 
inputs: do AISs 
crowd-in or crowd-
out commercial 
purchases? 
There has been limited investigation into the broader economy-wide effects of subsidy 
programmes on private input market development with a few exceptions (Chirwa and 
Dorward, 2013b). The main evidence has therefore tended to come from studies looking 
at whether and when AISs crowd-out (displace) or crowd-in (stimulate) unsubsidised 
commercial sales of the input being subsidised at the household level. Aside from the 
impact on the private sector, levels of crowding-out are recognised to determine the 
impact AISs have on total incremental use of the product being subsidised, the private 
input sector and cost-effectiveness (SOAS et al., 2008). Much evidence on subsidised 
fertiliser has pointed to crowding-out taking place due to weak targeting, though there is 
some limited evidence of crowding-in (Jayne et al., 2013, Liverpool-Tasie et al., 2010, 
Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011, Takeshima et al., 2012, Xu et al., 2009). There remain 
questions therefore over the conditions under which crowding-in could be further 
encouraged. 
 
One study on the effects of improved maize seed subsidies in Malawi and Zambia also 
finds evidence of crowding-out in both cases (Mason and Ricker-Gilbert, 2012). 
However, there is also evidence of growing commercial purchases of seeds in Malawi’s 
FISP (Dorward et al., 2013). 
Environmental 
impacts, including 
crowding-in or 
crowding-out of 
organic manure. 
Another longstanding debate, on fertiliser subsidies in particular, is over the potentially 
negative impacts of encouraging increased use of inorganic fertilisers. On the one hand 
it is fairly widely recognised that fertilisers are an important part of combatting lack of 
soil fertility (Morris et al., 2007). On the other, there are those who have suggested that 
overuse of inorganic fertilisers and intensive farming may lead to a decline in soil matter 
and negative environmental externalities (GRAIN, 2010). However, the evidence for this 
remains somewhat unclear and overuse is less of a concern in most LIC contexts given 
that it is substantial underuse that is the key policy problem. 
 
Given the above, an interesting question has been raised over whether subsidies for 
inorganic fertiliser crowd-in or crowd-out the use of organic fertiliser. The limited 
empirical evidence carried out in study sites in Malawi suggests crowding-in rather than 
crowding-out was taking place between 2006 and 2009 (Holden and Lunduka, 2010b, 
Holden and Lunduka, 2012a). 
Crop simplification 
or diversification?  
Whether AISs for specific fertiliser and seed encourage specialisation or diversification 
of crops has been the topic of some debate. There is some evidence to suggest 
subsidies for maize fertiliser may encourage allocation of larger amounts of land to 
maize (Chibwana et al., 2012). However, other evidence suggests that subsidised maize 
fertiliser may have actually encouraged diversification by increasing productivity and 
yields, meaning the same amount of maize can be grown on a smaller plot of land 
(Dorward et al., 2013, Holden and Lunduka, 2010b: 29, Karamba, 2013). Evidence on 
longer-term economy-wide agricultural diversification suggests that over the duration of 
the FISP in Malawi a declining proportion of landholdings were under maize cultivation 
(Dorward et al., 2013).   
Relative returns to 
AISs compared to 
other policies or 
investments 
While most current thinking recognises a potential role for AISs, a key debate centres 
on how much priority they should be given relative to other policies and investments. 
There is growing acceptance in many quarters, for example, that expenditure on AISs 
may be crowding-out necessary investments in other areas (CISANET, 2014, Jayne and 
Rashid, 2013). How to maintain an appropriate balance remains a key question and 
practical policy challenge. 
 
In order to try and quantify the returns to AISs, a number of studies have estimated 
benefit-cost ratios, though they are highly sensitive to which benefits and costs are 
included and to yield responses to fertilisers (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013a, Dorward and 
Chirwa, 2011a, Jayne et al., 2013). The desirability of AISs as a policy option relative to 
other government policies (e.g. investments in infrastructure or research and extension) 
remains a contentious issue. While some argue that other investments will yield greater 
returns, e.g. (Osorio et al., 2011), the evidence remains limited and is likely to vary with 
contexts and with the relative size and design and implementation efficiency of different 
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programmes. For example, one modelling study found input subsidies to be more 
welfare-efficient than cash transfer programmes in Malawi under certain conditions 
(Filipski and Taylor, 2012). One study estimated that returns to agricultural growth and 
poverty reduction from fertiliser subsidies in India from the 1960s to 1990s were 
consistently lower than roads and education, but varied over time (Fan et al., 2007). 
However, it is problematic to consider returns to different investments without 
considering potential complementarities and dependencies between them, and 
outcomes will ultimately differ depending on conditions and context. 
Achieving 
graduation and exit 
from subsidies 
It is generally recognised that political demands can tend to lead to input subsidies 
persisting over time even when they may not be required any longer (Osorio et al., 2011). 
Knowing when exactly they are no longer required, how to ensure beneficiaries can and 
do graduate away from subsidised inputs to full cost inputs and how to eventually exit 
from the programme remain major questions (Chirwa et al., 2011a). While the market 
smart approach and other perspectives suggest subsidies must be time limited, there is 
some lack of clarity over when exactly subsidies should be removed and what the criteria 
for their removal should be. The lack of clarity regarding duration is further complicated 
from the competing ideas of what should be the principal policy objectives of AISs. 
Source: Author. 
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Appendix 4: Key contemporary issues, debates and questions in the literature on 
PHPSs  
Topic Issues, debates and questions 
Full or partial 
subsidies: how 
to most 
effectively 
reach intended 
beneficiaries, 
especially the 
poorest and 
most in need? 
There has been much empirical analysis concerning the extent to which PHPS programmes 
have led to improvements in equity of access or use. Debate has centred on how best to 
achieve improvements in equity. Some have noted that ‘even free public sector interventions 
often fail to reach the poor’ and that ‘[m]aking greater use of the commercial sector for the 
distribution of nets could conceivably prove more sustainable and less expensive’ (Hanson 
et al., 2003: 274). However, some authors highlight the need for more rapid increases in 
coverage of some PHPs such as ITNs to achieve global targets and have shown that mass 
free campaigns can be effective in achieving rapid increases in equitable coverage 
(Grabowsky et al., 2005, Noor et al., 2007). The lure of fully subsidised PHPs might appear 
stronger in the light of recent studies that suggest even highly subsidised PHPs may still 
remain out of reach for the poorest and most vulnerable or remote (Cohen et al., 2010, 
Hanson et al., 2009, Sabot et al., 2009) and a review of 20 African ITN studies that found 
the strategies achieving high ownership and use among children under five delivered ITNs 
for free through campaigns (Willey et al., 2012).  
 
One debate relating to the use of full subsidies has been over whether or not people will use 
free nets as effectively as if they were made to pay at least a nominal amount for them. While 
Marin et al. found nets that were paid for were used more often, evidence by Maxwell et al. 
and Cohen and Dupas suggests that free nets are not used less than those that are paid for 
(Cohen and Dupas, 2010, Marin et al., 2005, Maxwell et al., 2006). Today the debate has 
moved beyond whether full or partial subsidies are better, towards the recognition that some 
combination of full and partial subsidies is likely to be most effective in achieving ‘catch-up’ 
and ‘keep-up’ of coverage over the longer-term (Baume and Marin, 2008, Grabowsky et al., 
2007, Koenker et al., 2013). Questions remain, however, over what the appropriate balance 
between the two might look like in particular contexts, and evidence suggests appropriate 
sequencing between the two will also be crucial (Snow et al., 1999). Within the catch up and 
keep up debate, recent studies have also focused on the impact that free nets may have on 
partially subsidised sales, with some studies finding no effect and one indicating they may 
reduce partially subsidised sales (Eze et al., 2014, Gingrich et al., 2011b, Gingrich et al., 
2014). 
Effective and 
appropriate 
use of 
subsidised 
PHPs 
It is recognised for many PHPs that access is very different to effective use, which is 
essential for ensuring intended health outcomes. As such, various research has recently 
looked at how subsidised PHPs have been used, whether it is adherence to a programme 
of medication (Bruxvoort et al., 2014) or appropriate use of ITNs (Hanson et al., 2009, 
Marchant et al., 2010). These findings can help provide policy guidance on design and 
implementation features that are important for effective use. 
Impacts on 
private 
provision of 
PHPs. 
Another emerging debate has been over whether the distribution of free ITNs will undermine 
commercial markets and therefore longer-term access and future sustainability (Noor et al., 
2007). It has been suggested that negative effects of free campaigns may arise either 
through the supply-side (by discouraging private sector provision in the presence of 
subsidies) or on the demand-side (by displacing commercial purchases that would otherwise 
have gone ahead, or if subsidies distort the recipients’ views on the value of the product by 
making them undervalue the actual price that they should pay in the future) (Gingrich et al., 
2011a: 162).  
 
Hanson et al. have suggested that the crowding-out of commercial sales from free or very 
low cost PHPs is likely to vary considerably by context and there may well be cases where 
subsidies instead crowd-in the private sector, especially in the presence of low levels of 
private sector development or PHP use (Hanson et al., 2001: 129). Others have suggested 
that crowding-in may arise if experience of using the subsidised PHP is linked to improved 
health outcomes in the minds of the users, in which case subsidies may stimulate additional 
purchases in the long-run and be considered an ‘experience good’ (Dupas, 2010). However, 
there remains very little empirical evidence regarding commercial crowding-out. 
Cost-
effectiveness 
An important debate within the literature concerns the level of cost-effectiveness of different 
PHPS programmes. Part of this comes out of the full versus partial subsidy debate above. 
Some studies have suggested that particular social marketing approaches can be more cost-
effective in terms of averted deaths compared to free campaigns (Hanson et al., 2003). 
There has also been a large scale review of the cost-effectiveness of different delivery 
strategies for ITNs (Willey et al., 2012). The general findings of that study were that costs 
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are largely comparable across the three main delivery strategies (partial subsidies through 
retail outlets, full subsidies through antenatal clinics and full subsidies through large-scale 
campaigns). Cost-effectiveness estimates were most sensitive to assumptions around ITN 
lifespan and leakage. 
Challenges in 
using and 
appropriate 
use of the 
private sector. 
There is a major interest in how to ensure that PHPSs delivered through the private sector 
help achieve public health goals. While it is recognised that using the private sector can help 
improve access and use, there remains limited rigorous evidence relating to their full impacts 
(Montagu et al., 2014). 
 
The recent AMF-m programme has attracted particular criticism in certain quarters. On one 
side of the debate some argue that the model has led to a significant increase in the 
availability of improved and affordable ACTs, along with crowding-out of inferior mono-
therapies (Sabot et al., 2009). On the other, critics have argued that, although there are now 
more ACTs in LICs and MICs, the model of the AMF-m programme has not always brought 
about the intended price reductions, that there has been diversion and cross-border leakage 
benefiting middlemen, that poor targeting exists including to those who do not need ACTs, 
and that globally the programme has not allocated a limited global supply in the most efficient 
way (Bate and Tren, 2011). 
 
A further criticism of the AMF-m and of PHPSs that are delivered through the private sector 
in general, is that providing subsidies in this way shifts much needed resources away from 
investing in public health care services, which may be better suited to meeting the health 
needs of populations due to the range of perverse incentives that arise out of the private 
sector being concerned primarily with profit-maximisation (Marriott, 2009). 
Source: Author. 
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Appendix 5: Studies on equity outcomes of public health product subsidies 
Study Country and 
commodity 
Measurement 
of equity 
Methodology Data Main findings 
(Njau et al., 
2009) 
Tanzania 
(ITNs) 
Socioeconomic 
distribution of 
the ownership of 
nets examined 
using an asset-
based index. 
Change in equity 
ratios over time 
was compared. 
Two stage 
cross-sectional 
survey of 
women of child-
bearing age. 
Improvement of 0.27 
(from 0.21 in Feb to 
May 2005 to 0.48 in 
June to Sept 2005). 
(Grabowsk
y et al., 
2007) 
Ghana (ITNs) Socioeconomic 
distribution of 
the ownership 
and use of nets 
examined using 
an asset-based 
index. Use was 
among children. 
Change in equity 
ratio over time 
compared. 
Two separate 
population-
based surveys. 
Slight decline of 0.06 
for ownership and a 
0.16 improvement in 
use (though this was 
38 months following a 
mass free bed net 
campaign which 
brought about high and 
equitable levels of 
ownership and use). 
(Agha et 
al., 2007) 
 
 
 
Zambia 
(ITNs) 
Socioeconomic 
distribution of a 
range of 
outcomes (e.g. 
use of nets, 
access time, 
and number of 
nets owned) 
examined using 
an asset-based 
index. 
Concentration 
indices for 
intervention and 
control districts 
are compared. 
Also examine 
distribution of 
benefits of the 
intervention 
among SES 
groups and test 
for interactions 
between SES and 
intervention 
status. 
One-off 
household 
survey data. 
Statistically significant 
lower index scores 
(greater equity) in 
intervention districts  
compared to 
comparison for range 
of outcomes, including: 
‘Access to nets in 15 
minutes or less’, 
‘Number of ITNs 
owned by household’, 
‘Usually sleeps under a 
net’. 
(Hanson et 
al., 2009) 
 
 
 
Tanzania 
(ITNs) 
Socioeconomic 
distribution of 
the use of nets 
among children 
under 1 year old 
examined using 
an asset-based 
index. 
Change in equity 
ratio throughout 
programme.  
Three 
nationally-
representative 
cross-sectional 
household and 
facility surveys 
(early, mid-way 
and end of 
programme). 
Improvement of 0.18 
from 2005 to 2007. 
(Noor et al., 
2007) 
 
 
 
Kenya (ITNs) Socioeconomic 
distribution of 
use among 
under-5s 
examined using 
an asset-based 
index. 
Concentration 
indices compared 
over time. 
 
Longitudinal 
repeated cross-
sectional 
surveys. 
Improvement of 0.281 
in concentration index 
(0.281 in 2004, 0.131 
in 2005, and 0.000 in 
2006). 
(Kangwana 
et al., 2011) 
 
 
Kenya 
(Artemether 
Lumefantrine) 
Socioeconomic 
distribution of 
receipt of AL 
among children 
aged 3-59 
months 
examined using 
an asset-based 
index. 
Test for 
interaction 
between wealth 
quintiles and 
intervention at 
follow-up. 
Cross-sectional 
household 
surveys before 
and after 
intervention. 
No statistical 
correlation between 
wealth and probability 
of receiving any brand 
or subsidised brand of 
AL on same or 
following day of fever 
developing. 
(Sabot et 
al., 2009) 
 
Tanzania 
(ACTs) 
Socioeconomic 
distribution of 
treatment 
Comparison of 
proportion of 
purchases of AL 
Repeated exit 
interviews 
before and 
No correlation between 
the SES of the 
consumer and the 
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 seeking 
examined based 
on (shorted 
questionnaire) 
concerning 
household 
assets. 
Geographical 
equity of access 
examined based 
on stocking by 
location. 
Equity of price 
paid by SES 
quintile and 
location 
examined. 
compared to 
other anti-
malarial 
treatments by 
SES. 
Comparison of 
stocking levels by 
competition 
category (based 
on number of 
nearby shops).  
Comparison of 
prices paid by 
SES and 
competition 
category. 
during 
intervention. 
likelihood of buying 
ACTs (44.4% of 
purchases by 
consumers in the 
poorest two quintiles 
and 42.4% by those in 
the least poor 
quintiles). However, 
poorer individuals 
sought treatment 
substantially less 
frequently than 
wealthier ones. 
Proportion of shops 
with 2 or more others 
nearby more likely to 
stock than those with 
0-1 competitors 
(p<0.001). 
Price paid did not vary 
significantly by either 
the SES quintile of the 
consumer or the 
competition category 
(remoteness) of the 
shop. 
(Rutta et 
al., 2011) 
 
 
Tanzania 
(ACTs) 
Uptake / 
availability by 
district 
examined. 
Comparison of 
uptake by 
geographic 
location. 
Drug register 
data from 
outlets. 
Substantial variation 
among districts in 
uptake of ACTs (10% 
of all sales in 
Kilombero compared 
to 47% in Morogoro). 
(Wang et 
al., 2011) 
 
Nepal (Zinc 
supplement) 
Socioeconomic 
distribution of 
use by children 
examined with 
asset wealth 
index. 
Used multiple 
logistic 
regression 
analysis on use to 
identify 
statistically 
significant 
predictors, 
including SES. 
Odds ratios 
calculated. 
One-off 
household 
survey. 
Children in the highest 
wealth quintile more 
likely to be treated with 
zinc than children in 
the lowest quintile 
(odds ratio=5.76, 
p<0.05). Children 
whose caregivers had 
secondary education 
or higher were also 
more likely to be 
treated with zinc 
(OR=1.76, p<0.05). 
Source: Systematic search and review of impacts carried out by the author.
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Appendix 6: Working with dichotomous variables when calculating concentration 
indices 
 
A longstanding debate has taken place over the best way of dealing with a dichotomous 
outcome variable when calculating CIs (Erreygers, 2009a, Wagstaff, 2005), though there 
is at least agreement that such variables can be used (Wagstaff, 2011). 
One of the main problems is that the bounds are no longer between -1 and 1, but depend 
on the mean value of the outcome variable (Wagstaff, 2005). This makes comparison of 
indices across countries problematic if there are large differences in the average 
outcomes. The original proposal by Wagstaff (2005) aimed to address the issue by 
normalising the CI. It was suggested this could be done by dividing the CI by the upper 
bound, which in the case of a binary outcome variable is given by 1 – μ, where μ is the 
sample mean of the outcome (Equation 10). 
 
𝑪𝑰𝒏 =  
𝑪𝑰
𝟏 − 𝝁
 
 
Equation 10: Wagstaff’s Normalisation 
 
An alternative correction to the standard CI was proposed by Erreygers, which has been 
summarised by Wagstaff (2009) as: 
 
𝑬𝒄 =  (
𝟒 𝝁 𝒃 − 𝒂
𝒃 − 𝒂
) . 𝐂 
 
Equation 11: Erreygers’ correction 
 
where Ec is Erreygers’ correction, C is the standard CI, µ is the mean of the outcome 
variable and b and a are the upper and lower bounds of the outcome variable.  
An extensive debate has ensued over which approach is most appropriate, with Wagstaff 
arguing that Erreygers’ correction may be driven more by an attempt to measure absolute 
inequality rather than relative inequality (Wagstaff, 2009). Erreygers has also criticised 
Wagstaff’s normalisation for inflating CIs in cases where mean values are high 
(Erreygers, 2009b). 
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Appendix 8: Number of households interviewed by district 
 
District AISS-1 AISS-2 FISS-4 
Northern    
Chitipa 100 120 100 
Karonga 98 120 120 
Nkhata Bay 109   
Rumphi 103   
Mzimba 119 140 140 
Central    
Kasungu 134 140 100 
Nkhotakota 120 120 120 
Ntchisi 120   
Dowa 128   
Salima 103   
Lilongwe 137 160 300 
Mchinji 120   
Dedza 160 159 80 
Ntcheu 139 140 120 
Southern    
Mangochi 172 181 240 
Machinga 139  100 
Zomba 157 160  
Chiradzulu 120   
Blantyre 126 139 140 
Mwanza 109   
Thyolo 148 143 221 
Mulanje 140   
Phalombe 120 120 80 
Chikwawa 140 140 140 
Nsanje 119   
Balaka 118   
Neno    
Total 3,298 1,982 2,001 
 
Source: AISSs (2006/07 and 2008/09) and 2012/13 FISS. 
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Appendix 9: Frequency of households interviewed by livelihood zone 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AISSs (2006/07 and 2008/09) and 2012/13 FISS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Livelihood zone Sample households 
 AISS-1 AISS-2 FISS-4 
Chitipa Maize and Millet 84 100 100 
Misuku Hills 16 20  
Northern Karonga 32 40 40 
Central Karonga 34 40 40 
Nkhata Bay Cassava 117 40 40 
Western Rumphi and Mzimba 102 40 40 
Mzimba Self-Sufficient 86 100 100 
Northern Lakeshore 178 120 120 
Kasungu-Lilongwe Plain 719 399 400 
Rift Valley Escarpment 228 120 120 
Southern Lakeshore 105 60 80 
Border Productive Highlands 114 204 80 
Shire Highlands 371 80 221 
Pirilongwe Hills 77 80 80 
Lake Chilwa - Phalombe Plain 357 180 180 
Middle Shire 251 99 100 
Lower Shire 259 14099 140 
Thyolo-Mulanje Tea Estates 168 120 120 
Total households 3,298 1,982 2,001 
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Appendix 10: Attrition and its relationship to wealth in the subsidy allocation-use 
process (2006/07) 
 
Source: AISS 2006/07. 
 
 Received at least a share of 
one fertiliser voucher 
Successfully used all 
fertiliser vouchers to buy 
subsidised fertiliser 
No reported other use for 
all subsidised fertiliser 
 % N % N % N 
All 
households 
56.2 
[53.1, 59.4] 
3298 95.7 
[94.3, 96.8] 
1817 96.1 
[94.8, 97.0] 
1760 
Quintile 1 
(poorest) 
40.5 
[35.3,45.9] 
659 94.5 
[90.6,96.8] 
265 94.4 
[90.9,96.6] 
253 
Quintile 2 55.1 
[49.1,61.0] 
660 92.8  
[88.5,95.6] 
342 97.6 
[95.5,98.7] 
329 
Quintile 3 56.9 
[52.2,61.5] 
659 96.2  
[93.5,97.8] 
367 96.1 
[93.1,97.8] 
354 
Quintile 4 62.2 
[57.5,66.7] 
660 95.9  
[92.9,97.7] 
407 97.0 
[94.6,98.4] 
394 
Quintile 5 
(wealthiest) 
66.9 
[61.3,72.1] 
660 98.2 
[95.8,99.2] 
436 97.6 
[95.7,98.7] 
430 
Male-headed 59.4 
[55.7,62.9] 
2433 95.7 
[93.9,97.0] 
1407 96.6 
[95.4,97.6] 
1365 
Female-
headed 
47.4 
[43.4,51.5] 
865 95.6 
[92.7,97.4] 
410 97.0 
[94.8,98.3] 
395 
Hh size    
1-3 
 
 
4-6 
 
 
 >6 
 
48.1 
[44.0,52.3] 
 
57.2 
[53.1,61.3] 
 
61.6 
[57.1,65.8] 
 
786 
 
 
1614 
 
 
898 
 
96.4 
[93.8,97.9] 
 
95.2 
[93.0,96.7] 
 
96.1 
[93.6,97.7] 
 
380 
 
 
901 
 
 
536 
 
95.2 
[92.7,96.9] 
 
96.2 
[94.5,97.4] 
 
98.5 
[97.3,99.2] 
 
369 
 
 
867 
 
 
524 
Land size      
Up to 0.499 
ha 
 
0.5 to 0.99 
ha 
 
1 to 1.99 ha 
 
 
2 ha and 
above 
 
50.5 
[45.1,56.0] 
 
54.1 
[50.1,58.1] 
 
61.9 
[57.9,65.7] 
 
56.6 
[50.2,62.8] 
 
689 
 
 
883 
 
 
1040 
 
 
686 
 
95.1 
[92.0,97.0] 
 
96.5 
[93.5,98.1] 
 
95.9 
[93.6,97.3] 
 
95.0 
[91.7,97.1] 
 
337 
 
 
472 
 
 
621 
 
 
387 
 
94.0 
[90.5,96.3] 
 
95.9 
[93.2,97.6] 
 
98.1 
[96.4,99.0] 
 
97.9 
[95.8,98.9] 
 
323 
 
 
458 
 
 
603 
 
 
376 
 
No livestock 44.9 
[40.9,49.0] 
1063 95.0 
[92.6,96.7] 
456 96.7 
[94.6,98.0] 
437 
Own 
livestock 
62.0 
[58.6,65.3] 
2235 95.9 
[94.2,97.2] 
1361 96.7 
[95.3,97.7] 
1323 
Northern 64.7 
[58.1,70.9] 
529 93.3 
[85.0,97.2] 
325 98.4 
[96.1,99.3] 
316 
Central 57.7 
[51.7,63.5] 
1161 97.2 
[94.9,98.5] 
655 98.2 
[96.4,99.1] 
645 
Southern 53.2 
[49.4,56.9] 
1608 94.9 
[92.9,96.4] 
837 94.8 
[92.8,96.3] 
799 
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Appendix 11: Attrition and its relationship to wealth in the subsidy allocation-use 
process (2008/09) 
Source: AISS 2008/09. 
 
 Received at least a share of 
one fertiliser voucher 
Successfully used all 
fertiliser vouchers to buy 
subsidised fertiliser 
No reported other use for 
all subsidised fertiliser 
 % N % N % N 
All 
households 
70.7 
[66.4, 74.6] 
1982 96.7 
[95.0, 97.8] 
1386 90.9 
[88.1, 93.1] 
1360 
Quintile 1 
(poorest) 
61.9 
[56.2,67.3] 
396 93.4 
[88.7,96.2] 
233 86.8 
[80.2,91.4] 
220 
Quintile 2 72.8 
[66.5,78.2] 
396 97.3 
[94.2,98.8] 
278 88.3 
[80.5,93.2] 
275 
Quintile 3 72.9 
[67.3,77.8] 
397 97.0 
[93.8,98.6] 
286 95.5 
[92.0,97.6] 
283 
Quintile 4 73.7 
[63.0,82.2] 
396 97.5 
[94.2,98.9] 
290 94.7 
[90.1,97.3] 
287 
Quintile 5 
(wealthiest) 
73.1 
[65.6,79.4] 
397 98.0 
[95.3,99.1] 
299 94.2 
[90.4,96.6] 
295 
Male-headed 70.3 
[65.4,74.7] 
1454 96.9 
[95.0,98.1] 
1017 92.8 
[89.9,95.0] 
998 
Female-
headed 
71.7 
[66.4,76.5] 
521 96.0 
[92.8,97.8] 
363 89.8 
[83.7,93.8] 
356 
Hh size    
1-3 
 
 
4-6 
 
 
 >6 
 
71.7 
[66.7,76.3] 
 
69.4 
[63.7,74.6] 
 
72.0 
[66.7,76.7] 
 
398 
 
 
958 
 
 
626 
 
95.7 
[91.5,97.9] 
 
97.6 
[95.4,98.7] 
 
95.9 
[93.1,97.6] 
 
278 
 
 
660 
 
 
448 
 
87.0 
[80.0,91.8] 
 
91.3 
[87.6,93.9] 
 
96.2 
[92.8,98.0] 
 
270 
 
 
652 
 
 
438 
Land size      
Up to 0.499 
ha 
 
0.5 to 0.99 
ha 
 
1 to 1.99 ha 
 
 
2 ha and 
above 
 
57.6  
[45.5,68.8] 
 
69.2 
[63.9,74.0] 
 
73.4 
[69.2,77.3] 
 
81.1 
[76.3,85.1] 
 
351 
 
 
521 
 
 
714 
 
 
396 
 
95.6 
[92.3,97.5] 
 
97.2 
[95.0,98.5] 
 
96.2 
[92.8,98.0] 
 
97.6 
[94.5,99.0] 
 
199 
 
 
357 
 
 
516 
 
 
314 
 
84.8 
[78.7,89.4] 
 
91.3 
[87.5,94.0] 
 
93.7 
[89.5,96.3] 
 
94.8 
[90.3,97.2] 
 
193 
 
 
350 
 
 
507 
 
 
310 
No livestock 63.6 
[57.1,69.6] 
535 94.3 
[90.9,96.5] 
323 88.2 
[82.8,92.1] 
311 
Own 
livestock 
73.5 
[69.4,77.3] 
1446 97.5 
[95.8,98.5] 
1062 93.2 
[89.9,95.5] 
1048 
Northern 78.9 
[70.6,85.3] 
380 98.7 
[95.0,99.6] 
297 96.9 
[92.7,98.7] 
296 
Central 70.2 
[64.2,75.6] 
719 96.5 
[93.5,98.2] 
482 91.7 
[86.2,95.1] 
467 
Southern 69.3 
[62.1,75.7] 
883 96.3 
[93.3,97.9] 
607 90.9 
[86.2,94.1] 
597 
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Concentration indices for households ranked by household income and 
income per capita 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. Note: For the dichotomous outcome indicators (D), 
Erreygers’ correction is used to standardise them. * Indicates CIs were statistically 
different from zero (i.e. perfect equality) at the 5% significance level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcome 
indicator 
Year Concentration index 
[95% confidence intervals] 
Wealth index Household income Per capita income 
Receipt of 
any fertiliser 
coupon (D) 
2006/07 0.20* 
[0.18, 0.22] 
0.14* 
[0.12, 0.16] 
0.10* 
[0.08, 0.12] 
 2008/09 0.09* 
[0.06, 0.11] 
-0.03 
[-0.06,-0.01] 
-0.03 
[-0.06, -0.01] 
 2012/13 0.08* 
[0.05, 0.10] 
-0.02 
[-0.04,-0.01] 
-0.05* 
[-0.08, -0.03] 
Number of 
fertiliser 
coupons 
2006/07 0.19* 
[0.15, 0.22] 
0.11* 
[0.07, 0.15] 
0.08* 
[0.04, 0.13] 
 2008/09 0.10* 
[0.08, 0.13] 
0.00 
[-0.03, 0.03] 
-0.01 
[-.041, 0.02] 
 2012/13 0.09* 
[0.06, 0.12] 
0.04* 
[0.01, 0.07] 
0.02 
[-.013, 0.04] 
Redeemed 
all fertiliser 
coupons (D) 
2006/07 0.04* 
[0.03, 0.04] 
0.03* 
[0.02, 0.03] 
0.02 
[0.02, 0.03] 
 2008/09 0.03* 
[0.02, 0.04] 
0.01 
[0.00, 0.02] 
0.01 
[0.00, 0.01] 
 2012/13 0.02 
[0.01, 0.03] 
0.02 
[0.01, 0.04] 
0.02 
[0.01,0.03]  
Volume of 
subsidised 
fertiliser 
acquired 
2006/07 0.12* 
[0.09, 0.14] 
0.07* 
[0.05, 0.09] 
0.06* 
[0.04, 0.08] 
 2008/09 0.09* 
[0.07, 0.11] 
0.02* 
[0.00, 0.04] 
0.01 
[-0.01, 0.03] 
 2012/13 0.06* 
[0.04, 0.08] 
0.05* 
[0.03, 0.07] 
0.04* 
[0.03, 0.06] 
No ‘other use’ 
of fertiliser 
(D) 
2006/07 0.01 
[0.00, 0.02] 
0.00 
[0.00, 0.01] 
-0.01 
[-0.01,0.00] 
 2008/09 0.07* 
[0.06, 0.08] 
0.03 
[0.02, 0.04] 
-0.00 
[-0.01, 0.01] 
 2012/13 -0.02 
[-0.02,-0.01] 
-0.01 
[-0.01, 0.00] 
-0.01 
[-0.02, 0.00] 
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Appendix 13: Example template of semi-structured interview questions 
Note: Module B2 shown here followed Module A on household characteristics and B1 
on coupons. Extended answer sections for other respondents (e.g. MoAFS staff) were 
adapted accordingly.  
 
MODULE B2 (extended answer section): Smallholder farmers         Person ID:_________ 
 
A7b. List any livestock owned and numbers 
CHICHEWA A7b. Munganditchulireko ziweto zina zili zonse zimene muli nazo ndi kuti zilipo 
zingati? 
 
B5. Have you heard of anyone having to pay for coupons that they were allocated this last 
agricultural season?  
x Do you know anyone personally who had to pay for a coupon they were allocated? 
x Did you pay for a coupon you were allocated? 
x If so, how much did you pay for each coupon? 
x You do not need to give specific names but can you describe who the payment was made 
to? 
CHICHEWA B5. Munayamba mwamvapo kuti wina wake amagula ma kuponi amene 
anapelekedwa muulimi wapitawu?   
x Pali amene mukumudziwa amene anagula ma kuponi yoti inaperekedwa kale? 
x Nanga inuyo munagulapo kuponi yoti inali itaerekedwa? 
x Ngati ndi choncho,munagula ndalama zingati pa kuponi imodzi? 
x Simukuyenera kutchula maina, koma mungandilongosolele kuti ndalama zinapatsidwa 
kwa ndani? 
 
B7A. (If any coupon was redeemed) How did you afford/ obtain the money for buying the inputs 
(if more than one source, note the order of importance)? 
CHICHEWA B7A. (If any coupon was redeemed) Munakwanitsa bwanji kupeza ndalama zogulira 
zipangizo(fert and seed) (if more than one source, note the order of importance)? 
 
B7C. For each coupon you did not redeem, what was the main reason for not redeeming it (fill in 
table)? 
x Were there any other reasons that made you choose not to redeem the voucher? 
x Was your personal safety ever a concern when deciding whether or not to go to the shop 
with your coupon? 
x Within your household, how is it decided what will be done with subsidy coupons? 
CHICHEWA B7C. Pa coupon ina ili yonse imene simunagwiritse ntchito kugulira zipangizo zotsika 
mtengo, ndi zifukwa zanji zimene simunagwiritse ntchito?  
x Panalinso zifukwa zina zimene zinakupangitsani kuti musankhe kuti musagwiritsire coupon 
kukagulira zipangizo zotsika mtengo? 
x Inuyo, munalibe matha pomwe munkaganiza kuti mupite kapena musapite ku sitolo ndi 
coupon?  
x Mu nyumba mwanu, mumaganiza bwanji mmene mungagwiritsire ntchito coupon ya 
subsidy?  
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‘Coupon type’ 
code (see B3) 
Coupon yanji? 
Main reason 
(for not 
redeeming)  
Chifukwa 
chake          
Other 
reason 
zifukwa 
zina 
Concern for 
safety? 
Malingaliro 
Decision-making 
(coupon use) 
Chiganizo 
     
   
   
   
 
B12. (If household did not use all of the subsidised inputs on own land) What did you do with 
the remaining subsidised inputs?  
x In your household, how is it decided how subsidised inputs (fertiliser or seed) are to be 
used? 
x What were the reasons why you chose to not use all of the subsidised inputs on your land? 
CHICHEWA B12. (If household did not use all of the subsidised inputs on own land) 
Munapanga chiyani ndi zipangizo zina zotsika mtengo?  
x Mu nyumba mwanu, Munapanga bwanji kuti muganize mmene zipangizo zotsika mtengo 
zingagwiritsidwe ntchito? 
x Ndi zifukwa ziti zimene zinakupangitsani kusankha kuti musagwiritse ntchito zipangizo 
zotsika mtengo pa munda wanu?  
 
B13. Why do you think you did not receive a voucher this year? 
x What other reasons do you know of why people did not receive coupons? 
CHICHEWA B13. Ndi chifukwa chiyani simunalandire coupon chaka chino?  
x Ndi zifukwa zina ziti zimene mumadziwa zimene zinapangitsa anthu kuti asalandire 
coupon?  
 
B14. I would like you to imagine that it is November and coupons have been given out. You are 
offered a lump sum of money either for your coupon or for the subsidised fertiliser that you buy. 
How many Kwacha do you think you would require as a payment in order to part with the coupon 
or the fertiliser?  
x Can you please explain your choice?  
CHICHEWA B14. Mungoganizira kuti panopa tili mu November ndipo ma coupon aperekedwa. 
Mwapatsidwa ndalama zambiri zote mulandire coupon kapena mugulire feteleza otsika mtengo. 
Mungafune ndalama zingati ngati malipiro kuti mugulitse coupon kapena feteleza? 
x Mungandifotokozere kusankha kwanu? 
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MODULE C: Smallholder farmers (allocation procedures)  Person ID:________________ 
 
The coupon allocation process 
C1. Can you tell me about the procedure that was used in your village in the last agricultural season 
(from Nov 2012) for deciding who should receive subsidy coupons, starting with: 
x How many meetings were held in total? 
x What happened at each meeting? 
x Who was present at each meeting? 
x What was the role of each person? 
x Of the people you mentioned were involved, who had the most influence on the process? 
And after them, who had the second most influence (and so on)? 
Mungandiwuzeko za ndondomeko imene anagwiritsa ntchito mu mudzi wa-------------------mu ulimi 
wa chaka chatha (Kuyambira mu Nov 2012/2013) pamene amaganiza munthu amene akuyenera 
kulandira ma coupon, (Kuyambira):  
x Anakumana(kukhala ndi ma meeting) kangati akaphatikiza? 
x Chinachitika ndi chiyani pa kukumana(meeting) kuli konse? 
x Pokumana kunali ndani ndi ndani?  
x Ntchito ya munthu wina ali yense inali yotani?  
x Pa anthu amene mwatchulawa, kodi inuyo munatengako mbali? Inuyo mukamawona, 
amene anatenga gawo lalikulu ndi ndani pantchitoyi? Kupatula munthu uyu, winanso ndi 
ndani amene anatenga gawo lalikulu?  
 
Meeting 
number 
(Nambala) 
What happened 
(Chinachitika ndi 
chiyani?) 
(add line between 
meetings) 
Person 
involved 
(Munthu 
anabwera 
anali ndani) 
Description of 
role (Ntchito ya 
munthuyo inali 
yotani?) 
Influence 
(ranking) 
     
    
    
 
C2. Did anyone explain to you what the criteria were to determine who should receive a coupon 
and/or how many coupons they should receive? If so, who explained this and what did they say? 
CHICHEWA C2. Kodi munthu wina aliyense anayamba wakufotokozerani choyenera kuganizira 
posankha amene akuyenera kulandira ma coupon? Ngati zili choncho, fotokozani. Nanga 
anakufotokozerani nambala ya ma coupon amene akuyenera kulandira? Ngati zili chincho, 
fotokozani ndipo anati chiyani?  
 
C3. What were the most important things that determined who got a voucher? (list in order of 
importance) 
CHICHEWA C3. Kodi munthu kuti alandire pepala logulira feteleza ndi mbewu(voucher/coupon) 
amayenera kukhala otani? (list in order of importance). 
 
C4. I understand that in Malawi female headed households tend to be less likely to receive a 
coupon and are less likely to receive such large quantities of subsidised fertiliser as male headed 
households, have you seen this happen in (name of village) and if so, why do you think this 
happens?  
CHICHEWA C4. Ndikudziwa kuti kuno ku Malawi manyumba amene wamkulu wapakhomo ali 
mzimayi, nthawi zambiri samapatsidwa mwayi kulandira ma coupon komanso samalandira 
zipangizo zotsika mtengo zambiri kuyerekeza ndi manyumba amene wamkulu wa pakhomo ndi 
mzibmbo. Kodi izi zimachitika m’mudzi muno?  Ngati zili chocho, mukuona kuti izi zimachitika 
chifukwa chiyani?  
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C5.I understand in some villages that the village head has been known to give coupons to their 
relatives. Have you heard of this happening in the surrounding villages? (If so, please explain) 
x Have you witnessed this happen in (name of village)? 
x If it happens, how can this happen when there are supposed to be open meetings to agree 
on beneficiaries?  
CHICHEWA C5. Ndikudziwa kuti mu midzi ina, amfumu a mmudzi amatchuka kupereka ma coupon 
kwa abale awo. Kodi inu munayamba mwaonapo izi zikuchitika (mdera lino?)  Nanga mmudzi 
mwa___________________ 
x Ndiye ngati izi zimachitika, zimatheka bwanji pomwe pamayenera kukhala msonkhano 
kugwirizana za anthu amene akuyenera kulandira ma coupon?  
 
C6. In the last agricultural season, was a list of villagers who were going to receive coupons posted 
somewhere? 
x If so, where and what has been the effect of this (if any) compared to earlier years when there 
was no list? 
x One of the reasons for the list was to make sure that people who were allocated coupons 
ended up getting them. Did this always happen? If not, why not?   
x Any other positive / negative effects? 
CHICHEWA C6. Mu ulimi wathawu(2012/2013), kodi ndandanda wa anthu a mudzi amene 
amayenera kulandira ma coupon unamatidwa pena pake kumudzi wa___________?  
x Ngati zili choncho, anamata pati? Tikayerekeza ndi kale lija pomwe kunalibe ndandanda wa 
anthu wolembedwa mukuwona kuti ndandandawu wathandiza chiyani? (Ngatinso 
siwunathandize, fotokozani.)(effect). 
x Chifukwa chimodzi choyikira list chinali kuwonetsetsa kuti anthu amene anayikidwa kuti 
adzalandira ma coupon alandiradi. Kodi izi zinali chonchi? Ngati sizinali chonchi, chifukwa 
chiyani?  
x Nanga pali zinanso zabwino/zoipa zimene munaziona?  
 
C7. Thinking about all previous agricultural seasons, have you ever heard of people buying or 
selling coupons in the area?  
x If yes, please can you tell me about that? 
x Have you heard or seen it happen in this village?  
x Who is it that typically sells coupons? 
x Why do you think people choose to sell coupons? 
x How common do you think it is? (1=very common, 2=fairly common, 3=fairly uncommon, 
4=never happens) 
x How has this changed in recent years (if at all)? 
CHICHEWA C7. Tikaganiza za ulimi wa mbuyomu, kodi munamvako kuti anthu akugula ndi 
kugulitsa ma coupon ku dera lino 
x Ngati eya, Chonde ndiwuzeniko za izi?  
x Nanga munayamba mwamvako kapena mwazionako zikuchitika mmudzi muno? 
x Ndi ndani kwenikweni amene amagulitsa ma coupon?  
x Ndi chifukwa chiyani anthu amasankha kugulitsa ma coupon?  
x Kodi zogulitsa ma coupon ndizochulukira bwanji?  
(1=Ndi zochuluka kwambiri, 2=Ndizochulukirako, 3=ndizosachuluka, ) 
x Kodi zogulitsa ma coupon zasintha bwanji mu zaka zamasiku ano? (Ngati zasintha) 
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C8. Thinking about all previous agricultural seasons, have you ever heard of people selling 
subsidised inputs (or buying them – in addition to any inputs they may have bought using their own 
coupons) in the area? 
x If yes, please can you tell me about that? 
x Have you heard or seen it happen in this village? 
x Who is it that typically sells subsidised inputs? 
x Why do you think people choose to sell inputs? 
x How common do you think it is? (1=very common, 2=fairly common, 3=fairly uncommon, 
4=never happens) 
x Have you ever sold subsidised inputs? 
x How has this changed in recent years (if at all)? 
CHICHEWA C8. Tikaganiza za ulimi wapitawo, mwamvapo za anthu amene amagulitsa zipangizo 
za ulimi zotsika mtengo mdera lino? (kapena mwanvapo za munthu wina aliyense akugula 
zipangizo zotsika mtengo – kuphatikizira zipangizo zawo zimene anagula kale kugwiritsa ntchito 
ma coupon?)  
x Ngati eya, Chonde tandiuzani za izi.  
x Nanga munamvapo kapena munawonako izi zikuchitika mmudzi muno? 
x Ndi ndani kweni kweni amene amagulitsa zipangizo za ulimi zotsika mtengo?  
x Nanga ndi chifukwa chiyani anthu amasankha kugulitsa zipangizo zaulimizi? 
x Kodi zogulitsa  zipangizo zotsika mtengozi, ndizochuluka bwanji? ( 
1=Ndi zochuluka kwambiri, 2=Ndizochulukirako, 3=ndizosachuluka, 4=Never happens) 
 
 
C9. I understand that sharing of coupons can often take place in villages. Has this happened in this 
village?  
x If so, who decides when someone shares their coupons with others?  
CHICHEWA C9. Ndikudziwa kuti nthawi zambiri anthu amagawana coupon m’mudzi. Izi 
zimachitika mudzi muno? 
x Kodi amene amaganiza kuti uyu agayire mzake coupon ndi ndani?  
 
 
C10. I want to understand how similar people in this village are in terms of their wealth or income. 
Which of the following would you say best describes the village (show diagram): 
1= Everyone is on the same level in terms of household assets, livestock or income 
2= Most people are on the same level but one or two are at a different level 
3= Many people are on the same level but a number of people are on a different level 
4= People are on quite different levels 
CHICHEWA C10. Ndikufuna kumvetsetsa mmene midzi imafananilana kutengera ndalama zimene 
amazipeza kapena kapezedwe. Inuyo mungati ndi chithunzi chiti chimene chikunena zowona zeni 
zeni za mudzi.  
1. Aliyense ndiwofanana mu mapezedwe kutengera katundu wa nyumba amene ali naye ndi 
ziweto kapena kapezedwe.  
2. Anthu ambiri ndi wofanana kapezedwe koma pali modzi kapena awiri mene ali wosiyana 
mu kapezedwe  
3. Anthu ambiri amapeza mofanana, koma pali anthu angapo amene amapeza mosiyana.   
4. Anthu ndiwosiyana kwambiri kapezedwe 
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C11. I also want to understand how trusting and close together people feel with one another in the 
village. Which of the following would you say best describes the village: 
1 = All people are very trusting of one another and everyone feels close ties to each other 
2 = People mostly trust one another and most people feel close ties to each other 
3 = People sometimes trust one another and some people have close ties between each 
other 
4 = People do not trust one another very much and there are not many close ties between 
people 
CHICHEWA C11. Komanso ndikufuna kumvetsetsa mmene anthu a mdera lino amakhulupilirana 
ndi mmene anthu amakahalira pafupi limodzi mudzi muno? Pa zinthu izi zomwe titakutchulireni 
apa, zimene zikunena zowona za mudzi uno ndi ziti?  
1. Anthu onse  mudzi muno amakhulupilirana kwambiri ndipo aliyense amakhala ngati a pa 
chibale  
2. Anthu amudzi nthawi zambiri amakhulupilirana wina ndi mzake ndipo amakhala ngati pa 
chibale  
3. Nthawi zina anthu amakhulupilirana ndipo anthu ena amakhala ngati pa chibale  
4. Anthu samakhulupilirana wina ndi mzake ndipo anthu samakhala ngati pa chibale.  
 
 
Benefits and problems with the FISP 
C12. Thinking specifically about your own household and this village, have you seen any benefits 
from the FISP? If so, please describe them. 
CHICHEWA C12. Kuganiza kweni kweni za nyumba yanu ndi mudzi uno, mwaonapo ubwino wina 
uli wonse (wa subsidy?) pa pulogalamu yolandira zipangizo za ulimi zotsika mtengo? Ngati zili 
choncho, fotokozani.  
 
C13. Thinking again about your own household and this village, have you seen any negative effects 
of the FISP? 
CHICHEWA C13. Tiganizenso za nyumba yanu ndi za mudzi uno, kodi mwaonanso zoipa zina zili 
zonse (za subsidy?)pa pulogalamu yolandira zipangizo za ulimi zotsika mtengo?  
 
C14. Is there anything else at all that you would like to tell me about the FISP and how it works in 
this village? 
CHICHEWA C14. Palinso china chilli chonse chimene mungafune kundiwuza za pulogalamu 
ya(subsidy)zipangizo zotsika mtengo ndi mmene imagwilira ntchito mmudzi muno? 
 
 
Thank the participant  
Zikomo kwambiri 
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Appendix 14: Sample districts in 2008 TNVS household survey 
 
Zone Region District 
Central Manyara Simanjiro 
 Dodoma Bahi 
 Singida Singida Rural 
Coast Coast Kisarawe 
  Rufiji 
 Dar es Salaam Kinondoni 
Lake Mara Rorya 
 Kagera Chato 
  Karagwe 
 Mwanza Sengerema 
Northern Arusha Arusha Rural 
 Kilimanjaro Rombo 
  Moshi Rural 
 Tanga Muheza 
Southern Mtwara Mtwara Urban 
 Lindi Nachingwea 
 Ruvuma Namtumbo 
Southern Highlands Mbeya Mbeya Urban 
 Rukwa Sumbawanga Rural 
 Iringa Makete 
  Iringa Rural 
Western Lake Shinyanga Bariadi 
  Shinyanga Urban 
 Kigoma Kigoma Urban 
 
Source: 2008 TNVS Monitoring and Evaluation report. 
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Appendix 16: IV estimation using LIML estimator (heardIV as instrument)  
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
 
                                                                              
Regressors tested:    tnvs_13m_plus
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.9600
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                               0.003
-endog- option:
                                                 (equation exactly identified)
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         0.000
                                                                              
NB: Critical values are for Cragg-Donald F statistic and i.i.d. errors.
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005).  Reproduced by permission.
                                         25% maximal LIML size            5.53
                                         20% maximal LIML size            6.66
                                         15% maximal LIML size            8.96
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal LIML size           16.38
                         (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):         30.350
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               33.330
                                                                              
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0000
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):             30.326
                                                                                    
             _cons     -.384165    .143198    -2.68   0.007    -.6648279    -.103502
             mprev     .0038721   .0005971     6.49   0.000     .0027019    .0050423
     retaildensity     .0045989   .0137389     0.33   0.738    -.0223288    .0315266
       prevpreg12m    -.0336105   .0234126    -1.44   0.151    -.0794985    .0122774
          currpreg     .0426165   .0293855     1.45   0.147     -.014978     .100211
         women1549     .0301167   .0171489     1.76   0.079    -.0034945     .063728
            over50    -.0159624   .0236314    -0.68   0.499    -.0622792    .0303543
            under5     -.020072   .0198804    -1.01   0.313    -.0590368    .0188928
           hh_size     .0440208   .0070258     6.27   0.000     .0302505    .0577911
       profservbus     .1329138    .033094     4.02   0.000     .0680507    .1977769
     headage50plus     .0301289   .0435185     0.69   0.489    -.0551658    .1154237
       headage3049     .0246158   .0329648     0.75   0.455    -.0399941    .0892258
       headage2229     .0282946   .0339199     0.83   0.404    -.0381872    .0947764
        femalehead    -.0058298   .0186819    -0.31   0.755    -.0424456     .030786
          heardPWV     .0800746   .0252333     3.17   0.002     .0306182     .129531
       hheduc8plus     .0729314   .0405792     1.80   0.072    -.0066024    .1524653
          hheduc17    -.0117998   .0182428    -0.65   0.518    -.0475551    .0239555
         semiurban    -.1159022   .0553529    -2.09   0.036    -.2243918   -.0074125
             rural    -.1757781   .0539137    -3.26   0.001     -.281447   -.0701092
         quintile2     -.020634   .0161602    -1.28   0.202    -.0523074    .0110394
         quintile3    -.0068169   .0185692    -0.37   0.714    -.0432119    .0295781
         quintile4     .0268915   .0196071     1.37   0.170    -.0115378    .0653208
         quintile5     .2805945   .0368065     7.62   0.000     .2084551    .3527339
       distmed_4x7     .0001211   .0000304     3.98   0.000     .0000614    .0001807
      totalnets12m     -.092331   .0835859    -1.10   0.269    -.2561564    .0714944
  freenet_13m_plus     .0107219    .092854     0.12   0.908    -.1712687    .1927124
      free_net_12m     -.009712   .0521075    -0.19   0.852     -.111841    .0924169
    tnvs_purch_12m    -.0268482   .0348513    -0.77   0.441    -.0951554     .041459
unsub_purch_13to36      .031845   .0898168     0.35   0.723    -.1441926    .2078827
     tnvs_13m_plus    -.0631798   .3541928    -0.18   0.858    -.7573849    .6310254
                                                                                    
   unsub_purch_12m        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                   Robust
                                                                                    
Residual SS             =  2520.667097                Root MSE      =    .6036
Total (uncentered) SS   =         3224                Uncentered R2 =   0.2182
Total (centered) SS     =  2897.893611                Centered R2   =   0.1302
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000
                                                      F( 29,  6888) =    13.23
                                                      Number of obs =     6918
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Appendix 17: IV estimation using LIML estimator (gotvouch as instrument) 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
                                                                              
Regressors tested:    tnvs_13m_plus
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.6840
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                               0.166
-endog- option:
                                                 (equation exactly identified)
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         0.000
                                                                              
NB: Critical values are for Cragg-Donald F statistic and i.i.d. errors.
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005).  Reproduced by permission.
                                         25% maximal LIML size            5.53
                                         20% maximal LIML size            6.66
                                         15% maximal LIML size            8.96
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal LIML size           16.38
                         (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):        428.795
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):              711.321
                                                                              
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0000
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):            393.395
                                                                                    
             _cons    -.3745232   .1149629    -3.26   0.001    -.5998462   -.1492001
             mprev     .0039039   .0005863     6.66   0.000     .0027547    .0050531
     retaildensity     .0039517   .0127084     0.31   0.756    -.0209562    .0288596
       prevpreg12m     -.035952   .0155105    -2.32   0.020    -.0663519    -.005552
          currpreg     .0430235    .029431     1.46   0.144    -.0146603    .1007073
         women1549     .0306707   .0171998     1.78   0.075    -.0030403    .0643817
            over50    -.0150741   .0229497    -0.66   0.511    -.0600548    .0299066
            under5    -.0217333   .0157058    -1.38   0.166    -.0525161    .0090494
           hh_size     .0444513   .0064937     6.85   0.000      .031724    .0571786
       profservbus     .1336483   .0330282     4.05   0.000     .0689142    .1983824
     headage50plus     .0289716   .0423258     0.68   0.494    -.0539855    .1119287
       headage3049      .023086   .0312437     0.74   0.460    -.0381505    .0843224
       headage2229     .0271895   .0327771     0.83   0.407    -.0370524    .0914313
        femalehead    -.0049271   .0172943    -0.28   0.776    -.0388233    .0289691
           heardIV    -.0024915    .018582    -0.13   0.893    -.0389116    .0339285
          heardPWV     .0786384   .0189861     4.14   0.000     .0414264    .1158504
       hheduc8plus     .0745624   .0388401     1.92   0.055    -.0015628    .1506877
          hheduc17    -.0124987   .0175671    -0.71   0.477    -.0469296    .0219322
         semiurban    -.1172375   .0537339    -2.18   0.029    -.2225541   -.0119209
             rural    -.1776178   .0515249    -3.45   0.001    -.2786047   -.0766309
         quintile2     -.020479   .0161501    -1.27   0.205    -.0521327    .0111746
         quintile3    -.0057632   .0167085    -0.34   0.730    -.0385113    .0269849
         quintile4     .0273498   .0191612     1.43   0.153    -.0102054     .064905
         quintile5     .2823237   .0360066     7.84   0.000     .2117521    .3528952
       distmed_4x7      .000119   .0000249     4.78   0.000     .0000702    .0001677
      totalnets12m    -.1036495   .0217579    -4.76   0.000    -.1462942   -.0610048
  freenet_13m_plus      .023058   .0267815     0.86   0.389    -.0294328    .0755488
      free_net_12m    -.0054982   .0418239    -0.13   0.895    -.0874717    .0764752
    tnvs_purch_12m    -.0233435   .0229182    -1.02   0.308    -.0682624    .0215754
unsub_purch_13to36     .0437435     .02588     1.69   0.091    -.0069804    .0944675
     tnvs_13m_plus    -.0147605   .0769314    -0.19   0.848    -.1655433    .1360224
                                                                                    
   unsub_purch_12m        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                   Robust
                                                                                    
Residual SS             =  2521.105313                Root MSE      =    .6037
Total (uncentered) SS   =         3224                Uncentered R2 =   0.2180
Total (centered) SS     =  2897.893611                Centered R2   =   0.1300
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000
                                                      F( 30,  6887) =    12.82
                                                      Number of obs =     6918
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Appendix 18: Marginal effects from second stage of control function approach 
using Poisson model 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Log pseudolikelihood = -3528.1208                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1728
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(31)   =     959.25
Poisson regression                                Number of obs   =       6918
                                                                                    
            lpuhat    -.0392846   .0815213    -0.48   0.630    -.1990633    .1204942
             mprev     .0039517   .0005606     7.05   0.000     .0028529    .0050504
     retaildensity    -.0035928   .0130564    -0.28   0.783    -.0291829    .0219973
       prevpreg12m    -.0269397   .0136865    -1.97   0.049    -.0537648   -.0001146
          currpreg     .0424935   .0233595     1.82   0.069    -.0032902    .0882772
         women1549     .0073785   .0103572     0.71   0.476    -.0129212    .0276781
            over50    -.0064856   .0196402    -0.33   0.741    -.0449798    .0320085
            under5     -.013956   .0120204    -1.16   0.246    -.0375156    .0096036
           hh_size     .0392716   .0046464     8.45   0.000     .0301649    .0483783
       profservbus      .058882   .0181542     3.24   0.001     .0233005    .0944635
     headage50plus     .0343211   .0464373     0.74   0.460    -.0566944    .1253365
       headage3049      .045015   .0378264     1.19   0.234    -.0291233    .1191533
       headage2229     .0468233   .0409385     1.14   0.253    -.0334147    .1270613
        femalehead    -.0099934   .0188265    -0.53   0.596    -.0468927    .0269058
          heardPWV     .1235536   .0256592     4.82   0.000     .0732626    .1738447
       hheduc8plus     .0575278   .0284805     2.02   0.043      .001707    .1133485
          hheduc17      .005748   .0232088     0.25   0.804    -.0397404    .0512364
       distmed_4x7     .0001599   .0000318     5.03   0.000     .0000976    .0002223
      totalnets12m    -.0893524   .0214147    -4.17   0.000    -.1313245   -.0473803
  freenet_13m_plus    -.0025209   .0361337    -0.07   0.944    -.0733416    .0682998
      free_net_12m    -.0142942   .0434701    -0.33   0.742    -.0994941    .0709057
unsub_purch_13to36     .0431927   .0234086     1.85   0.065    -.0026874    .0890728
         semiurban    -.0239373   .0224383    -1.07   0.286    -.0679155     .020041
             rural    -.0917473   .0254175    -3.61   0.000    -.1415646     -.04193
         quintile2     -.029222   .0288663    -1.01   0.311     -.085799    .0273549
         quintile3     -.004318   .0280698    -0.15   0.878    -.0593338    .0506977
         quintile4     .0563547   .0272442     2.07   0.039     .0029572    .1097523
         quintile5     .2266034   .0288329     7.86   0.000      .170092    .2831148
 tnvs12_13plus_bin     .1997548   .0663367     3.01   0.003     .0697372    .3297724
    tnvs_purch_12m    -.0493018   .0269162    -1.83   0.067    -.1020566    .0034531
     tnvs_13m_plus    -.0934565   .0804964    -1.16   0.246    -.2512266    .0643136
                                                                                    
                          dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                Delta-method
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Appendix 19: Average marginal effects using Poisson model  
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
 
 
 
 
Log pseudolikelihood = -3533.7232                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1715
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(29)   =     957.44
Poisson regression                                Number of obs   =       6918
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
                                                                                    
             mprev     .0039567   .0005569     7.11   0.000     .0028652    .0050482
     retaildensity    -.0023874   .0129033    -0.19   0.853    -.0276775    .0229027
       prevpreg12m    -.0251649   .0127134    -1.98   0.048    -.0500828   -.0002471
          currpreg      .041936   .0234376     1.79   0.074    -.0040009     .087873
         women1549     .0066761   .0102593     0.65   0.515    -.0134317     .026784
            over50    -.0078765   .0193716    -0.41   0.684    -.0458442    .0300912
            under5    -.0135635   .0118651    -1.14   0.253    -.0368186    .0096916
           hh_size     .0391808   .0045957     8.53   0.000     .0301734    .0481883
     1.profservbus      .062094   .0205193     3.03   0.002     .0218769    .1023111
   1.headage50plus     .0369658   .0496156     0.75   0.456    -.0602789    .1342106
     1.headage3049     .0454675   .0381403     1.19   0.233    -.0292861    .1202211
     1.headage2229     .0484679   .0483008     1.00   0.316       -.0462    .1431358
      1.femalehead    -.0107525    .018238    -0.59   0.555    -.0464982    .0249933
        1.heardPWV     .1033416   .0173551     5.95   0.000     .0693263     .137357
     1.hheduc8plus     .0595441   .0332951     1.79   0.074    -.0057132    .1248013
        1.hheduc17     .0063165   .0228562     0.28   0.782    -.0384809    .0511139
       distmed_4x7      .000161   .0000317     5.07   0.000     .0000988    .0002232
      totalnets12m    -.0815905   .0122246    -6.67   0.000    -.1055503   -.0576308
  freenet_13m_plus    -.0112957   .0307392    -0.37   0.713    -.0715435     .048952
      free_net_12m    -.0138927   .0432798    -0.32   0.748    -.0987196    .0709342
unsub_purch_13to36     .0351409   .0144312     2.44   0.015     .0068561    .0634256
       1.semiurban    -.0215639   .0218218    -0.99   0.323    -.0643338    .0212061
           1.rural    -.0881899   .0245578    -3.59   0.000    -.1363223   -.0400576
       1.quintile2    -.0281793   .0259213    -1.09   0.277    -.0789841    .0226256
       1.quintile3     -.006777   .0272741    -0.25   0.804    -.0602333    .0466793
       1.quintile4     .0605073   .0328056     1.84   0.065    -.0037904     .124805
       1.quintile5     .2671271   .0424159     6.30   0.000     .1839934    .3502607
    tnvs_purch_12m    -.0202333    .023229    -0.87   0.384    -.0657613    .0252948
     tnvs_13m_plus    -.0952194    .028149    -3.38   0.001    -.1503905   -.0400483
                                                                                    
                          dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                Delta-method
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Appendix 20: Double hurdle model (Hurdle one: Probit with tnvs_13m_plus as 
dependent variable) 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
  
                                                                                    
             _cons    -2.751879   .3179784    -8.65   0.000    -3.375105   -2.128653
             mprev      .011282   .0015074     7.48   0.000     .0083275    .0142365
       prevpreg12m    -.0726808   .0346207    -2.10   0.036    -.1405362   -.0048255
          currpreg     .0550863   .0642605     0.86   0.391    -.0708621    .1810346
         women1549     .0302711   .0326829     0.93   0.354    -.0337863    .0943285
            over50     -.020923    .052173    -0.40   0.688    -.1231802    .0813341
            under5      .005042   .0359171     0.14   0.888    -.0653542    .0754382
           hh_size     .0629615   .0132671     4.75   0.000     .0369585    .0889645
       profservbus     .2229716   .0573857     3.89   0.000     .1104977    .3354456
     headage50plus     .0199345   .1244391     0.16   0.873    -.2239617    .2638307
       headage3049     .1587124   .1045164     1.52   0.129    -.0461361    .3635608
       headage2229     .1661106   .1130188     1.47   0.142    -.0554022    .3876234
        femalehead    -.0378344   .0531135    -0.71   0.476     -.141935    .0662662
          heardPWV     .3731453   .0577507     6.46   0.000     .2599561    .4863346
       hheduc8plus     .1982646   .0801012     2.48   0.013     .0412692    .3552599
          hheduc17     .0729465   .0567393     1.29   0.199    -.0382604    .1841535
       distmed_4x7     .0002764   .0000777     3.56   0.000     .0001241    .0004286
      totalnets12m    -.1417406   .0318035    -4.46   0.000    -.2040743    -.079407
      free_net_48m      -.08215    .115829    -0.71   0.478    -.3091706    .1448707
      free_net_36m    -.1871621   .1914377    -0.98   0.328     -.562373    .1880488
      free_net_24m     .0933067   .1483266     0.63   0.529    -.1974081    .3840215
      free_net_12m    -.0890508   .1027803    -0.87   0.386    -.2904964    .1123949
unsub_purch_13to36     .0957693   .0442966     2.16   0.031     .0089496     .182589
         semiurban    -.2014561    .072814    -2.77   0.006     -.344169   -.0587432
             rural    -.3124443   .0784846    -3.98   0.000    -.4662712   -.1586174
         quintile2    -.0523003   .0693987    -0.75   0.451    -.1883192    .0837186
         quintile3    -.0259085   .0683104    -0.38   0.704    -.1597944    .1079774
         quintile4     .1272009   .0682227     1.86   0.062    -.0065131    .2609149
         quintile5     .5638293   .0761324     7.41   0.000     .4146124    .7130461
     tnvs12_13plus     .4765416   .1415839     3.37   0.001     .1990423    .7540409
    tnvs_purch_12m    -.1554962   .0762999    -2.04   0.042    -.3050412   -.0059512
     tnvs_13m_plus    -.3812224   .0778231    -4.90   0.000    -.5337527    -.228692
Tier1               
                                                                                    
                          Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                   Robust
                                                                                    
Log pseudolikelihood = -3647.0715                 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(31)   =     655.47
                                                  Number of obs   =       6918
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Appendix 21: Double hurdle model (Hurdle two: Truncated normal with 
unsub_purch_12m as dependent variable) 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. Note: Coefficient on tnvs_13m_plus cannot be directly 
interpreted from the output but must be estimated using postestimation analysis following 
Burke (2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                    
             _cons    -.8647546   .7115987    -1.22   0.224    -2.259463    .5299533
     retaildensity    -.0755879   .0645394    -1.17   0.242    -.2020828    .0509069
             mprev     .0054166   .0034162     1.59   0.113     -.001279    .0121122
       prevpreg12m    -.0514459   .0729433    -0.71   0.481    -.1944122    .0915205
          currpreg     .2591023   .1472094     1.76   0.078    -.0294227    .5476274
         women1549     .1197221   .0761622     1.57   0.116     -.029553    .2689972
            over50    -.0191076   .1218427    -0.16   0.875    -.2579149    .2196997
            under5    -.1203231   .0730672    -1.65   0.100    -.2635322     .022886
           hh_size     .1764047   .0315351     5.59   0.000      .114597    .2382124
       profservbus     .0874447   .1168942     0.75   0.454    -.1416638    .3165532
     headage50plus     .2688774   .2468974     1.09   0.276    -.2150327    .7527874
       headage3049    -.0994188   .1766304    -0.56   0.574     -.445608    .2467703
       headage2229    -.2929488   .1882816    -1.56   0.120     -.661974    .0760765
        femalehead    -.0139936   .1000243    -0.14   0.889    -.2100377    .1820504
          heardPWV    -.0511698    .145715    -0.35   0.725     -.336766    .2344264
       hheduc8plus     .2134184   .1794722     1.19   0.234    -.1383406    .5651774
          hheduc17    -.0144205   .1421647    -0.10   0.919    -.2930583    .2642173
       distmed_4x7     .0004014   .0001484     2.70   0.007     .0001105    .0006923
      totalnets12m    -.4197251   .0894661    -4.69   0.000    -.5950755   -.2443748
      free_net_48m     .0169521    .127586     0.13   0.894     -.233112    .2670161
      free_net_36m     .5237421   .4199188     1.25   0.212    -.2992836    1.346768
      free_net_24m        .2834   .1997399     1.42   0.156     -.108083     .674883
      free_net_12m     .0746647   .2191065     0.34   0.733    -.3547761    .5041055
unsub_purch_13to36     .0689226   .0912637     0.76   0.450    -.1099511    .2477962
         semiurban     .0865853   .1408481     0.61   0.539    -.1894718    .3626425
             rural    -.1615014   .1476805    -1.09   0.274    -.4509499     .127947
         quintile2     -.186729   .1361751    -1.37   0.170    -.4536272    .0801693
         quintile3    -.0492372   .1383906    -0.36   0.722    -.3204777    .2220034
         quintile4     .0869563   .1317676     0.66   0.509    -.1713034     .345216
         quintile5     .3623789   .1713123     2.12   0.034      .026613    .6981447
 tnvs12_13plus_bin     .7475503   .4216542     1.77   0.076    -.0788768    1.573977
    tnvs_purch_12m    -.3644227   .1320561    -2.76   0.006    -.6232478   -.1055975
     tnvs_13m_plus    -.1555996   .1352918    -1.15   0.250    -.4207666    .1095675
Tier2               
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Appendix 22: OLS estimation 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                    
             _cons    -.3803496   .1130351    -3.36   0.001    -.6019332    -.158766
             mprev     .0038802   .0005808     6.68   0.000     .0027417    .0050188
     retaildensity      .004343    .012727     0.34   0.733    -.0206059    .0292919
       prevpreg12m    -.0345026   .0149797    -2.30   0.021    -.0638674   -.0051378
          currpreg      .042774   .0295649     1.45   0.148    -.0151822    .1007303
         women1549     .0303158   .0172185     1.76   0.078    -.0034377    .0640693
            over50    -.0156235   .0229921    -0.68   0.497     -.060695     .029448
            under5    -.0206782   .0156129    -1.32   0.185    -.0512843    .0099279
           hh_size     .0441774   .0064055     6.90   0.000     .0316206    .0567341
     1.profservbus     .1331302    .033145     4.02   0.000     .0681557    .1981047
   1.headage50plus     .0297297   .0425277     0.70   0.485    -.0536378    .1130972
     1.headage3049      .024088    .031375     0.77   0.443    -.0374167    .0855926
     1.headage2229      .027919   .0329662     0.85   0.397     -.036705     .092543
      1.femalehead    -.0054949   .0173447    -0.32   0.751    -.0394959     .028506
        1.heardPWV     .0791683   .0170284     4.65   0.000     .0457874    .1125492
     1.hheduc8plus     .0735067   .0389497     1.89   0.059    -.0028467    .1498601
        1.hheduc17    -.0120707   .0173959    -0.69   0.488     -.046172    .0220306
       distmed_4x7     .0001202   .0000246     4.89   0.000     .0000721    .0001684
      totalnets12m    -.0965045   .0123305    -7.83   0.000    -.1206762   -.0723329
  freenet_13m_plus     .0152693   .0187562     0.81   0.416    -.0214986    .0520372
      free_net_12m    -.0081627   .0417554    -0.20   0.845    -.0900161    .0736907
unsub_purch_13to36     .0362177   .0170236     2.13   0.033     .0028461    .0695892
             rural    -.1765037   .0512894    -3.44   0.001    -.2770467   -.0759607
         semiurban    -.1164698   .0535509    -2.17   0.030    -.2214461   -.0114935
                    
                5      .2812259   .0359085     7.83   0.000      .210834    .3516177
                4      .0270751   .0191698     1.41   0.158    -.0105036    .0646538
                3     -.0064383   .0166356    -0.39   0.699    -.0390491    .0261726
                2     -.0205834   .0161787    -1.27   0.203    -.0522986    .0111317
      quintile_mca  
                    
    tnvs_purch_12m    -.0256582   .0229027    -1.12   0.263    -.0705545    .0192382
     tnvs_13m_plus    -.0454841   .0174246    -2.61   0.009    -.0796416   -.0113265
                                                                                    
   unsub_purch_12m        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                   Robust
                                                                                    
                                                       Root MSE      =  .60491
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1302
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 29,  6888) =   14.18
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    6918
